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Abstract
Despite recognition of the centrality of nationalism for International Relations, 
there has been comparatively little research from the perspective of this discipline 
on the way national identities are transformed through time, and on the effect 
these changes can have in relations among states. Thus the focus of this work on 
the transformation of Mexican identity in the context of the relation between 
Mexico and the United States after the end of the Cold War and within the 
framework of economic integration through NAFTA.
The main argument throughout this work is that the meaning of national 
identity is made through an interaction with the Other, interpreted by means of 
two sets of discourses: on the one hand, there are those discourses on ethnicity, 
religion and language that seek to construct a unity out of the people inhabiting a 
given territory, mainly by pointing out how they are different from those outside 
territorial boundaries. And on the other, there are the discourses on world politics, 
which reify the national state as the legitimate political unit of allegiance and 
construct ‘classificatory frameworks’ and narratives which shape their 
interactions.
Given the historical link between cinema and national identity, contending 
representations of the national identity put forward in recent films, both from 
Hollywood and from Mexico, are analysed to trace the way this process has been 
forged discursively in the Mexican case, and to assess the degree to which 
alternative narratives have become successful or failed to hegemonise a new 
meaning for the national identity.
A Post-Structuralist Approach to National Identity After the Cold War: the C ase  of Mexico
T a b le  o f  C o n t e n t s
INTRODUCTION 5
N a t io n a l  Id e n t it y  a n d  In t e r n a t io n a l  R e l a t io n s ..............................................................................................5
M eth o do lo g ic al  Fr a m e w o r k .........................................................................................................................................9
Em piric al  C o r p u s .................................................................................................................................................................14
Org a n isa t io n  o f  the  C h a p t e r s .................................................................................................................................... 19
I .  T he M e x ic a n  I d e n t i t y  B e tw e e n  t h e  R e v o l u t i o n  an d  t h e
C o ld  War
1. THE DISCOURSE OF THE REVOLUTION 27
T he Po r fir ia t o ...................................................................................................................................................................... 27
T he Re v o l u t io n a r y  St r u g g l e ..................................................................................................................................... 31
D efining  th e  Political  F ie l d ........................................................................................................................................32
Haciendas vs. Ejidos ................................................................................................................................................ 33
Foreign vs. Domestic Investment..........................................................................................................................35
Bourgeoisie vs. Peasants and Working Class....................................................................................................37
Dependence vs. Independence...............................................................................................................................40
Patriarchal Family vs. Emancipation o f Women..............................................................................................40
Legitimate vs. Illegitimate Government.............................................................................................................. 40
Individual vs. Community........................................................................................................................................ 41
Re su lt in g  S ubject  Po sit io n s .........................................................................................................................................42
The National Identity through Ethnicity.............................................................................................................43
The National Identity through Religion.............................................................................................................. 47
Equivalences and Differentiations  .............................................................................................................. 50
2. THE DISCOURSE ON WORLD POLITICS 56
Pr o d u c in g  ‘the W e s t ’ d u r in g  th e  C o ld  W a r : F re ed o m , D em o c r a c y , Pr o s p e r it y ....................... 56
The International Context.......................................................................................................................................61
The Domestic Realm ..................................................................................................................................................65
T he D isc o u r se  o n  Film ...................................................................................................................................................... 69
Negotiating The National Identity on Film 1910-1989.......................................................................................77
The Revolution as Discursive Horizon........................................................................................................................71
Class, Ethnic and Gender Diversity Become a Unified ‘We’ ................................................................................ 74
‘W e’ versus ‘They’ ..........................................................................................................................................................76
Mexico Between the East and the W est..................................................................................................................... 78
I I .  T he P o s t - C o ld  War C h a l le n g e
3. CHALLENGES FROM ‘OUTSIDE’ 89
T he C hallen g e  to  th e  E a stAVest  D iv id e ...............................................................................................................89
Producing the West After the Cold War: Development, Industrialisation, Secularism........................ 89
Ch allen g e  to  th e  Po sition  in  R elatio n  to  th e  U .S ........................................................................................ 100
The Logic o f the Supplement................................................................................................................................ lOI
Drug Trafficking Control............................................................................................................................................. 103
Illegal Migration............................................................................................................................................................ 107
The Economy: the External Debt and NAFTA........................................................................................................I l l
4. CHALLENGES FROM INSIDE’ 120
E th no-linguistic  C h allen g es to  the Id e n t it y ................................................................................................ 121
The Indigenous Challenge.....................................................................................................................................121
The Chicano Challenge......................................................................................................................................... 131
Table of Contents 4
The Linguistic Challenge...................................................................................................................................... 138
T he Relig io us  Id e n t it y  C h a l l e n g e ......................................................................................................................... 141
Contending Interpretations.................................................................................................................................. 143
A Discursive Interpretation.................................................................................................................................. 146
5. THE CHALLENGE ON FCLM: 1989-2002 152
T he V iew  from  H o lly w o o d : Repr esen t a t io n s  o f  Su pple m e n t a r t ty ...................................................153
Traffic......................................................................................................................................................................... 158
Bread and Roses...................................................................................................................................................... 165
T he V iew  from  M ex ic o : C h allenges  to  th e  Id e n t it y ...................................................................................171
Representations o f Mexico as a Member o f the Post-Cold War ‘West'................................................ 174
Challenges to the Ethnic, Religious and Political Dimensions o f the Nation........................................178
Amores Ferros (Love’s a Bitch)..................................................................................................................................178
The Crime of Father Amaro.........................................................................................................................................183
Herod’s Law................................................................................................................................................................... 190
CONCLUSIONS 196
T he M e t h o d o l o g y .............................................................................................................................................................196
T he Ca s e  o f  M e x ic o ..........................................................................................................................................................200
The Beginning: from ‘creoles,' ‘mestizos' and ‘natives' to ‘Mexicans'................................................. 200
The Revolution: from Outward-looking Modernity Seekers to Authenticity-cravers..........................203
The Cardenas Administration: Land Reform, Art and Nationalisation.................................................. 206
During the Cold War: Undecidability.............................................................................................................. 207
After the Cold War: the External Challenge....................................................................................................211
Traditional Accounts....................................................................................................................................................212
The Discursive Account.............................................................................................................................................. 212
The Supplement...................................................................................................................................................... 213
Internal Challenges to the Discourse.................................................................................................................215
The Challenge of Indigenous Minorities..................................................................................................................215
The Challenge of Chicanos......................................................................................................................................... 217
The Challenge to and From Religion........................................................................................................................219
Representations on Film........................................................................................................................................221
C o n c l u d in g  Re m a r k s ..................................................................................................................................................... 228
AFTERWORD 230
BIBLIOGRAPHY 234
W e b sit e s ................................................................................................................................................................................. 248
FILMOGRAPY 250 
ADDENDUM 252
Re c l a m a t io n ....................................................................................................................................................................... 255
A Post-Structuralist Approach to National Identity After the Cold War: the C ase  of Mexico
Introduction
National Identity and International Relations
The importance of the idea of the nation, and of the actual national states in which 
the world is currently divided —that is, national states seen mainly as power 
containers— has long been acknowledged as central to International Relations, for 
their very interactions are ostensibly the discipline’s object of study. (Giddens, 
1985: 120) The main impact of nationalism in international relations occurred 
with the transfer of sovereignty from the rulers to the ruled, which brought with it 
an “unprecedented attempt to freeze the pohtical map.” (Mayall, 1990: 35) 
Moreover, and despite the ‘supra’ and the ‘sub’-national recent challenges, the 
effects of this transition continue to shape the conununities of allegiance we 
presently inhabit, since “there is no immediate prospect of transcending the 
national idea, either as the principle of legitimisation or as the basis of pohtical 
organisation for the modem state.” (Mayall, 1990: 145)
Thus the centrality of nationalism for International Relations is 
acknowledged. But despite the abundant research both on the relationship 
between nationalism and the international system and on particular nationalisms, 
specially at times when conflict can be directly attributed to them, there has been 
comparatively httle research from the perspective of this discipline on the way 
that national identities are transformed through time, and on the effect these 
changes can have in the relations among states rather than within states.^ (Carr, 
1945; Cobban, 1969; Tilly, 1975; Tivey, 1980; Howard, 1991 Lijphart, 1977; 
Ignatieff, 1993) This might have been due to the view that such a concern would 
be more in the realm of sociology than of IR, but given the complexity of the 
objects of study of the social sciences, only an interdisciphnary approach can be 
of help at present, and the range of areas of research deemed within the scope of 
IR has accordingly broadened. Thus the focus of this work on the transformation 
of the Mexican national identity, primarily in the context of the relation between
 ^ Moreover, while there is abundant literature on European identities, and substantial research 
on Asian and African identities, there has been comparatively little research on Latin American 
identities, especially recently.
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Mexico and the United States after the end of the Cold War, an end that 
transformed the international realm and therefore called for new theoretical 
perspectives.^
So just how are national identities transformed? The answer to this 
question will of course depend on how the national identity and indeed the nation 
are defined, and on which factors are identified as constituting the conditions for 
their continued existence. Traditionally the debate on the origins and 
transformation of nations is presented, in a rather over-simplified fashion, but 
nonetheless a useful one for heuristic purposes, as a continuum. At one end there 
would be the ‘perennialists’, for whom nations have a platonic essence and thus 
they can undergo minor superficial transformations but the ‘national character* 
would not change. This belief, probably grounded on Kant’s ideas of freedom as 
self-determination and on Fichte and the German Romantics was also shared by 
Woodrow Wilson in his view of a just world order and underpinned the League of 
Nations, but it is now espoused only by the nationalists themselves. (Smith, 2003: 
11)
A less extreme view would regard the nation as “a deposit of the ages, a 
stratified or layered structure of social, political and cultural experiences and 
traditions laid down by successive generations of an identifiable community.” 
(Smith, 1999: 171) Thus nations and the identities of their peoples would change, 
according to this perspective, by the experience of the successive generations 
amounting to depositing ‘new layers’ that can only be built on previous ones, that 
would therefore in turn determine the shape and the content of the recently added 
layers. The experience of the generations is not only constrained as regards its 
interpretation —by the experience of earlier generations— but also by the pattern 
of cultural elements that make up a sense of continuity, shared memories and 
notions of collective destiny. Understood in this way, only major developments 
such as war and conquest, exile and enslavement, the influx of immigrants and
 ^In fact, O’Hagan and Fry’s characterisation of this period as, after Gaddis, “a tectonic shift” in 
the “geology” of International Relations accurately captures the redrawing of boundaries that 
the end of the Cold War implied, which in turn I claim bore profoundly on the re-definition of 
national identities. (O’Hagan and Fry, 2000: 1)
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religious conversion would qualify as factors that can account for the 
transformation of national identities. (Smith, 1991: 25)
At the other end of the debate however, we would find two opposite but 
equivalent positions. For the most extreme one, not only are national, and indeed 
all other collective identities not ‘natural’, either as eternal essences or 
superimposed layers of successive experience, but they are never even fully 
achieved. Living is not a case of being but of becoming. (Deleuze, 1990) Always 
unfinished, always in the making, identities can never really fully be. (Hall, 1995) 
Accurate as this may be, this position, if taken too far, would make all theorising 
of the transformation of national identities untenable. Thus before it can be useful 
for theorising it needs to be nuanced, complementing it with a less extreme 
position, namely the view that in the specific case of national identities, the 
‘nation’ on which they depend is a historical, modem construction. From this 
perspective, the conditions for its emergence were economic as well as social and 
political, expressed as “reaching a minimum threshold” or as the development of 
capitalism, the passage from agrarian to industrial societies coupled with the 
formation of vernacular languages and more generally of a high culture spreading 
downwards. (Hobsbawm, 1991; Gellner, 1983) The role of the nascent media, 
especially newspapers and novels, in providing the means —such as “empty 
time”— whereby it would become possible for people to think of themselves as 
having a culture in common with others they had never met and would never meet 
—in other words, of developing a national identity— and the role of the elites and 
intelligentsias engaging in nation and state-building, often for personal gain, are 
also taken into consideration.^ (Anderson, 1991) According to this perspective, 
national identities would undergo transformations when the economic, social and 
political conditions for the existence of nations outlined above in turn either 
ceased to be or became so intense as to change in nature.
 ^Benedict Anderson used Walter Benjamin’s notion of “homogeneous, empty time” to describe 
the way the 19* century novel managed to convey the idea of simultaneity, crucial to imagining 
others as partaking in die national community with the reader: readers follow the movement of 
the hero “through a sociological landscape of a fixity that fuses the world inside the novel with 
the world outside.” (Anderson, 1991: 24, 30) In cinema, the medium analysed in this thesis, the 
same effect is achieved through parallel editing, a technique often employed by early visual 
narrators of the nation such as Sergei Eisenstein and David Wark Griffith. (Howells, 2003: 183, 
264)
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It is abundantly clear that the conditions identified by ‘modernists’ are 
now changing. Some have even declared the end of modernity itself, defining 
current ‘post-modemity’ as “disbelief towards meta-narratives,” and pointing to 
the ways that reality has been replaced by “simulacra.” (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv; 
Baudrillard, 1994) Others espouse a more nuanced position, speaking instead of 
“late,” “high” or “accentuated” modernity, whose main features would be the end 
of tradition, understood as the end of the cyclical reproduction of customs, habits 
and cherished assumptions across generations, all of these crucial to nationalism; 
the separation of time and space; the disembedding of social institutions; intrinsic 
reflexivity; and pervasive risk-calculation. (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992) It is 
further argued the world economy now has for the first time “the capacity to work 
as a unit in real time on a planetary scale,” and that new electronic media foster 
communities where “the unit is the network.” (Castells, 1996: 92-93) But whether 
‘post’, ‘late’ or ‘high’ modernity, it is acknowledged that the present is in any 
case a context in which both supra-national entities, such as the European Union, 
and sub-national entities such as regions or ethnic and other minorities, pose a 
challenge to the national states that came to embody the idea of the nation, the 
states that constitute the present state system. In International Relations, these new 
conditions have been described as the globalisation of world politics.
The challenge has been succinctly sununarised by Anthony H. Richmond, 
whose model of the capitalist society or Gesellschaft is embodied in a secular 
state, legitimated by institutions and the rule of law, where public schools and 
newspapers are the main media of communication and that has nationalism at its 
heart. In other words, nationalism is the legitimating ideology of the modem state. 
(Richmond, 1994: 291) Post-industrial or Verbindungsnetzschaft society however, 
relying as it does in the service sector and specially in the exchange of 
information, where the main media of communication include satellite television, 
international agencies and computerised technologies, introduces fragmentation. 
The homogenising, or to use an image from physics, “centripetal” social dynamics 
of nationalism are disrupted, as the “centrifugal” dynamics that replace them put 
nationalism as the legitimating principle of the state under severe strain, often
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expressed through attempts at secession or integration of supranational units. 
(Ohmae, 2000: 217)
The advantage of such a focus is that it allows for the theorisation of 
transformations in national identities, a transformation that is perceived 
empirically, even if the national state does not undergo conquest, religious 
conversion or the other deep social disruptions regarded as the only 
transformative disruptions by Smith. Therefore, based on the ‘modernist’ 
framework somewhat supplemented by its more radical versions, I have used 
Mexican identity as a case study, mainly for two reasons: first, nationalism had a 
very important role in the shaping of Mexican society throughout the twentieth 
century and even earlier."^  And second, the country has recently been subjected to 
the social and economic transformations identified as relevant by the modernists, 
namely the abandonment of the aspirations to autarky inherent in every 
nationalism, the emergence of new ehtes and epistemic communities and their 
embrace of ‘globalisation’ and free trade, and the further development of the 
media of communication and transport, among others. (Mayall, 1990: 71; Smith, 
1991: 16)
Methodological Framework
This thesis subscribes to the poststructuralist tradition, within what has been 
termed, following the philosophy of Wittgenstein, the ‘linguistic turn,’ i.e. 
discourse analysis. In order to account for the methodological framework I have 
sought to apply to the empirical corpus of evidence compiled, in the paragraphs 
that follow I shall make exphcit the underlying assumptions of the thesis.
Given that the formation of national identities is mostly about the 
emergence of a ‘we’ of a specific kind,^ that can only exist as long as there are 
some ‘they’ who remain outside, or in other words, given that ‘we’ are never in a 
vacuum but always in relation to the Other, in order to trace the impact of the
 ^ Incidentally, one of the examples used by Anderson to make his point on the role of the 19*** 
century novel in the formation of national identity is precisely a Mexican one: El Periquillo 
Sarniento, written by José Joaquin Fernandez de Lizardi in 1816, during the War for 
Independence. (Anderson, 1991: 29-30)
 ^A ‘we’ whose members are bound with each other in a community of history and destiny.
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processes mentioned above in the Mexican national identity I have used a 
methodological framework that conceives of identities not as pre-existing but as 
emerging at the moment of interaction, a view thus particularly useful for 
International Relations, which “as a discipline in constant interaction with the 
Other(s)...cannot afford to be without the ability to resolve the critical issues that 
otherness and difference raise.” (Keyman, 1997: 158) At the core of this 
framework lies the proposition that any system of signification such as social 
reality “is structured around an empty place resulting from the impossibility of 
producing an object which, none the less, is required by the systematicity of the 
system.” (Laclau, 1996: 40) In other words, meaning is organised around a 
fundamental lack, socially experienced as deprivation, whose concealment results 
in the variety of discourses that, temporarily, constitute identities, that is, in 
hegemony: “for life to go on the lack must be concealed and the concealment 
hidden. This is accomplished by the production of social reality.” (Edkins and 
Pin-Fat, 1999: 6)
Two main consequences follow from such a stance. The first, is that ‘the 
Other’ is not in my theorisation merely an external outsider, but actually 
constitutive of the Self: the Self only makes sense inasmuch as it is different from 
the Other, thus were the Other to cease to exist, the Self would be meaningless. 
(Derrida, 1984; Laclau, 1996) And because ‘the Other’ with whom Mexicans in 
general and the Mexican political elites in particular interact on behalf of the 
Mexican people has at least since the revolution been the United States, I contend 
the Mexican identity and the transformation I claim has been taking place cannot 
be understood without taking into account the role of the United States in its 
relationship with Mexico and in world politics.^
The second consequence that follows from the methodological stance 
discussed above is that the importance of boundary-making procedures —that is, 
procedures that constitute the political field, by instituting difference— is 
paramount, for ultimately it is all those who become circumscribed within the 
boundaries that will thereby obtain their identity. Therefore those social practices
 ^It is of course possible to make the case that it has been Mexico that has been constructed as 
‘the Other’ in relation to the United States, given that discursively it is the marked term, but this 
thesis deals with discursive constructions from the Mexican perspective.
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that shape boundaries, and in so doing constitute their objects of study —i.e. 
endow, as it were, the basis for subjectivity— are of particular relevance here. 
(Bourdieu, 1984, 1993; Foucault, 1972) As put by David Campbell with regards 
to the state, which is also true of the nation:
“If we assume that the state has no ontological status apart from the 
many and varied practices that bring it into being, then the state is an 
artefact of a continual process of reproduction that performatively 
constitutes its identity. The inscription of boundaries, the articulation 
of coherence...can be located in and driven by the cultural discourses 
of the community.” (Campbell, 2(X)3: 57)
I here refer to the set of such practices as a discourse, creating subject- 
positions which interpellate subjects in a specific manner. (Althusser, 1971) These 
positions will be taken if appealing enough, in which case there will be a 
hegemonised political field: power giving identity, or in other words bringing into 
existence, its subjects as whatever the positions, in this case as Mexican people. 
Because all identities so conceived are ultimately the result of the exercise of 
power, they must be understood as contingent, nothing binds the subject to its 
position beyond the articulation of both performed by the meaning-making 
discursive practices. Power will thus be contested when this contingency, a 
fundamental dislocation at the heart of all identities as mentioned above, is 
rendered visible and the identities become implausible: their meaning is unfixed, 
different meanings can be given to them by weaving them into alternative 
discourses, which will become hegemonic if and when they succeed in creating 
their subjects. (Laclau, 1996: 36-46)
In sum, identity results from occupying (subject) positions created through 
the instituting of difference via the definition of antagonists, which delimit the 
political field in relations of power. These identities are more or less stable 
depending on the success with which the hegemonic project in fact fixes their 
meaning within the discourse, although an absolute fixture is ultimately 
impossible —otherwise, it would not be possible to account for change. Those 
elements which cannot be articulated and remain unincorporated, as well as the 
unforeseeable and changing nature of social reality —i.e. the contingent character
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of all discourses— continuously disrupt and unsettle the discourse in question, 
and may eventually completely undermine it, as happens at times of crisis. The 
methodology thus has a role for both the individual and the structure as mutually 
constitutive agents.
Keeping within the spirit of the thesis. The Castle of Crossed Destinies, a 
novel by Italo Calvino, will be useful to illustrate these points here. The novel is 
about a group of travellers who meet in a Castle, which is also a tavern, under 
mysterious circumstances. They have been deprived of speech, and thus resort to 
the use of a Tarot to communicate with each other. One by one, they all arrange 
their cards on the table so that they tell a story, the story of their life, which the 
narrator then retells for us readers, in words printed alongside the cards. By the 
time all participants have told their story, the narrator makes the following 
remarks:
“The square is now entirely covered with cards and with stories. My 
story is also contained in it, though I can no longer say which it is, 
since their simultaneous interweaving has been so close. In fact, the 
task of deciphering the stories one by one has made me neglect until 
now the most salient peculiarity of our way of narrating, which is that 
each story runs into another story, and as one guest is advancing his 
strip, another, from the other end, advances in the opposite direction, 
because the stories told from left to right or from bottom to top can 
also be read from right to left or from top to bottom, and vice versa, 
bearing in mind that the same cards, presented in a different order, 
often change their meaning, and the same tarot is used at the same 
time by narrators who set forth from the four cardinal points.” 
(Calvino, 1977: 41)
Leaving aside the implications of the set of cards being a Tarot, and the 
fact that through this subterfuge the author manages to recount such different 
stories as the tragedies of Oedipus and Hamlet, the myths of Parsifal and Faustus 
among others, the situation described, I would argue, can work as a metaphor for 
politics: objective reality, the ‘cards,’ are there, some naturally and others 
socially-constructed. But what they all mean will depend on in which narrative
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they are articulated/ Nothing binds the ‘cards’ either together or to a specific 
narrative, they can always be re-grafted into alternative discursive chains. When 
the ‘players’ find the narratives convincing, i.e. when they know who they are, 
they will bear the identity in question, with its purported meaning.^ The more 
subjects are brought into the discourse, the broader and more-encompassing the 
political project becomes. Power depends on, while attempting to conceal the 
lack, being able to impose the meanings that work to one’s, or rather, to the 
hegemonic group’s, advantage.^ That, in fact, would be what the very exercise of 
hegemony is all about. (Gramsci, 1971)
The assertion that there is no ultimate guarantor of truth beyond the 
collective belief in a particular hegemonic narrative is often raised against post­
structuralism, which is accused of relativism. However, “although there is no 
absolute truth, no truth apart from representation and dissemination, there are still 
contingent, qualified, perspectival truths in which communities are invested.” 
(Shohat and Stam, 1994: 179) Moreover, I concur with Richard Dyer in his 
assessment of post-structuralism as ethical since
“though often thought of as anti-humanist in its rejection of 
moralising about human destiny, [it] is in fact profoundly humanist in
 ^Being would, of course, place some constraints on how it can be articulated. Umberto Eco puts 
it as follows: “That being places limits on the discourse through which we establish ourselves in 
its horizon is not the negation of hermeneutic activity: instead it is the condition for it. If we 
were to assume that everything can be said about being, the adventure of continuously 
questioning it would no longer have any sense. It would suffice to talk about it randomly. 
Continuous questioning appears reasonable and human precisely because it is assumed that 
there is a limit.” (Eco, 2000: 50)
* This point can be further illustrated with an example from the realm of film: in The Man 
Without a Past, conflict revolves around a loss of memory. Although perfectly healthy, skilled 
and a native speaker of the language, a character is unable to function socially because he 
cannot remember who he is. The state —metonymically, through the police— launches an 
appeal through the media for clues on his identity. In a few days the state is able to tell the man 
exactly who he is, which brings about the dénouement. (Kaurismaki, 2002)
 ^ Studies on national identity from the perspective of International Relations have in the past 
benefited from interdisciplinarian approaches somewhat similar to the one I have undertaken in 
this work. In 1990 for instance, William Bloom fruitfully drew on psychology to account for 
individual identification with a group, in this case ‘the nation,’ on the basis of the advantages 
this belonging poses for the individual’s personality. (Bloom, 1990) Other psychology-based 
(Lacanian) research on national identity, while not from the IR perspective, is to be found in 
Slavoj Zizek’s “The Nation-thing,” where he defines the nation as a way in which we organise 
our collective enjoyment. (Zizek, 1992: 165)
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its stress on the human fact of the cultural construction of our lives. It 
is a political and intellectual stance that should stand us in good stead 
against any revival of ‘scientific’ politics with their well documented 
inhuman consequences.” (Dyer, 2002: 9)
While this does not settle the issue, I believe it does make a good case for 
Post-structuralist-based research.
Empirical Corpus
Given that one of the key tenets of the methodology outlined above is that there is 
bound to be a gap between reality as it is and our attempts to know it and account 
for it, “rather than to ignore or narrow this gap, as mimetic approaches do, 
aesthetic insight recognises that the inevitable difference between the represented 
and representation is the very location o f politics/* (Bleiker, 2001: 510, my 
emphasis) Thus special attention is given in this thesis to processes both of 
production and of attempts of appropriation, by the various political projects now 
contending for power, of representations of the national identity, for as Martin 
Bauer and George Gaskell state:
“The world as we know and experience it, that is, the represented 
world and not the world in itself, is constituted in conununication 
processes...social research therefore rests on social data —data about 
the social world— which are the outcome of, and realised in, 
communication processes.” (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000: 5)
And text, image and sound are the media in which these communication 
processes are in turn realised. While instances of the three media have been used 
to compile the empirical corpus for analysis in this thesis, with speeches, 
newspaper articles and academic papers featuring in all chapters, and photographs 
and painting featuring in the first and fourth chapters, it is mostly films that I have 
drawn on. There are several reasons for this choice, which range from the 
suitability of films for social research more generally and for national identity in 
particular, to the role of films in the bilateral relation between Mexico and the US. 
Let us take a look at each one of these.
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Because they are the outcome of a collective effort and because they aim 
to please a mass audience, cinematic representations are indicative of what is 
hegemonic or struggling to become hegemonic in a discourse. (Kracauer, 1947: 6; 
Chowdhry, 2000: 3) Films dramatise abstract ideas and mundane events, and thus 
participate in the setting of agendas. They mediate experience and act as catalysts 
for further debate and enquiry, including debate and enquiry on national 
belonging. (Gregg, 1988: 1-25) Cinema gives “worldviews, in the literal sense of 
the term.” (Woolen, 1998: 113) And beyond the role films have in shaping the 
structure and contents of contending discourses, the cinema-going experience is 
also a particularly effective way to interpellate an audience:
“The cinematic experience...fashions a plural, ‘mutant’ self, 
occupying a range of subject positions. One is ‘doubled’ by the 
cinematic apparatus, at once in the movie theatre and with the...action 
on screen. And one is further dispersed through the multiplicity of 
perspectives provided by...montage...Spectatorship can become a 
liminal space of dreams and self-fashioning. Through its psychic 
chamaleonism, ordinary social positions, as in carnival, are 
temporarily bracketed.” (Shohat and Stam, 1996: 165)
While spectators can produce dominant, negotiated or oppositional 
readings depending on their individual, specific circumstances, the film is bound 
to provide for them a subject-position to engage with. Film is, in this sense, a site 
for the negotiation and contestation of ideology.
With regard to national identity, a case can be made that there is a ‘fit’ 
between national identity as an object of study and cinema as the main medium in 
which it has been represented.^^ Just as, according to Benedict Anderson, the
In fact, films in many ways inherited the narrative features of the 19* century novel that 
according to Anderson allowed the nation to be widely imagined. One such feature is what 
Mikhail Bakhtin called the chronotope: “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial 
relationships that are artistically expressed in [film]...the chronotope, functioning as the 
primary means for materialising time in space, emerges as a centre for concretising 
representation.” (Quoted in Konstantarakos, 2000: 3, 7) In other words, representations on film 
can render a particular time and a particular space inseparable and simultaneous.
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development of capitalism to the stage where printed media could reach majorities 
in territorially demarcated communities partly established the conditions for the 
origins of the national idea, once this idea was established cinema became one of 
the media most actively used to engage in nation building —in fact, most national 
states developed a ‘national cinema.’ (Williams, 2002: 4) The public that could 
read the printed materials to which Anderson alludes was restricted to the 
educated, therefore if the origins of the nations in Latin America can be traced 
back to the Bolivars and the Martis, it is in fact with the invention of cinema, 
which did not require a literate public, and with the gradual urbanisation of those 
national territories that allowed access to cinema, that the national idea could 
really take root. Georg Simmel, Thorstein Veblen, Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer among others have remarked on the coincidence of “the birth of 
consumer culture and the invention of motion pictures,” and there is a recent 
approach to the study of national identity that focuses on culture and on the 
performative dimension of the national subject as the consumer of a specific type 
of culture. (Gaines, 2000: 102) And even if cinema spectatorship entailed “a very 
different public sphere from the one Hegel extrapolated from the reading of 
newspapers, it was just as effective in instituting a mode of self creation through 
membership of a media-defined community.”  ^^  (Donald and Hemelryk, 2000: 
119) Although earher conceptions of national cinema as the social equivalent to 
Lacan’s mirror phase in the formation of (national) identity are currently 
untenable, since as a social product film itself is far from being a mere direct and 
unproblematic reflecting surface, it is still possible and indeed productive to 
conceive of cinema as another representational system that constructs the sense of 
reality it simultaneously claims to represent. (Lacan, 1977: 1-7; Jameson, quoted 
by Nichols, 2000: 37; Turner, 1988: 129)
Moreover, the relation between national identity and cinema is not limited 
to the latter’s key role in nation-building throughout the twentieth century, but it 
continues to be a close one in the dislocation of national identities under
Even at present, a close relationship between cinema and the nation can be observed in film 
festivals, which continue to contribute to the reification of a world ‘naturally’ made up of 
national states by classifying films according to the country-of-production criteria. The same 
goes for film histories. (Jarvie, 2000: 76)
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globalisation. The importance that theories of the globalisation of culture ascribe 
to cinema is arguably greater than the importance attributed to other media. 
Research on reception for instance has shown that in the case of television, it is 
indigenous programmes that are usually quoted as the ones preferred by audiences 
worldwide. (Sinclair et al., 1996; Grantham, 2000: 2) Music is said to be more 
directed towards the young, thus the consequences of the globalisation of the 
music industry are shown mainly in a specific age group within a national 
population. (Levinson, 1995: 45-99) In the case of cinema however, the 
globalisation of the film industry has had an impact at the level of national 
cultures. Theorists of ‘hybridisation’ hail this impact, since they regard it as a 
mere mixing of the American culture as spread by Hollywood and the local 
cultures that appropriate it and adapt it, as part of an ongoing process of cultural 
hybridisation that has taken place ever since cultures were first in contact with 
each other. (Hannerz, 1992; Watson, 1997 etc.) On the other hand, theorists of 
‘cultural imperialism’ deplore this impact, since they stress the unequal relation 
between the dominant and the local cultures, and on this basis they do not regard 
the result of the encounter a mere ‘hybridisation,’ but rather an instance of 
imposition, thus cultural imperialism. (Mac Bride and Roach, 1989; Schiller, 
1992; Ramonet, 1998 etc.) Whether regarded as benign or as a threat, the 
influence on local cultures exerted by Hollywood films is not denied. In the 
‘reflexive’ times of globalisation, reliant as they are on the telling and retelling of 
narratives to help make sense of uprooted selves, cinema continues to be “a 
superb story-telling machine that imparts a kind of presence and immediacy to the 
world.” (Elsaesser, 2001: 1) While the story told tended to construct a national 
community, it now challenges it as well.
In addition, cinema is a particularly pertinent source of data on the 
national identity in the case of Mexico. Ever since the arrival of cinema to the 
country in 1896, the first films shot there “celebrated the nation by documenting 
its landscapes, its indigenous cultures, and the pomp and circumstance of
In Mexico some empirical evidence corroborates this claim: research on cultural preferences 
of adolescents in a variety of secondary schools in border cities found that although students 
consistently preferred and consumed Mexican television channels and programmes, and 
national radio stations and music, this was not the case for films. (Lozano, 1996: 169-176)
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President Porfirio Diaz’s extended regime.” (Garcia, 1999: 1) During the PRI’s 
own ‘extended regime,’ the film industry became central in the forging of the 
national identity, for instance by developing an indigenous star system that 
provided sources for identification, and creating a shared cultural space that 
allowed “citizens to see the national forest from the individual trees.” (Nichols, 
2000: 39) Moreover its industry has recently been described as a site of reverse 
cultural flows from the periphery to the centre. (Hannerz, 1992: 221-223) With 
regards to the relation with the United States, cinema is also a very pertinent 
source of data not only because representations of Mexicans in some Hollywood 
films are found to have changed both during the Cold War and later in line with 
the re-grafting of Mexico in alternative discursive chains as is my argument, but 
also because of the latest trends in Mexico itself, whose films during the 1990s 
tended to re-graft Mexico in those same discursive chains, and at present show 
evidence of a dislocation taking place as demonstrated in chapter five.
Finally, there is the issue of the suitability of film given the role it has 
played in international relations in general, and in the international relations 
between Mexico and the United States in particular. Hollywood films have often 
been described as “a crucial weapon” for the dissemination of American 
narratives and the implementation of foreign policy. Head of the Motion Pictures 
Export Association of America (MPEAA) Jack Valenti is even said to call 
Hollywood “the little State Department” given its close links with the State 
Department and the CIA. (Lopez, 2000: 422; May, 2000: 176, 203) Jack Warner 
of Warner Brothers reportedly declined Roosvelt’s invitation to join the 
diplomatic service stating that he thought he could “do more for American 
diplomacy with a good film about the United States every now and then.” 
(Vanderwood, 1996: 59-82) More recently, key figures in American politics did 
have a Hollywood background, such as former President Reagan, or close 
connections, as in the case of Bill Clinton. (Scott, 2000: 155-157) Politics has 
always played “a game of spectacle and idealisation...[which] Hollywood came 
to enhance.” (Scott, 2000: 6)
Films also figure in the diplomatic history of US-Mexico relations in many 
ways, which range from early disputes over representations of Mexicans to the
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widespread distribution of Mexican films in the US through the Consulates, a 
policy which contributed to fostering the cultural identification of the Chicano 
community. (De Los Reyes, 1996: 26-35; Fein, 1996: 43-58) More recently, 
during the Zedillo administration, it was a former ambassador, Jorge Alberto 
Lozoya, who was Head of the Mexican Film Institute (IMCINE), and cultural 
attachés in Mexican embassies around the world have made it part of their pohcy 
to make Mexican films accessible for the general public.
Last but not least, the support of film studies, very rarely used in IR other 
than for teaching purposes, is also in line with the interdisciplinary approach that 
informs this thesis.
Organisation of the Chapters
In this work, I claim that the heterogeneous group who came to power in Mexico 
as a result of the revolution and who subsequently became the ruling elite 
hegemonised the political field through the construction of a discourse that 
revolved around the revolution itself, a convenient empty signifier whose fields of 
meaning or ‘moments’ proved rather stable for over seventy years partly due to 
the fact that it was circumscribed within the broader political discourse of the 
East/West and later the Cold War divide, but which have since been grossly 
dislocated. The extent to which this project was successful is evidenced in the 
status of the discourse about the revolution, which in recent research has been 
described as a mystique:
“Mystical discourse can be understood as an ordering of 
representations of the origins, the sense and transcendence of 
collective identities in history...the Mexican revolutionary discourse 
was constituted as a mystical system of representations providing a
Important exceptions to this are the work of James Der Derian on Hollywood films and their 
relation to security studies, and also the work of Michael Shapiro, who not only has made use of 
films to engage in a critique of International Relations that he describes as “Kantian” in spirit, 
but who regards cinema, under a Deleuzan approach, to be such a promising avenue of research 
as to attempt to extend its features to political thought itself: ‘Through its cuts, juxtapositions, 
and the temporal trajectories of its images, cinematic writing-as-critical-thought assembles an 
alternative perspective to those narrations that support the coherences of bounded individual and 
other collective identities.” (Der Derian, 1992; Shapiro, 1999: 1, 7)
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strong sense of belonging, unity and commitment.” (Buenfil, 2000:
88)
The revolution is identified as an empty signifier insofar as it stood for a 
lack, insofar as it meant nothing in itself but summarised that which was 
perceived as missing, a surface of inscriptions for the aspired social cures to what 
Connolly describes as “the fundamental unfairness of life.” (Connolly, 1991: 1) In 
other words, “although the fullness and universality of society is unachievable, its 
need does not disappear: it will always show itself through the presence of its 
absence.” (Laclau, 1996: 53) Upon its triumph, the revolution provided new 
images of identification for the population, whose representations in literature, 
painting, music, films, the creation of ‘traditions’ and political agendas for various 
groups all became practices that actively shaped the discourse of what it meant to 
be Mexican. Parallel to these internal developments, the discourse on world 
politics that prevailed during the Cold War also constructed a place for ‘Mexico’ 
which bore directly on the construction of the national identity. This process is 
sketched in the first part of the thesis, whose main aim is to set the background of 
what the national identity in question meant, an identity which I argue has been 
challenged. Chapter one provides a historical background, while chapter two deals 
with the way the discourse on world politics during those years also shaped 
national identity. This part concludes with a section on films, which provide 
evidence for all claims made.
In the second part of the thesis, on chapter three entitled “Challenges from 
‘Outside,’” I argue that, when the sets of oppositions that delimited the political 
field of world politics during the Cold War, namely the opposition between the 
West and the East —the former meaning freedom, democracy and prosperity, 
while the latter meant planning, totalitarianism and poverty— collapsed, the 
boundaries whereby the Mexican identity had been constructed in exclusion as a 
member of the Third World also collapsed. The main reason, as I contend in 
chapter two, is that the group in power, the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), had throughout the Cold War successfully deployed an undecidable 
identity, one which in some discourses constructed Mexico, alluding to its cultural 
heritage, its post-war period of growth characterised as the ‘Mexican miracle’ and
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its civilian government which held elections and changed of Head every six years, 
as part of the West, while in other discourses this identity was expressed as 
Eastern: Mexico was a country which had had a revolution, it was heavily in debt 
and plagued by gross inequality and despite its punctually held elections it was 
effectively a one Party system. This undecidability, I argue, enabled the regime to 
supply an answer to the question ‘who are we’ under most circumstances that 
arose in international politics.
This changed, however, when the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving it 
seemed only the Western option available, indeed not only for Mexico but all over 
the world. The neohberal team who came to power in those days, although still 
under the auspices of the PRI, had to ‘decide’ the Mexican identity. The most 
important change involved a re-definition of what Mexico meant in relation to the 
United States, always central to discourses on world politics but for historical and 
geographical reasons very acutely so in the case of Mexico. I contend that from 
the end of the Cold War onwards, there was an attempt to re-graft the meaning of 
Mexicanity in such a way that it would become the supplement, rather than the 
antagonist, to the United States, a process which was only interrupted after 
September 11^ 2001. This attempt was made by framing key issues of the 
bilateral relation, specifically drug trafficking control, illegal migration and 
economic integration, into discourses that constructed them not as problems but as 
opportunities for co-operation and evidence of complementarity. The key signifier 
became “North-America,” an economic and possibly political unit to be forged 
together with Canada, to which the signing of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement was crucial. My claim is not that, with the help of American business 
and political elites, Mexican elites were seeking to make ‘North-Americans’ out 
of Mexicans, in a manner similar to those nationalists who famously engaged into 
making ‘nationals’ out of ‘peasants.M exicans would still be Mexican, but
While various authors have theorised the emergence of regional identities of different sorts as 
co-existing with and even undermining traditional national identities —see for instance Kenichi 
Ohmae’s ideas of region-states based on the existence of ‘single economic units,’ such as 
“Mexamerica” or Samuel L, Huntington’s ‘civilisations’ which behave as ‘civilisational 
states’— I concur with John W. Meyer et al. that “world-cultural principles license the nation- 
sate not only as a managing central authority, but also as an identity-supplying [entity].” 
(Ohmae, 1995; Huntington, 1993; Meyer et al., 2004: 89)
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encompassed within a newly emerging North-American region, what being 
Mexican meant from the end of the Cold War on, was open not only to debate, but 
to actual construction. Evidence for this is provided in chapter five, “The 
Challenge on Film.”
In chapter four “Challenges from ‘Inside,’” I deal, on the one hand, with 
the ethnic, linguistic and religious identities, since it is usually the interplay of 
these that, when in conjunction with a specific territorial space —and also in 
conjunction, I would argue, with specific discourses on world politics— mark the 
national identity. (Smith, 1991) And on the other hand, I deal with the political 
system that continuously interpellated people as Mexican. Ethnicity, on which the 
image of the nation as an extended family so heavily relies, is discussed first. 
Here I argue that the mestizo as the ethnic basis of the nation has been challenged 
by the dislocation in the discourse, and that as a result of this the Zapatista 
National Liberation Army EZLN, which later became a political movement, 
emerged and up to a point succeeded. Drawing on the work of Laclau on 
populism as a mode of articulation I further contend that the importance of 
Zapatismo resides overall in the possibilities it offers for the re-articulation of a 
nationalist discourse while excluding the former elite from power. (Laclau, 
forthcoming) But the challenge to the discursively-constructed ethnic identity is 
not only obvious in the sudden re-emergence of indigenous identities that had 
been formerly concealed under class identities. It is now evident in the equally 
sudden re-appraisal of Chicanos, those Mexican-Americans that remained ‘under 
erasure’ —and thus all the more present— in the earlier discourse, but who have 
now come to embody the new ethnic ideal for a mythical national identity. While 
a reappraisal of the Chicano population in the US is evident in most films 
discussed in chapter five, contemporary Chicano art is discussed in this chapter, 
as it deals with the reappraisal of Chicanos by Chicanos themselves and by 
Mexicans.
Apart from the nation as an ‘extended family’ and its foregrounding of 
ethnicity, nationalism as an ideology has also been described as a ‘secular 
religion’ in which the nation has replaced God, thus the totalitarian potential in 
every nationalism. (Kedouri, 1960) Indeed, links between religion and
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nationalism may be traced back to the “god of the land” and the “god of the 
lineage,” early markers that demarcated territory. (Grosby, 2001: 103) Like 
religion, nationalism “plays on the atavistic sentiments of the masses and shares 
with chiliastic religions similar populist and messianic features, as well as similar 
techniques of mass mobilisation.” (Smith, 2003: 13) And just as the modem state 
relies on nationalism as the ideology on which it draws legitimacy as mentioned 
above, the pre-modem, feudal state or Gemeinschaft of overlapping territorial 
authorities drew on religion. (Richmond, 1994: 290) But the decline of religion 
that came with the Enlightenment made it increasingly difficult for “God” to 
continue to be the organising principle of society. In other words, a discourse of 
faith was superseded by a discourse of rationalism that rendered former beliefs 
unconvincing and made it impossible for ‘God’ to conceal the lack. The nation 
became instead the way to have dignity restored, through its appeal to a Golden 
Age, and cmcially, it also offered a way to transcend oblivion through posterity, 
with its linking of generations, surmounting the finality of death. (Smith, 1991: 
161) Thus the ‘tme Church’ became equated with the nation, which, in some 
cases such as Bolshevism and Fascism, became equated with the leader of the 
Party. (Grosby, 2001: 104)
Because Christianity has long recognised the rights of Caesar to mle over 
this-worldly affairs, it has been relatively easily accommodated into a symbiotic 
relation with many nationalisms despite its aspirations to universality. In the case 
of Mexico, Catholicism became key for the national identity through the syncretic 
practices of which the Virgin of Guadalupe is the most obvious and relevant 
example. However, the nationalist project espoused by the revolutionaries, 
following Marxist and Weberian ideas about the relationship between religion and 
the economy, sought at first to promote Protestantism rather than Catholicism, and 
only settled in an uneasy but mutually beneficial relation with the Vatican after 
the Cristera War. Catholicism remained crucial for the national identity, and any 
attempt to re-cast it as North-American would involve either its direct 
undermining to the benefit of Protestantism or Laicism, or at least the 
undermining of those Catholic symbols that represent the national identity, 
specially the Virgin of Guadalupe.
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However the newly emerging projects have been attempting to articulate 
different versions of the Catholic religion into their contending discourses. The 
Catholic Church is itself in crisis, and although the upper hierarchy has lost much 
legitimacy, the popularity of liberation theology has continued to grow in some 
areas. The result of this has been the signifier ‘the Church’ splitting into at least 
two different signifieds, each being put forward by the group now in power and 
‘the opposition’ loosely termed respectively. Therefore religion continues to be a 
source of discontinuity. Overall, the picture that emerges is one of a dislocation 
and of rival discourses contending to become hegemonic, without any one of them 
being as yet able to become the equivalent of what the discourse of the revolution 
was in the twentieth century. This failure is also partly due to the lack of a broader 
discourse on world politics that is equivalent to the one that prevailed during the 
Cold War.
Having theorised challenges from ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ evidence is again 
provided through the analysis of representations from the realm of film. In chapter 
five, in The View from Hollywood, the re-interpretation of issues in the bilateral 
agenda in such a way that they place Mexico in a relation of supplementarity to 
the US rather than in a relation of antagonism with it is discussed through films by 
Chicanos and Mexican directors, and also through the mainstream Traffic, by 
Steven Sodenbergh (2000) and Bread and Roses by British director Ken Loach 
(2000), on drug trafficking and migration respectively. As for Mexico, the series 
of comedies that in the 1990s depicted Mexico as naturally belonging in the West 
and the films that sought to undermine the regime of the PRI by interrogating the 
national identity on which it based its hegemony are discussed. Herod's Law is a 
devastating critique of post-revolutionary Mexican politics, while The Crime of 
Father Amaro is a somewhat more ambiguous, but equally influential critique of 
the Mexican Catholic hierarchy and thus of some of the religious —institutional— 
dimensions of the national identity. (Estrada, 2000; Carrera, 2002) Finally, 
Amores Perros {Love’s a Bitch), a story described by screenwriter Guillermo 
Arriaga as one of “Cain against Cain,” undermines the myth of the extended 
family as the ethnic basis of the nation, although the writer stated as his intention 
that of making a plea for fraternal restoration. (Gonzalez: 2001; Mateos: 2000)
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Finally, the conclusion recapitulates the main arguments made and offers 
some concluding remarks on the application of this methodology to the study of 
national identities from the perspective of International Relations.
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The Discourse of the Revolution 
The Porfiriato
Mexico began its twentieth century in 1910, with a revolution that overthrew the 
thirty-year old dictatorship of General Porfirio Diaz (1876-80 and 1884-1911). It 
had been an independent nation for only a hundred years, and during this time it 
had managed to survive the politically unstable period of its birth, roughly 
characterised by the struggle between liberal and conservative forces that pushed 
for a republican and a monarchical project respectively, as well as two foreign 
interventions, albeit keeping just about half the original territory.
The Diaz regime, known as the Porfiriato, had been a period of great 
stability and economic growth, based mainly on the land, whose possession was 
concentrated in a few families that became wealthy through agriculture and 
mining. In 1910, when the total population of Mexico was ten million, 830 estate 
owners possessed 880,000 kms^, almost half the total land. Conversely there were 
about 3,096,827 workers in these haciendas, about 64 per cent of the workforce. 
(INEGI, 1986: 10) Foreign investment, mostly European, allowed major 
developments in communications, specially the railroads, and the attempt to 
develop a national industry through exploitation of natural resources: according to 
the National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics INEGI, twenty 
five successful industries were active at the time, and this early industriahsation 
produced an upper class of about 78,000 people (0.6 per cent of the population), a 
middle class of 1,126,000 (8.3 per cent) and an overwhelming poor majority of 
about 13 million. (Ibid) The Diaz administration is credited with having fostered 
foreign trade from a balance with imports worth $18,793,493 and exports 
$27,318,788 USD in 1875, to $205,874,273 and $293,753,639 respectively by the 
time he was ousted. (Garcia-Naranjo, 1970: 256-257) Despite the nascent 
industrialisation, the hacienda and its feudal structure remained the most 
important economic unit throughout this time, and the regime alienated the vast
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majority of the population shortly after coming into power. When the revolution 
finally triumphed in 1915, a project that would eventually hegemonise most of the 
political field for the rest of the century was set in motion. Until the times of Diaz, 
the Mexican national identity had been defined basically in terms of opposition to 
Spain, France and crucially the United States.
The process whereby the Creole elite constructed Spain, with whom they 
shared every single aspect of their culture but the place of birth, as ‘the Other’ has 
been documented in detail in the literature about Latin American/Mexican 
independence and provided plenty of evidence for Anderson to argue that the first 
architects of nations were indeed European settlers in the ‘new world.’ (Anderson, 
1991: 67-82) Having been bom in the land we now call the Americas made 
creoles equivalent to mestizos and ‘Indians’ and, moreover, they were also united 
in their suffering injustice that came from Spain, from those (Others) who 
victimised them.
Being Mexican in opposition to being American was somewhat more 
ambivalent. In fact, before the Porfiriato, what the American Others meant for 
Mexico had been at the heart of the debate between the Conservatives, who had 
assumed this Other to be a threat to be avoided and from whom protection ought 
to be sought, and the Liberals, for whom this Other had been a sort of model to be 
admired and imitated. While the Conservatives had stressed the differences, — 
being Mexican was the opposite of being American in terms of religion, in terms
of language, in terms of ethnicity , Liberals had focused in the similarities:
both nations had been bom out of a conscious struggle against European colonial 
powers.
During the Porfiriato, however, the liberal faction that finally dominated 
and of which Diaz was a representative favoured the construction of the Mexican 
nation as a federal republic, not only because the rejection of Spain implied the 
rejection of its institutions, particularly the monarchy, as unjust and oppressive, 
but also because, in being able to claim a popular mandate, the mling elite 
acquired legitimacy and was able to consolidate the nation: it was the government 
of the people, the government of those who were included, of those who 
belonged. Clearly the Americans had had a tremendous influence, through their
The Mexican Identity Between the Revolution and the Cold War 2 9
construction of the United States, in the construction of the Mexican nation as a 
(just) republic by (free) European settlers. The opposition, however, came from 
their neighbouring position combined with all those cultural features that were 
disregarded in the case of Spain. The first of the two foreign interventions had 
been fought precisely against the Americans, in 1847, and the massive loss of land 
that ensued became a key component in the othering of Americans, furthered 
considerably after they became ‘developed’ and ‘a world power,’ indeed, after 
they became ‘America’ itself.
France, on the other hand, had a role as an opposite in the definition of the 
Mexican political field only briefly. The second war of intervention, in which 
Dfaz had been a hero, had been fought and won against the Mexican conservative 
faction allied to the French, who were assigned a very similar role to that of Spain 
only forty years earlier. After their contribution to the formation of the Mexican 
national identity as the powerful —but defeated— European enemy in search of 
land and people to oppress, France was recast by Diaz not as the antagonist that 
affirmed the value of the Mexican nation and glorified him, but as the 
unthreatening alternative to Mexico’s two Others, the United States and Spain. In 
other words, the role played by France in the construction of the Mexican national 
identity during the Porfiriato, although a role of an ‘Other,’ was close to Karl 
Schmitt’s enemy/foe distinction, that is, an Other whose existence is not assumed 
as threatening to the Self.^  ^(Schmitt, 1996)
In fact, the time of the Porfiriato was characterised by a profound desire to 
bring about a Mexican-Furopean identity, but while Spain, where the Western 
heritage of Mexico came from, would have implied a threat to the Self, France did 
not.^  ^Thus, for instance. Reforma, the main avenue of Mexico City, was designed
Significantly, it is only in English that ‘America’ actually means the United States. In Spanish 
‘America,’ refers to the continent, although ‘American’ might refer to a US citizen. In Mexico, 
however, a citizen of the United States is not usually called ‘American’ but ‘Fstadounidense,’ a 
word meaning citizen of the United States, not available in English. Indeed, when quoting 
references to citizens of the United States as ‘Americano,’ the leftwing press always adds “sic.” 
Some of the rightwing press uses italics. See La Jornada and El Universal respectively.
In fact, it can be argued the relation between Mexico and France as cast by Dfaz during the 
Porfiriato was more along the lines described by Connolly. (Connolly, 1991)
“Paris [was at the time] the city Mexicans consider the centre of the world...it is also Paris 
that they turn to find out what is good or bad, to ask about science, art, poetry, novel ideas or the 
futility of fashion, the nonsense of false spirits, the perversity of vice.” (Tenorio, 1996: 12)
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a copy of the Champs Elysées and the whole of the architecture in urban 
residential areas was based on Parisian town houses. (Johns, 1997: 17) French 
rather than English was taught as a second language in secondary schools. His 
oligarchic regime provided the elites with a constellation of ‘Mexican’ identities 
modelled after Europe to appropriate, but in its looking for modernity into the 
future, in its refusal of looking back into a mythical Golden Age that the Mexican 
nation would once again seek to realise, in its refusal to search for that former, 
authentic self that being Mexican would eventually embody, in its refusal, in 
short, to turn the Mexican people into the secular equivalent of the elected people 
via the nation, the Diaz regime undermined the Mexican national project and the 
identity thereof as a whole.
A number of narratives that attempt to account for the eruption and 
eventual success of the Mexican revolution focus in economic and political 
factors as the direct causes of the upheaval. (Gilly et al., 1979; Katz, 1981; Meyer 
et al., 1999 etc.) Without questioning the accuracy of those accounts, I wish to put 
forward the hypothesis that when rebellions erupted in the north, central and 
southern regions of Mexico, the exploited, landless, pauperised masses were 
trying to recover the national identities they had last fully held at the end of the 
nineteenth century.
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The Revolutionary Struggle^^
Whether historians regard the revolution as a single, unified process, or as a series 
of separate episodes only connected through their insertion within the 
revolutionary narrative, there is agreement that the struggles now encompassed 
within ‘the revolution’ were fought at three different fronts that were 
distinguished both geographically and in terms of the demands they posed. This is 
hardly surprising as economically Mexico reproduced the global feature of a north 
that is comparatively more prosperous than its south. The relatively wealthier and 
ethnically less mixed states of the north had been led in the struggle by Francisco 
Villa, with a broad spectrum of social claims. The south had uprisen in a very 
concrete claim for ‘land and freedom,’ which became its revolutionary banner, 
conunanded by peasant leader Emiliano Zapata. In the centre, the original demand 
had been for democracy, which at this stage simply meant the sacking of Diaz, 
represented first by Francisco I. Madero and later by Coahuila governor 
Venustiano Carranza. (Aguilar, 1970; Cordova, 1989; Meyer, 1999: 505)
Upon the overthrow of Diaz, the three revolutionary fronts were unable to 
coalesce into a single one and briefly struggled amongst themselves, a process 
that is well documented in the literature and out of which the Carranza faction 
ultimately emerged victorious. (Katz, 1981: 253-297) The subsequent series of 
governments, all led by charismatic generals —caudillos— on the basis of their
The extent to which the Mexican revolution “really happened” and accounts on its origins and 
direction differ markedly. Revisionist historians “stress that the revolution’s legacy has 
generally been to consohdate (not to destroy) the inegalitarian, capitalist, pohtically centralised 
structure that emerged during the Porfiriato.” (quote by Levy and Székely on revisionists, 1987: 
46; Gilly, 1981; Côrdova, 1979: 15-38) More official narratives maintain that many important 
changes did take place, such as a fossilised oligarchy being replaced by an elite with broader 
social recruitment, peasants and labour being brought into the consensus-making mechanisms of 
the Party, the creation of a social security system, a new political order based on civilian rule 
developing and the emergence of a strong nationalism. (Silva-Herzog, 1960; Mancisidor, 1959; 
Levy and Székely, 1987: 33) Notably, the 23 volume History of the Mexican Revolution 
published by the Colegio de México between 1977 and 1995, authored by, among others, 
Alvaro Matute, Eduardo Blanquel and Berta Ulloa, spans not only the period of the actual 
struggle but reaches the year 1960, endorsing the view that it was for those governments of the 
PRI to carry the revolution forward. Since the methodology employed in this thesis is not 
concerned with what “really happened” but rather with the way contending narratives “made it 
happen”, as it were, I have used throughout the chapter the latter account as this was the 
narrative sponsored by the ‘governments of the revolution’ themselves, and the one on history 
textbooks for elementary and secondary education until the Salinas reforms.
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personal power, crystallised with the creation of institutions, specially the Party, 
and with it, the basis for post-revolutionary Mexico and for the consolidation of 
the Mexican identity it entailed were laid. (Silva-Herzog, 1960)
Defining the Poiiticai Fieid
As is evident from the century of Mexican history briefly outlined above, the 
discourse that constructed the national identity, which can be traced back to the 
war for independence and which was easily added to during the period of 
international antagonisms such as the interventions, reached the point of a 
stalemate during the Diaz regime, when the absence of obstacles to be overcome 
in order to reach our ‘true’ selves and indeed the effective end of this search 
eroded its hegemony, causing the proliferation of elements it was unable to 
articulate, and it was then replaced by the more encompassing discourse of the 
revolution.
To properly understand how discourse analysis can account for the 
consolidation and later transformation of national identity, it is necessary to 
establish, first, what this discourse consisted of and the sort of identities it made 
available and articulated, then the procedure whereby it became dominant, and 
finally to put it in its broader, international context.
The discourse of the revolution established its political field through the 
construction of antagonisms with the Diaz regime. In terms of discourse as social 
practice, it underwent a first phase of radicalism from the foundation of the ruling 
Party, then called PNR —National Revolutionary Party— in 1928, until its 
transformation into the PRM —Mexican Revolutionary Party— by General 
Lazaro Cârdenas, in 1938 when it settled the basis for the strong presidentialism 
that characterised it later and when it reached its most radical stage. In 1946 the 
Party was further transformed into the PRI —Institutional Revolutionary Party— 
and the country abandoned both military rule and effectively the revolution. In 
fact Miguel Aleman was the first candidate of the PRI as such, that is, of the 
political system the PRI would become, as well as the first civilian president. The 
main antagonisms are outlined below.
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Haciendas vs. Ejidos
Where the Diaz regime stood for the quasi-feudal structure of the hacienda and 
caciquismo, even if justified as the basis for macro-economic prosperity, the 
discourse of the revolution, specially in its early stages, proposed the very 
opposite: ‘the land reform,’ i.e. distribution of those same estates into ejidos, 
collectively owned by those willing to cultivate them, inalienable land suitable for 
self-subsistence.
At the symbohc level, the distribution of land was paramount for the 
nation-building project, given the role that territory plays for national projects in 
general. Derrida defined as ontopology: “an axiomatics linking indissociably the 
ontological value of present-being [on] to its situation, to the stable and 
presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, 
body in general.” (Derrida, 1994: 82) It can be argued that this ontopological 
relation was estabhshed by turning this territory that would be dehvered into an 
essence of the national identity, fostering its imagined dimension. After 
establishing in article 27 of the Constitution that all land belonged, in the first 
instance, to the nation, thus turning the nation into the original i.e. the real and 
natural owner of the land, and that the government, its agent, was entitled to 
allocating it to people into what then would become private property, turning 
private property in this way into a manufactured, unnatural form of possession, 
depending upon the government for its legitimisation, the government was 
providing the population with the economic means for its subsistence, while at the 
same time uniting it through the bond it created with the historic land, the land 
over which the struggle had taken place.
In other words, the land reform created a relationship between the land and 
the people —i.e. a subject position for the people— that constructed them as 
Mexican in what Etienne Bahbar has called the ‘fictive ethnia’ of nations:
“...the ‘external frontiers’ of the state have to become ‘internal 
frontiers’ or —which amounts to the same thing— external frontiers 
have to be imagined constantly as a projection and protection of an 
internal collective personality, which each of us carries within 
ourselves and enables us to inhabit the space of the state as a place
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where we have always been —and will always be— ‘at home.’” 
(Balibar, 1988: 95)
The heroic figure of agrarian leader Emiliano Zapata, once assimilated 
into the national repertoire of the PRI, became the repository of all these 
meanings and until the late 1980s representations of him were subsequently 
invoked whenever connotations of social justice and of the success and 
continuation of the revolution were sought. Zapata quickly became part first of the 
revolutionary myth and then of the national imaginary. It is of course the symbol 
of Zapata that the EZLN have tried to re-appropriate since 1989, replacing in the 
first instance the search for social justice in agrarian terms with the terms of 
excluded ethnic minorities, as discussed in chapter four. For all these reasons, at a 
time when about seventy per cent of the population lived in rural areas, the ejido 
became a paramount signifier for the discourse to attempt to hegemonise. Long 
after Diaz had been defeated and left for exile, it had been the failure of 
successive governments to comply with the land reform that kept fuelling the 
armed struggle.
Ejidos had been used in pre-Hispanic times, which again legitimated them 
as ‘original’ and ‘natural.’ The term was reintroduced to the discourse of the 
revolution by Zapata. During the radical early stages of the post-revolutionary 
governments, when the political field was being defined internally, in opposition 
to the Diaz regime, land reform meant primarily breaking a structure that required 
intermediaries between production and consumption. The aim was not to break 
the estate into small private plots, but to keep large amounts of land —one 
hundred hectares— under collective ownership: ejidos. This posed several 
economic advantages: economies of scale, mechanisation, crop rotation, efficient 
allocation and use of labour, of water and inputs as well as bulk purchasing and 
marketing of products. (Markiewicz, 1980) Their main advantage, however, was 
political, since the land reform carried out by Cardenas during the 1930s and early 
1940s gave him the support of the masses, thus depriving rivals and would-be 
‘caudillos’ from the support required for further uprisings. (Brown, 1979: 102- 
136)
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By the 1950s however, when the major dislocation caused by the end of 
the Second World War was creating the East/West divide and with it a Western 
subject position for Mexico to define its identity, the signifier ‘land reform’ came 
to signify splitting estates into small individual —but not private— property, the 
new ‘small ejidos' of between ten and twenty five hectares, still allowing peasants 
to improve their material conditions only this time in order to create a domestic 
private market for capitalism. The principle of communal lands remained, 
nonetheless, “an almost sacred revolutionary ideal.” (Hamnett, 1999: 263)
Although in variable amounts and qualities, and undergoing major 
changes in meaning, land reform continued until it was officially ended in 1989, 
when the discourse suffered a major hegemonic crisis.
Foreign vs. Domestic Investment
Where the Dfaz regime stood for economic development founded in foreign 
investment, the revolution proposed the search for autarky embodied in all sorts of 
national development plans, effectively backed up with populist policies of 
protectionism and subsidies. Although some administrations emphasised this 
more than others, this principle accounts for the Keynesian, highly interventionist 
state until the late 1980s, with state ownership of almost all major industrial 
sectors of the economy —it is estimated the state in Mexico accounted at that time 
for 50 percent of the GNP— at one point including even the banking and financial 
system, and heavily subsidised urban areas, specially Mexico City, where 
transport and public services such as water, gas and electricity were very heavily 
subsidised. (De Sebastian, 1987: 52) People in working class neighbourhoods 
received an ID from the government that entitled them to free supply of basic 
items for subsistence such as milk and tortillas in those homes with children, and 
to other extremely cheap basic goods supplied by the National Council for 
Popular Subsistence CONASUPO in a ‘basic basket.’
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But without doubt the most relevant instance of domestic investment 
became the oil expropriation/^ In a very similar way to the land reform described 
above, the expropriation of what was viewed as a strategic industry for 
development by Cardenas in 1936 became the symbol of this collective ownership 
of all resources by ‘the nation,’ specially of a resource that would provide 
bargaining power, further essentialising not only the territory as land but also 
those elements underneath the land which comprised it. And because having been 
defeated, the struggle was not against Diaz nor among the revolutionary leaders 
themselves for the first time since the war had broken, but actually against 
‘foreigners,’ the nationalisation of oil supplied a new enemy, a new ‘Other’ 
presented as the cause of the lacking which despite the revolution still persisted, 
an Other against whom ‘we’ could be united and in opposition to whom ‘we’ 
could be ourselves. Cardenas made this very clear in the speech in which he 
announced the nationalisation:
“While there are no schools or hospitals in the areas where the oil 
companies operate, there certainly is a private police force to 
guarantee their interests. They argue there is no money for decent 
salaries, but they do have money for their pohce, for those 
organisations that go as far as murdering for them, for the anti- 
patriotic press which sustains them...they think their economic power 
and their arrogance shields them away from the dignity and the 
sovereignty of a nation who has generously granted them her vast 
natural resources...it is for these reasons inescapable to...take action 
in a definite and legal way to put an end to this state of affairs...I 
hereby request the unreserved moral and material support to carry out 
this justified, transcendental and indispensable resolution.” (Cardenas:
1936, my translation)
Moreover, the involvement of Cardenas’ wife in the fundraising campaign 
invoked the powerful representation of the nation as a family. The campaign 
received major coverage, and photographs of children and peasants carrying hens 
and piggybanks, presented along with those of middle classes and the rich, whom
Again there are contending versions of the oil expropriation. It is viewed either as a heroic 
affirmation of independence by Cârdenas, a champion of the national cause, or an assertion of 
power by the incoming elite, which thereby granted itself access to considerable resources and 
gained immediate legitimacy and mass-approval. (Philip, 1982: 201-226) But here too I am 
concerned only with the implications of the oil nationalisation for the ability to interpellate ‘the 
Mexican subject’ and thus create a national subject-position in the nationalist discourse.
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“even the Catholic hierarchy had urged to co-operate,” handing-in cheques and 
jewels “to pay for the debt,” stressed the sources of unity and cohesion even 
across classes. (INEGI, 1986: 150; Philip, 1982: 224) Narratives of the heroic 
efforts of everyone involved, from the rail workers who had worked “twenty four 
hours transporting the oil” to the “technicians who had hitherto only received 
orders and been humiliated” but who were now successfully taking over the work 
of foreign engineers, complemented the media campaign. Finally, March 18*^ , the 
day of the nationalisation of oil, became a public holiday. (Ibid)
It also helped to consolidate the Cardenas administration, in fact unique in 
its radicalism, as a myth on which his successors drew legitimacy whenever it was 
necessary. During the administrations when the word ‘nationalisation’ used in 
1936 became associated with so-called communism, and thus politically incorrect, 
it was replaced by the consensus maker ‘Mexicanisation.’ After the Salinas and 
the Zedillo administrations had completely implemented neo-liberal economic 
policies, the meanings conveyed by oil in the (still) hegemonic discourse that held 
them in power but which they were actively transforming proved remarkably 
difficult to change.^^ Representations of a paternalistic state and its corresponding 
‘child-like,’ dependent citizens, evident for example in the logos of the various 
governmental institutions —the national health service (IMSS) logo for instance 
depicts the institution as pair of hands, protectively enclosing the icon of a 
family— appealing to hierarchical family values endowed the state of affairs with 
a natural and positive connotation which remains unchanged.
Bourgeoisie vs. Peasants and Working Class
Where Diaz had privileged the bourgeoisie over the poor, the discourse of the 
revolution purported to do the opposite and endeavoured to protect peasants and 
workers by the creation of a welfare state that provided free education and health 
care and, at least at the very beginning, by strengthening trade unions and a
^  Even at the time of writing (2004) with the Fox project well under way, the denationalisation 
of the energy sector, especially oil, but also gas and electricity, continues to be an extremely 
contentious issue.
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national peasant organisation that was later formally incorporated into the Party 
—and thus largely neutralised. Legislation was introduced granting workers the 
right to strike, to get a share annually of the profits made by enterprises and to 
safe working conditions; an 8 hour-maximum working day and a minimum salary 
were introduced; sacking would be allowed only when justified; saving 
associations were fostered. (INEGI, 1986) It also promoted the collective 
ownership by workers of a number of enterprises called ‘co-operatives,’ in an 
equivalent scheme to what ejidos were for peasants, only not as ambitious. In later 
stages few of these enterprises survived, and only those unions absorbed and 
controlled by the state were strengthened, while all others were crushed into 
disappearance. (Agustm, 1999: 171-181)
This area of social policy was closely related to the point mentioned 
earlier. The state became the major service provider and its influence was felt in 
all areas of social life: a joint trust with private investors was set up to make cheap 
or zero-interest loans available for workers to acquire government housing, whose 
construction was also massively undertaken (FONACOT). (Meyer, 1999: 629) 
Also access to government infrastructure in areas such as tourism (TURISSSTE), 
retail shops (ISSSTE), schools for artistic development (INBA), leisure activities 
and the further education of adults (IMSS), theatres, a national film industry, film 
library and institute (Cineteca and IMCINE) that stocked and showed national and 
art films mostly, television and radio channels, concert halls and even sports clubs 
sponsored and managed by the government were made widely available to 
everyone in urban areas, with some extra facilities for the various workers of 
governmental bureaucracies and their families. At a time, the protection offered 
by the government to the working classes even involved the prohibition of any 
increase in the payments of tenants as rent to some of the private housing market, 
a prohibition that implied the substantial deterioration of the buildings involved, 
and which lasted for at least twenty years. (INEGI, 1986: 99)
But the key areas remained education and healthcare. By offering access 
to free education and healthcare the government claimed to be offering conditions 
of equahty of opportunity as well as important means of social upward mobility. 
(Meyer, 1979: xvi and 1999: 628) Moreover, as soon as the government became
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civilian, it became one of the vital, unwritten laws of the system that the president 
would have, as a requisite, to have studied law at the national university, to further 
symbolise legitimacy. At the discursive level, since the government was more or 
less attempting a suture, as it were, by decree, the president had to be a lawyer, 
implying that governing was essentially to do with law and order, and with 
legislation in general, and that from his position such a suture-by-decree was 
feasible. The figure of the president could be thus understood as corresponding to 
a people that were citizens, and a country that was primarily a nation.^  ^This rule 
would only be broken by the latest neo-liberal administrations, whose presidents 
were economists with a managerial approach —creating a client-position for ‘the 
people’ and a business-position for the country. They also held postgraduate 
qualifications from American universities, a fact that would have been seen as a 
disadvantage by their predecessors.^^
In the arts, especially painting, literature and cinema, but also sculpture, 
dance and architecture, positive representations of peasants and workers made the 
class identity part of, and ultimately equivalent to the national identity. From the 
1920s and until the 1940s, muralism, a movement which featured peasants and 
workers as central themes and which involved the creation of large paintings on 
walls of public buildings, so as to make ‘high art’ available for the masses, 
predominated. (Smith, 2003: 211; Meyer, 1999: 592-597) In this way, muralism 
endowed the identities of peasants and workers with a double value: as a topic 
worthy of depiction in ‘high’ art in a way that would have never been possible 
under Diaz (as objects); and as would-be-consumers of ‘high art’ (as subjects). 
Muralism was also ‘translated’ into cinema by Eisenstein in his unfinished film 
jQue Viva México! which proved influential for Mexican directors such as Emilio 
Fernandez and Fernando de Fuentes. (Lopez, 2000: 425; Hershfîeld, 1999: 86)
PNR and PRM presidents had been members of the military, thus their rule supplied an 
ambiguous identity for the people: inasmuch as the rise of the modem state had created a 
division between the police for insiders or ‘nationals’ and the army for outsiders, military- 
presidents involved an outsider identity for the people, and a position of chaos for the country. 
Avila Camacho is said to have preferred Miguel Aleman as his successor because, among other 
reasons, he was a civilian.
^  Indeed, even at the time that NAFTA was being negotiated, detractors in Mexico “chastised 
negotiators as people who ‘speak in English and think in English’ meaning their concepts were 
alien to Mexican culture.” (Bertrab, 1997: 41)
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Dependence vs. Independence
Where the Diaz regime had meant dependence, the revolution opposed an 
independence it attempted to affirm via its foreign policy. (Meyer, 1999: 634-635; 
Philip, 1991: 119-120) Even when the radical period was over and the 
‘governments of the revolution’ moved towards an unequivocal right, staged as 
centre by devising a Labour Party and its corresponding Conservative Party, they 
always aimed at pursuing an image of agency in the international arena, 
particularly evident in diplomacy and in Mexican activity in international fora 
such as the United Nations. This topic is further discussed below, in reference to 
the broader international discourse in which the national discourse was inserted.
Patriarchal Family vs. Emancipation of Women
The pre-modem Dfaz regime had underprivileged women just as much as 
Indians/peasants and the working classes. Therefore, the discourse of the 
revolution, in its attempt to realise a comprehensive articulation of signifiers, 
opposed to this the incorporation of women from the very beginning. (Hershfield, 
2001: 129) Although as a universal category only, and thus in sharp contrast with 
the very particular roles played by the male caudillos, a role was granted and 
acknowledged for the participation of women first in the armed struggle, then in 
positions of relative power in the first post-revolutionary governments —it was 
Cârdenas who appointed the first women ambassadors— and during the Ruiz 
Cortrnez administration 1952-1958 the right to vote was granted to women. 
(Meyer, 1999: 591) The constitution also provided explicit rights and protection 
to pregnant women and mothers whether married or single. (Levy and Székely, 
1987: 29) However conservative Mexican society would become under the rule of 
the PRI and however fixed the subordinated status for women would be thereof, 
an attempt was made after the revolution to provide a subject-position for women 
as Mexican, so as to consolidate the nuclear family as the cornerstone of the 
modernity Mexico was supposed to be entering.
Legitimate vs. Illegitimate Government
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The final opposition to the government of Dfaz was its illegitimacy: it had been an 
oligarchic dictatorship, whereas the governments of the revolution were legitimate 
because they were democratic. When the revolutionary war began, democracy 
simply meant ousting Dfaz. In the early years after the war, the signifier 
‘democracy’ only came to signify fixed terms in power without the possibility of 
immediate re-election of the same person regardless the Party, and to this end the 
constitution, which originally stipulated four-year periods for the president as in 
the United States, was changed to establish six year periods without re-election. 
(Meyer, 1999: 302; INEGI, 198: 124) In fact the Party slogan remained ‘effective 
suffrage, no re-election’ for several years.
After a while the successive re-election of the Party via its various 
candidates led to a change of meaning in ‘democracy,’ which now meant the 
ruling of the PRI by antonomasia, since democracy was the government of the 
people and the Party had become the repository of the interests of the people 
while becoming its representative and agent as of the revolution. This was the 
time when the discourse around the revolution as an empty-signifier was most 
successful. This meaning of democracy, however, was later challenged as the 
Party lost hegemony. (Meyer, 1999: 625) There were struggles for this signifier to 
mean instead the alternating in power by a political elite split into two parties. 
(Gonzalez-Casanova, 1970) These struggles became more intense at the time the 
elite was effectively fracturing, and the second important Party PRD (Party of the 
Democratic Revolution) split from the PRI in 1989. (Granados, 2004)
Individual vs. Community
The resulting field is analysed in detail below, but now it is worth mentioning that 
underlying all these oppositions there is a deeper, implicit one, namely that which 
opposes a political project based on the individual, portrayed as alien to Mexicans 
and embodied by the dictatorship —itself a temporary accident, an interruption 
from the living of ‘our common destiny’—, to one based on the community, 
attributed to the pre-Hispanic peoples of mostly central and southern Mexico, who 
were now reassessed as ‘our roots’ and ‘who we really come from.’
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In political theory, this is the opposition between the liberal, instrumental 
conceptions of the state, and what Habermas has called the ‘holist model,’ in 
which individuals are part of the whole which is more than the sum of its parts: 
“The holist model emphasises that political autonomy is a purpose in itself, to be 
realised not by single persons in the private pursuit of their particular interests but 
rather only by all together in an intersubjectively shared praxis.” (Habermas, 
1992: 6) The Mexican national identity fostered by the revolution has been 
described in almost identical terms: “The Mexican which nationalism has 
in vented... is a being who survives thanks to the state. The individual is 
considered an unfinished and larval creature, whose metamorphosis can only take 
place within the bosom of the revolutionary state.” (Bartra, 1993: 42)
It is not difficult to realise that it is this second holist model which is more 
powerful in terms of its capacity to interpellate individuals as members of a 
collective identity, in that the identities it provides supply substantial cohesion to 
bind the ‘us’ group. Undoubtedly, this opposition to the Diaz discourse proved a 
key factor in the stability and general success of the new regime.
Resulting Subject Positions
So what is the nature of the subject positions that became available, and how, for 
the people whose identities had been blocked by the shattering experience of the 
revolutionary war, in the new discourse? Because national identities are cultural 
and collective, meaning ascribed to those cultural markers that set up the 
boundaries of the nation, namely ethnicity, religion, and language, produced by 
and through narratives of a common history, common territory and common 
institutions, specially the educational system, have traditionally been considered 
relevant in that they “make the people produce itself continually as national 
community.” (Balibar, 1988: 93) These are the cultural markers considered in this 
section.^^
Although the Mexican national identity was overdetermined, in that a ‘pure’ meaning for it 
could not be obtained given the plurality of identities which made it up, the attempt by the elite 
to encompass the whole of the population within it, or in other words their success in 
articulating as many floating signifiers as was actually possible within their discourse, resulted 
in a remarkably stable political field, which is what it analysed in this section.
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The National Identity through Ethnicity
Whether conceived as a ‘core ethnia,’ a ‘fictive ethnia’ or one of the components 
of the ‘proto-nation’ the role of a process of, as it were, ‘ethnisisation’ in the 
formation of national identity has been acknowledged, and is most evident in 
representations of the nation as an extended family, where nationalism borrows 
from the discourse of kinship. (Smith, 1991: 37-42; Balibar, 1988: 86-106; 
Hobsbawm, 1991: 46-79)
In the rehabilitation of the national identity as one that would appeal to 
vast social sectors and mobilise them, the first, main stage involved privileging 
the overwhelming mestizo majority as the ‘natural’ Mexican identity, although 
this was done through a thorough reassessment, for the first time, of its partly 
Indigenous origins. This was important because in this way not only did it 
incorporate the vast majority of the population while addressing it not negatively, 
in terms of class, but positively, in terms of ethnicity, but also because it presented 
to them an identity whose origins they could be proud of, incidentally those 
origins the indigenous minority represented, thereby incorporating both while 
gaining a key, distinctive element of ‘Mexicanity’ —Mexicans could boast a link 
with remote civilisations, who had been unfairly undervalued until then, wrongly 
portrayed as primitive and savage by the arrogant Euro centric discourse, but 
whose profound wisdom was incontestable and more importantly, who could be 
traced back in time, in the same, historical land, until ‘the beginning.’ For this 
reason, the representation of this indigenous past was reinforced in education, 
through textbooks; institutionally, through the creation of museums and 
organisations that appropriated and expropriated the ‘native’ image and 
performance of traditions. Thus, the re-writing of history the regime undertook 
devoted large sections to these ancient civilisations, under the heading ‘pre- 
Columbian Mexico,’ implying a more or less eternal Mexico, whose existence did 
not come into being with the independence of the political and administrative unit 
from the Spanish empire or even with the conquest but which predated the 
unequal encounter with Europe.
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Basically, the various indigenous tribes were not (re)presented as different 
peoples subjugated under Aztec rule, but quite the opposite, as the same, unified, 
homogeneous group of original inhabitants, merely parts of our common present 
whole: ‘the natives’ equivalent to one another and crucially to ‘us,’ who had 
embodied all good and been wronged by the foreign, Spaniard conquerors.^"  ^One 
alternative version, namely that the Spaniards were able to subdue the Aztecs only 
with the help of the subjugated Indian peoples, specially the Tlaxcaltecas, would 
have avoided the image of Mexico as a nation conquered by foreigners, an issue 
much discussed in the research on “Mexicanity” during the 1950s and 1960s, but 
only at the expense of breaking the unity of its origins. This version was thus 
never officially adopted. In official accounts the ‘natives’ had been brave, 
defeated only because they had been outnumbered, their unity broken by alien 
action, and because of the technological advantage of Spanish weapons; they had 
been rich, although their (‘our’) country’s natural resources had been 
systematically drained by the conquerors; the metaphor of the nation as a hving 
organism under a viral attack, so common in nationalistic ideologies, was also 
drawn upon to construct ‘our Indian’ selves as healthy, since terrible illnesses 
such as syphilis and typhoid had been brought by the Spaniards, likened to viruses 
themselves. All in all, the indigenous past came to represent a mythical Golden 
Age we should one day return to.
The discourse on ‘natives’ has been described in the literature, specially in 
psychological interpretations of national identity, as gendered female, not only 
because mestizos were the children of Spanish men and native women and 
thereby equated to the mother, and symbolically the motherland, but because they 
had been the conquered ones, the defeated ones, the forced-open ones, passive and 
had been thus despised and discriminated against. (Gonzalez-Pineda, 1961) The 
Spaniards were gendered male in that they were the opposite, and accordingly 
they were admired. However, given that mestizo Mexicans were at least as much 
of native as of Spanish origin, and moreover, given that the Mexican identity 
under construction involved a now Catholic, Spanish-speaking population, this
Ironically, most of those ancient civilisations had joined Cortés against the Aztecs in order to 
avoid precisely belonging to Mexico, the name in Nahuatl of the Aztec empire.
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discourse stopped short of actually branding the Spaniards as the source of all 
evil. The elements of Spanish origin inextricably intertwined with any meaning 
Mexicanity could be brought to signify forced an almost simultaneous 
reassessment of the Spanish heritage. The Cardenas government opened the 
country to Spanish exiles during the Spanish Civil War, and this provided an 
opportunity for such a reassessment to take place. Over thirty thousand Spaniards 
arrived in Mexico between 1937 and 1941. A large number of them belonged to 
the intelhgentsia and their influence was immediately felt in the cultural hfe of the 
country, especially in higher education, the Ministry of Education and the 
founding of major publishing houses.^  ^ (Ferrer, 1999) The Casa de Espana en 
Mexico, which in 1940 became El Colegio de Mexico, was founded in 1938 as a 
high quality research centre for Spanish intellectuals to join, and in fact it was one 
of the two institutions responsible for the publication of the primary school 
textbooks in 1971. (Martmez, 2002) The Colegio de México still remains a 
leading centre for academic research. Thus, the myth would have it that if Spain 
had first ‘sent’ to ‘Mexico’ some of the worst of her population as conquerors, she 
later ‘sent’ the best as exiles. In any case, both native and European ancestors 
could from then on provide roots that adequately restored dignity to the mestizo 
national ethnicity.^^
In discourse analysis, institutions and organisations are understood “as 
‘sedimented’ discourses, which despite their origins as products of hegemonic 
practices have become relatively permanent and durable.” (Howarth, 2000: 120) 
Moreover, on reflecting on the role of institutions in investing authority on social 
actors, by setting the circumstances under which the production of language is 
legitimate or ‘felicitous,’ —in other words, by creating appropriate subject- 
positions— Pierre Bourdieu has shown this role to be one of instituting difference, 
that is, of dividing people into those who are or can be encompassed within the
Among those who arrived there were several philosophers, poets, architects and artists, such 
as Jose Gaos, Leon Fehpe and Juan Grijalbo, and indeed the first serious researcher to specialise 
on Mexican cinema, Emilio Garcia Riera, who arrived as a child.
Another crucial point, further dealt with in chapter 3, was the replacement of the racist 
discourse that had produced mestizos as ‘half breeds’ and thus ‘impure’ and inferior with a 
discourse from genetics that argued that the more mixed a genetic pool is, the healthier and 
‘better,’ and thus superior the product of the mixing.
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boundaries of the consecrating institution and those who are and will be left out, 
thereby setting up boundaries that create identities. (Bourdieu, 1991: 117) In 
Mexico, two institutions were deployed to foster the ethnic component of the 
national identity: the National Museum of Anthropology and History (MNAH) 
and the National Indigenous Institute (INI).
The MNAH was created in 1940, under the Cardenas administration, and 
in 1964, “to pay homage to the admirable cultures that flourished in the pre- 
Columbian era...in whose example Mexico acknowledges features original to her 
national identity,”^^  its location was changed from a rather small building in 
central Mexico City to its current location at the heart of Reforma Avenue, this 
time allocating to it about 80,000 square metres. A considerable budget was 
assigned for it to house a series of collections that have continuously been added 
to following major archaeological works all over the country, with half the space 
devoted to collections of the indigenous past, and the other half to the present.
The INI was meant to improve the material conditions of living of the 
population classified as ‘native,’ with approaches to economic development and 
the general aim ‘social justice,’ which in practice meant supplying the means for 
them to be turned into the same identity, namely the Mexican identity, as the 
mestizos: it selected those features of the native cultures that would be 
incorporated into the national identity while attempting assimilation by 
eliminating all the rest, specially language. In particular, practices that could be 
classified as traditions, and that would provide a performative dimension to the 
national identity were widely promoted, such as music and dancing. Using the 
same metaphor of society as a living organism, Zygmunt Bauman has described 
assimilation as one —the ‘anthropophagie’— way of unmaking strangers, since it 
implies
However, the origins of the MNAH can be traced back to the National Museum founded in 
1865, where the Creole elites of the newly independent nation had first, although somewhat 
reluctantly, turned ‘idols’ that according to Catholicism ought to be destroyed into 
‘archaeological pieces’ worthy of academic attention and patriotic devotion, in an attempt to 
give prestige to what had been “an undervalued American past.” (Morales, 1994: 171-192; 
Smith, 2003: 210)
^  Inaugural speech by then President Adolfo Lopez Mateos on September 17**“, 1964.
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“annihilatmg the strangers by devouring them and then metabolically 
transforming them into a tissue indistinguishable from one’s 
own...making the different similar...forbidding all traditions and 
loyalties except those meant to encourage conformity to the new and 
all-embracing order; promoting and enforcing one, and only one, 
measure of conformity.” (Bauman, 1997: 49)
Thus the ‘natives’ were unmade as ‘strangers’ and made into ‘us,’ to fit 
within the Mexican side of the redrawing of boundaries the all-embracing order 
the national project entailed.
As for the MNAH, a Foucauldian frame of analysis of this use of 
institutions as conductive to the assimilation of native cultures to the national 
identity, and also of the account of the conquest supplied in textbooks, provides a 
different reading to that inherent in the policies of incorporation actively pursued 
by the government: if museums are institutions where the powerless are 
objectified subjected to the scrutiny of the powerful, constructed into others to be 
known, then by displaying the representations of these cultures provided in the 
collections for Mexicans to see, Mexicans are effectively being turned into the 
audience who knows, they are being placed in the (powerful) position of knowers, 
a position common to them, which does equate them to one another as non­
natives: the institution sanctioned the boundary between natives and non-natives. 
(Foucault, 1980) In this way, Mexicans were given a common —mestizo and 
Western— identity.
The National Identity through Religion
Together with kinship, the representation of nationalism most commonly found in 
the literature on the subject is that of a religion. Indeed, nationalism has been 
characterised as a secular religion, in that, after the death of God, its narrative was 
able to offer the nation as a replacement:
“Through a community of history and destiny, memories may be kept 
alive and actions retain their glory. For only in the chain of 
generations of those who share an historic and quasi-familial bond, 
can individuals hope to achieve a sense of immortahty in eras of 
purely terrestrial horizons. In this sense, the formation of 
nations...appears more like the institutionalisation of ‘surrogate
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religion’ than a political ideology, and therefore far more durable and 
potent than we care to admit.” (Smith, quoted by Castells, 1997: 33)
From the perspective of a discourse-analytical methodological framework 
however, a religion, surrogate or otherwise, is as much a discourse as a pohtical 
ideology, in that it can form and hegemonise a political field if it allows 
individuals to attempt to be, or in other words, if it provides them with an identity.
It would not be unfair to the early governments of the revolution to 
characterise them as struggles that mainly attempted to bring about this discursive 
change, namely the secularisation of the Mexican state. (Muro, 1994: 35) The 
major role played by the Catholic church from the times of the Spanish empire did 
not diminish with independence, itself in fact to a large extent the making of the 
Catholic priests, and endured attacks of the liberal Mason elite afterwards and 
until the Porfiriato.
It is true that president Juarez had severely curtailed the power of the 
Church at the cost of the war of the Reform, when its land was expropriated, civil 
rights were removed from its ministers and when an attempt was made to remove 
rites of passage from its control and into the control of the state through the 
creation of the civil registry and of secular cemeteries. (Meyer, 1999: 366-367) 
But this had not been enough since the main forces of cohesion, of integration and 
identification in Mexico so far had precisely come from the Church, whose 
discourse hegemonised to a considerable extent the Mexican political field. 
Through several syncretic practices that had been developed through the years, 
the identities it offered were profoundly embraced by the population at large, and 
instead of being a mere other component of the national identity, that is, instead of 
being reduced to an element to be articulated in the emerging discourse of 
nationalism, it effectively competed with it.
What the revolution entailed was the insertion of Mexico into modernity 
via the replacement of the hegemonic discourse of rehgion with what the elite 
hoped would be the equally powerful discourse of the nation. Thus the state 
became the new ‘father’: the carer, the protector, the saviour, the repository of 
unquestionable authority, the powerful one. Its citizens were positioned as 
‘children’ in need of guidance, protection and care, as those who obey and are
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rewarded if their behaviour complies with the norms, or punished accordingly. 
(Bartra, 1993: 42) Perhaps the main challenge the state faced was the remarkable 
resilience of religious institutional practices, which eventually led to a whole 
branch more or less splitting off Papal authority in what came to be known as 
Liberation Theology, and which made any attempt to articulate a new position for 
‘the Church’ in the new hegemonic discourse particularly difficult. (Muro, 1994: 
42-45)
In practice this led the government to uphold the laws of the Reform, 
which had until then been largely ignored, and to introduce a narrative on this 
regard; (Bailey, 1974) to, in an instance of historicism characteristic of 
nationalism, turn the Liberals into heroes not so much for having fought and 
resisted through foreign interventions, but because of their attack on the Church, 
and to appropriate them as symbols for the new government, while at the same 
time taking over the educational system, forbidding the Church to participate in 
education.^^ Finally, this also led to a brief armed struggle, particularly difficult 
because of the wish of martyrdom displayed by the population, —the “Guerra 
Cristera” or Cristiada, militarily won by the government. The extent to which the 
discourse of religion provided the basis for the main collective identity at the time 
can be appreciated from the following quote, given by a Cristero as an 
explanation for his participation in the struggle:
“We did not want to abandon the Church in the hands of the military 
men. What would we do without it, without its festivals, without its 
images which patiently listened to our lamentations? What were they 
condemning us to? To pine away among the stones and work the dry 
ground? To die like street curs, without any complaint, after leading a 
life of misery? It was better to die fighting! There is no evil that lasts 
for a hundred years, and he who spits at heaven, his spit falls to the 
ground again.” (Meyer, 1976: 182)
Victory was thus provisional. After the radical period of Lazaro Cardenas, 
the Church proved too vast an element to be eradicated. Instead of attempting to
Later however, when demand for education surpassed the state’s capabilities this point was 
not enforced. Sometimes religious organisations created civil societies in order to obtain the 
hcence to teach and continued to impart confessional education for the upper classes, but their 
number has never gone beyond ten percent of the total number of schools in the country. 
(Torres, 2002)
The Mexican identity Between the Revolution and the Cold W ar 5 0
construct the Mexican ‘us’ in opposition to the Catholic identity of the Mexican 
people, the hegemonic nationalist discourse articulated religion into a constituting 
part of that national identity/^ For most of the PRI administrations, the 
Constitution was again largely ignored until 1989, when the Salinas government 
resorted to closer —or rather, more visible— links with the Church, formally re­
establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican. (Aleman, 2002a; Barranco, 
2002; Loaeza, 2002a)
Equivalences and Differentiations
In the preceding pages, I have put forward the contention that a discourse 
emerged from the dislocation caused by the revolutionary war, centred around the 
revolution as an empty signifier: a locus for the inscription of social demands, 
hopes and aspirations. External to society, it allowed society to be unified. It 
marked the boundaries of the Mexican political field by recourse, first, to a 
number of antagonisms to the previous hegemonic discourse, and later by the 
complex intertwining of the resulting discourse and nationahsm. In this way, the 
discourse of the revolution was able to devise a broad array of subject positions 
and later of identities, that successfully articulated what had until then been 
excluded elements. Indeed, the main feature of this discourse, and one that 
accounts both for the extent and duration of its hegemony, was its ability for 
articulation. It developed conditions necessary for a stable hegemonic practice: a 
plurality of antagonistic forces and unstable frontiers separating them. (Barros and 
Castagnola, 2000: 31)
For the revolution to become this nodal point, four vital equivalences were 
made: first between the revolution and the government, on the one hand, and 
between the revolution and the nation on the other, in such a way that the 
government and the nation were also equivalent. (Meyer, 1999: 636) This was 
done by providing a coherent narrative of the revolution, one that homogenised 
the struggles of the three fronts and presented them as one single, unified struggle 
with common origins, aims and objectives, the most important being to achieve
30 The traditional symbol has been the Virgin of Guadalupe, whose syncretic origin is said to be
Tonatzin, ‘our mother,’ that is, feminine as the motherland.
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‘social justice,’ that is, that fundamental lack, the absent fullness, not only in 
textbooks but also in academic accounts. The ruling elite thus presented itself as 
the legitimate heir of the winners in the struggle, and at the time in charge of a 
historical mission: the realisation of the revolutionary ideals. (Buenfil, 2000: 86) 
The ultimate equivalence was that of the nation with the supreme good, drawing 
not only on ideas of the state as prior and superior to the individual, after the 
Aristotelian polity and the Hegelian state, but also on ideas of the state that 
revolved around the general will, after Rousseau. This was accompanied by its 
corresponding series of differentiations, which left little room, if at all, to dissent, 
and provided the grounds for the repression that at times characterised the 
regime.^^ The equivalence between the revolution and the nation was also 
achieved by the signifier ‘social justice’: undergoing the revolution was part of 
our community of history —of suffering injustice— and destiny —the salvation 
that would be granted by succeeding in it.
These points can be illustrated with photographs 1 and 2 found in the 
Addendum section. The first photograph, selected from a book entitled Testimony 
about Mexico^ shows the image of a man in uniform, surrounded by a group of 
men and women and some journalists, taking a skull out of a wooden box. Some 
of the men have taken their hats off or appear to be kneeling down. The caption 
reads “The mortal remains of President Venustiano Carranza were removed from 
the Dolores cemetery, to be taken to the Monument to the Revolution, on the 5^ 
of February, 1942.” (Tercero-Gallardo, 1978: 154)
We have here a representative of the government appearing together with 
some humbly dressed people, members of ‘the nation.’ But here there are also 
some well-dressed people, and women as well as men, all devotedly united in the 
worshipping of this skull, the symbol of the revolution, which unites the nation 
cutting across gender and social class. The skull, which at the literal level is
This is clearly reflected in the names the Party received in the brief period between its 
creation in 1928 to its final version in 1946 as mentioned earlier: it was transformed from 
“National Revolutionary” (PNR), to “Mexican Revolutionary” (PRM), when an attempt was 
made to give a particular content ‘Mexico’ to the universal ‘national,’ and finally to 
“Institutional Revolutionary” (PRI), which summarised the totalising attempt that was made to 
completely and utterly arrest the by now rather controlled flow of meanings and appropriate the 
meaning of the revolution, and in turn to use this to close the field.
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Carranza’s mortal remains, functions as a guarantee of the ancestry of the 
government that was in power at the time the photo was taken: it was legitimated 
because it was the successor of what had been the government of the revolution. 
At the symbolic level, the skull stands for all those who died during the struggle, 
dead men and women that the revolutionary discourse turned into ‘our community 
of history,’ whose mortal remains became part of the national homeland. The 
photo has been taken from the viewpoint of one of the standing members of the 
audience, so us as viewers share the same position as the audience, that is, the 
position the viewer is invited to take is one of participant. But while everyone is 
present, it is only ‘the government’ that is naturally entitled to taking and indeed 
takes ‘the revolution’ in ‘his’ hands, rescuing it from the obhvion of death, while 
invoking our passive admiration and respect.
Photograph two also illustrates very well the way the government was 
drawn in a chain of equivalence with the nation. It comes from the cover of 
Rotofoto, a magazine published in 1938 and reported “to have broken all 
circulation records for the period.” (Mraz, 1997: 152) The photograph shows 
president Cardenas formally dressed but nonetheless sitting on the floor, sharing a 
meal —ordinary food and beer— with a humbly dressed peasant. Although the 
subject is clearly Cardenas, he does not take a disproportionate amount of the 
visual space but quite the opposite, he almost shares it on equal terms with the 
peasant and the food.
Although it has been interpreted as a rare example of irreverent treatment 
of the presidential figure at the time, including a reminder that even within the 
conditions of free press enjoyed in the country at present, it is still prohibited, as a 
lingering taboo, to take photographs of the president while he is eating, I contend 
that this photo actually goes a long way in strengthening the presidential image, 
and more than that, the Cardenas myth, the myth that linked the governments of 
his successors with the revolution. (Mraz, 1997: 151)^  ^Here we can see he is ‘just 
one of us,’ someone who —of all social activities— eats ‘with us’: sharing meals
Fox initially attempted to imitate this aspect of the Cardenas presidency, in order to create the 
image of a strong leader in direct contact with the people that can by-pass congress. However he 
went even further, “dumbing down” the debate considerably. The strategy failed and was indeed 
counterproductive. (Loaeza, 2003) This point is further discussed in chapter three, under the 
heading “The Linguistic Challenge.”
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tends to foster links of solidarity and union among those involved. (Goody, 1982) 
And what is shared in this photo is ‘our homely, everyday food,’ which now 
becomes ‘ours’ in a double sense, the one we eat and the one he eats with us, so 
our ‘we’ broadens to include him, who symbolises the government, and to take as 
the result that ‘the government’ plus ‘us’ equals ‘the nation.’ The simple food 
depicted now linked to our new ‘we,’ the nurture granted to us by our land, has 
become ‘Mexican food.’ On the other hand his formal attire reminds us of his 
status as ‘our leader,’ even if by placing him in the context of eating instead of a 
‘political act’ his leadership appears rather ordinary, rather linked to everyday 
activities in a fatherly way.
Apart from the series of equivalences and differentiations outlined above, 
the attempt to provide a closure for the field is also to be found in the formal 
structures of the Party, which was nothing more than an attempt to institutionalise 
the discourse of the revolution. The PRI formally incorporated a ‘worker sector,’ 
a ‘peasant sector,’ a ‘business sector,’ and a ‘popular sector,’ to claim to be 
representing the interests of all sectors of society simultaneously and with the 
same policies, reached through the thorough negotiation among the sectors until 
consensus was achieved. Moreover, for at least fifty years the Party maintained 
very open and flexible recruitment, resorting mostly to co-option and corruption 
and to only selective repression, as if to further advance its grip of society at large. 
(Hanmett, 1999: 265-272) And one last feature of the practices that assured their 
hegemony worth mentioning at this point, was the unwritten law that, in order to 
reach the sort of alternation in power of Parties to the left and to the right of the 
pohtical spectrum found in so-called established democracies, this was to be 
achieved in Mexico by an in-built balance of the Party: each president would try 
to distant himself as much as possible from his predecessor, often by adopting the 
opposite sort of pohcies that had characterised the preceding regime. (Philip, 
1991: 6) This thus rendered some conservative governments and some liberal 
ones, always without resorting to a Party other than the PRI, which officially 
admitted to ‘mixed capitalism.’ (Meyer, 1999: 623)
In this way, through equations and differentiations embodied in 
representations that set the boundaries of ‘our identity,’ and through the process of
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institutionalisation mentioned above, the revolution, acting as a nodal point in the 
discourse, was able not only to articulate the national identity, but also to 
redevelop it so as to allow the government to take advantage of the possibilities it 
offered for the stability of the regime.
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The Discourse on World Politics
Having outlined those elements for the construction of the national identity 
developed from within Mexican boundaries, and precisely because identities are 
constructed in negative terms, that is, in terms of what one is not, we must now 
turn our attention to those elements from outside the social and territorial 
boundary, or in other words, to the subject-position created for Mexico within the 
broader discourse of international politics.
If the domestic dislocatory experience of the revolution at the beginning of 
the century enabled an almost all-encompassing discourse to emerge in Mexico, it 
can be argued that, from a discourse analysis perspective, the very dislocatory 
experience of the Second World War in turn brought about a new discourse into 
world politics: a discourse that, on the one hand, reiterated ‘the nation’ as the 
legitimate political unit around which, as it were, sets of essences (selves) 
clustered, enshrined in the right to self-determination. And on the other hand, this 
discourse also constructed the world as a political field through antagonisms 
between ‘the East’ and ‘the West,’ revolving around floating signifiers that have 
been very much used in politics for the past century, such as ‘freedom,’ ‘justice,’ 
and crucially ‘democracy.’ Let us look at the field that resulted out of ‘nations’ 
split along an ‘East/West’ divide and the position this created for Mexico.
Producing 'the WesV during the Cold War: Freedom, Democracy, 
Prosperity
Broadly speaking, the Cold War can be characterised as the confrontation 
between two competing narratives, each one of which attempted to supply 
meanings for democracy, prosperity, freedom and crucially justice, around which 
the respective political elites sought to both account for their hegemony and 
reassure their populations with regards to their way of life, by means of affirming 
their conunitment to the ‘right’ or ‘true’ project. (Gray, 2000: 23) These claims to 
the truth in turn justified the battles, both physical and ideological, that attempted 
to bring further states into either of these two political fields. (Booth, 1998: 35)
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But more importantly, this confrontation also allowed both the defence of their 
respective identities, not only because each other’s existence was due to the 
continuous threat, spanning seventy years, that unified ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ but also 
because failure could be justified by placing blame on the other, in what Connolly 
has called a problem of evil: “the evil that flows from the attempt to establish 
security of identity for any individual or group by defining the other that exposes 
sore spots in one’s identity as evil or irrational.” (Connolly, 1991: 8)
It seems to be the end of these cohesion-leading circumstances that 
NATO’s Secretary General mourned when lamenting, perhaps ironically but 
nonetheless with a grain of truth, the passing of the Cold War in the following 
terms:
“...When the Cold War was coming to an end...of course, we were 
mesmerised by the ‘velvet revolutions’ of 1989, but we were also 
worried. We had always wanted it to happen, but now, as it was 
happening, there was also an unease as to where all this would lead. In 
a sense, we were like the Lady at the bar of the Titanic. When the 
iceberg struck she turned to the waiter and said: ‘Yes, I ordered ice, 
but this is ridiculous
The Western narrative, based on the main tenets of liberalism, constructed 
its subjects as free, autonomous individuals. Society is not a whole that is more 
than the sum of its parts. Responsibility for prosperity and blame for unfairness 
therefore lie largely in the individual —or else, in contingency. The pursuit of 
individual interests best serves social interests. The Eastern narrative’s subject for 
its part is above all a social product, determined by a society whose freedom it 
constrains. In this view it is the system that is primarily responsible for justice, 
conceived as social justice, and the interests of the individual are best served by 
the pursuit of social interests. Both these discourses share the basis of the 
Enlightenment. (Gray, 2000: 23-24; Kaldor, 1990: 115) They are
oversimphfications of longstanding pohtical debates, expressing and synthesising 
the ultimate lack at the heart of society as well as the desire to overcome it: a lack, 
and in fact an impossibility, of coincidence, of achieving an overlapping between
Secretary General's Mountbatten Lecture, “NATO in the New Millennium,” 15 February 
2001, University of Edinburgh.
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the interests of the individual and the interests of the community, an overlap only 
conceivable as a particular embodiment of the universal, as the absolute. "^  ^
Therefore, they can be regarded as two different ways of expressing a failure to 
achieve the whole, as the evidence of limitation, which Connolly’s remark alludes 
to in its characterisation of the definition of evil as that which exposes these 
limitations — ‘sore spots’— inherent in being. As put by Steinback: “Maybe the 
whole world needs Russians. I suppose that even in Russia they need Russians. 
Maybe Russia’s Russians are called Americans.”^^  (Quoted in Galeano, 2001)
But during the Cold War, these antagonistic positions provided the basis 
on which meanings for key floating signifiers such as ‘freedom,’ ‘prosperity’ and 
‘democracy’ were constructed, in a complex, self-referential intertwining, always 
in relation to the Other. In this relationship, it was the Western discourse that was 
clearly dominant. Thus Western economies were free in the sense that they were 
not planned, like their Eastern counterparts. All sorts of positive connotations 
were attached to this lack of planning, presented not as the mere product of 
randomness nor of fate, but as a Darwinian arrangement that responded to a 
process of trial and error, which rendered the ‘surviving’ arrangement the ‘fittest,’ 
the natural way.^  ^ In this way, planning was associated with manufacturing or 
designing, with artificiality and thus fallibility. Moreover, freedom of the market 
was extended to mean a free society. (Costigliola, 2004: 289) Prosperity in turn 
was defined as the direct result of this freedom. All this was cast in a variety of 
representations, ranging from popular culture to high art. (Shaw, 2001: 1) 
Regarding the former, there is a body of literature on the reception of such 
cultural products as Hollywood fihns and TV programmes. (Stam and Habiba, 
2000: 381-401; Schiller, 1991; Mattelart, 1984) Regarding the latter, research on
As Laclau has noted, both Hegel and Marx proposed utopias that attempted to achieve this 
impossible overlap: Hegel by posing a state which comprises it all, the absolute, and Marx, 
through the disappearance of the state. (Laclau, Forthcoming)
Indeed I would argue one of the reasons why the binary opposition between Islam and the 
West seems to be gaining currency in some theories of International Relations is that it allows 
for the same projection of ‘sore spots’ into the other to take place. The Western assumption of 
superiority to Islam is “only the mirror image of the positions held by many, perhaps most 
Muslims.” (Brown, 2002: 294)
This is of course the view underpinning the ‘end of history’ thesis, regarding liberal 
democracy as the final destination in a human journey that was sometimes led astray, through 
socialism. (Fukuyama, 1989)
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Abstract Expressionism in painting, the movement that, promoted by the CIA via 
the Museum of Modem Art in New York, emerged and succeeded during the 
Cold War, has concluded that: “By giving their paintings an individualist 
emphasis and eliminating recognisable subject-matter, the abstract-expressionists 
[achieved] a purely political phenomenon: the supposed divorce between art and 
politics.” (Cockcroft, 1974: 41) Moreover
“The movement’s emphasis on spontaneity and individual freedom of 
action was easily made to fit the rhetoric that posited these qualities as 
quintessentially American, in stark contrast to the conformism and 
lack of individual freedom represented by Socialist Realism in the 
Eastern Bloc.” (Bohm-Duchen, 2001: 212)
Abstract expressionism in painting had its ideological equivalent in 
minimalism in other forms of artistic expression, such as sculpture and 
architecture. However, it was the privileged discourse of science, specifically 
economics, that through its claims of a knowledge closer to ‘the truth,’ was most 
influential in this respect. In the words of Hayek:
“.. .What is threatened by our present political trends [the rise of social 
democracy in Europe] is not just our economic prosperity, not just our 
comfort, or the rate of economic growth...It is very much more. It 
is...our civilisation...The fact is...that if at any point of the past man 
had mapped out his future on the basis of the then-existing knowledge 
and then followed this plan, we would not be where we are. We would 
not only be much poorer, we would not only be less wise, but we 
would also be less moral...We owe the fact that not only our 
knowledge has grown, but also our morals have improved...not to 
anybody planning for such a development, but to the fact that in an 
essentially free society certain trends have prevailed because they 
made for a peaceful, orderly, and progressive society.” (Hayek, 1968)
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According to this view, producing without planning, following no more 
rules than allowing the markets’ freedom i.e. absence of rules, would result in 
going beyond the cover of the bare necessities that was the case in the East, 
creating an excess, a surplus, always varied, presenting ever more choices to 
exercise freedom. (Kaldor, 1990: 106, 114; Medhurst, 2000: 13) In cases of 
successful production and distribution, centralised economies were criticised for 
presenting a lack of choice to consumers, which was equated to poverty. This was 
always contrasted with the abundance and options available to consumers, the 
preferred subjects of the Western discourse. As put by a woman in Poland:
“Once when I was in Warsaw, a friend told me about a spate of red- 
haired women: suddenly it seemed that half of the women in the city 
had red hair, a phenomenon that couldn’t pass unnoticed...imagine 
those women confronted by the fact that there is no other colour in the 
store...they have no choice. [Those were] years of the aesthetics of 
poverty. Even though I’m not an American, it seemed there was 
absolutely nothing to buy.” (Drakulik, 1992: 24)
Democracy in the West was the political embodiment of this. Substantial 
definitions of it —i.e. claims to being ‘the government of the people’— were 
derided in opposition to procedural definitions, that is democracy as the holding 
of elections, or in other words the availability of options, in the form of at least 
two competing Parties. Only the existence of respected alternatives secured the 
free and fair elections without which democracy in the West simply could not 
happen. The identities of the United States and the Soviet Union were 
unequivocally defined along these lines, together with their respective spheres of 
influence.^^ This gave rise to the ‘First’ and ‘Second’ worlds, and countries in the 
‘Third’ world, however non-aligned their governments might have proclaimed 
them, were also integrated into the security system of one or the other. (Kaldor, 
1990: 104-115)
37 Although rather nuanced in Western Europe through social democracy.
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Despite the fact that the revolution against Diaz in the early twentieth 
century and the arrangements whereby the armed struggles amongst the 
revolutionaries themselves were terminated, —i.e. the means of building 
consensus in Mexico— had involved an affinity with the East, the Mexican state, 
as mentioned in chapter two, was bound to be constructed as (developing) 
Western due to its geopohtical position.
However, what was fundamental for the regime’s success in producing the 
meaning of the Mexican identity during this period was precisely its refusal to 
become in relation to one of these identities only, or in other words, its 
undecidability, that is, its simultaneous maintenance of both sets of frontiers. As 
Derrida has shown undecidability is not simply concerned with ‘indeterminacy,’ 
but it rather designates “a determinate oscillation between possibilities [which are 
themselves] highly determined in strictly defined situations.” (Derrida, 1988: 148)
Undecidable identities are therefore very resilient. Thus by drawing on 
forms of interpellation that constructed subjects-positions in both prevalent 
discourses, the regime was able to cope with pressures to disarticulate signifiers 
from their hegemonic narrative, since in strictly defined situations, different sets 
of meanings for democracy, prosperity and freedom were deployed to signify the 
national identity. This undecidability took place both in the international context 
and in the domestic realm.
The International Context
On the one hand, because many revolutionary upheavals after 1945 described 
themselves as ‘national liberation’ movements, because many were linked to 
Marxism, and because of the force of the universal ‘nation’ as opposed to any 
particular, a focus in the nation and nationalism or any related term acquired for a 
while socialistic connotations. But on the other, the link between democracy and 
nationalism has been explored and described as ‘ineradicable,’ since it replaces 
the link between the Prince and God that allowed the former to embody power. 
(Lefort, quoted by Torfing, 1999: 192-193)
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“The Democratic Revolution involves ‘the dissolution of the markers 
of certainty’ and undermines the possibility of embodying symbolic 
power in a particular body. As a result, the locus of power becomes an 
empty place, [it] cannot be occupied.. .No government can appropriate 
power, as its exercise is subject to procedures of periodical 
redistribution and controlled contest...Nationalism represents the 
repressed Other of democratic universalisation, which is necessitated 
by liberal democracy, but which, nevertheless, threatens the very logic 
of the latter and prevents its ultimate closure.” (Torfing, 1999: 192- 
193)
In other words, a certain amount of nationalism is required for democracy 
to work, as democracy purports to be the government of ‘the people.’ But which 
people? How is the legitimate unit of ‘the people’ constructed? Of course through 
nationalism, which is precisely “a theory of political legitimacy.. .which holds that 
the political and the national unit be congruent.” (Gellner, 1983: 1)
In the period spanning from the revolution and until 1945 when the 
‘national’ project was retaken by the Mexican political elite, Russia underwent its 
Soviet Revolution and appeared to emerge as victorious of the Second World War 
as the United States did. As has been noted by E. H. Carr, Woodrow Wilson 
included the Soviet Union in the “democratic world” when he proclaimed 
democracy as an aim of the allies in the First World War. (Carr, 1945: 1) Later, in 
his speech on 3 July 1941, Stalin declared the Soviet Union had “merged with the 
struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for independence and democratic 
liberty.” (Carr, 1945: 2) Therefore, the close links developed between the 
Mexican elite and the (splitting) Soviet elite at the time could not be then framed 
in terms of the East/West antagonism that would ensue the end of the Second 
World War: such subject positions had not yet been shaped by the discourse.
From the end of the Second World War, however, it would be clear that 
while the United States constructed democracy in antagonism to autocracy or 
dictatorship, the USSR constructed the meaning for it by relating democracy, in 
opposition, to aristocracy or oligarchy. In other words, probably drawing on the 
Aristotelean definition of democracy as “the government where the supreme 
power of the polity is vested in those who possess no considerable property,” 
democracy was in the Soviet Union to be that kind of government where ‘the 
people’ ruled, rendered in this case as ‘the proletariat,’ and not the Tsarist dynasty
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or ‘the nobility.’ (Carr, 1945: 7 quoting Aristotle) By then it can be argued that 
the discourse of the East and the West divide addressed Mexico in such a way as 
to place it within the (dominant) Western set of oppositions, not only as a result of 
having its origin as a nation in Europe, but also as a result of its geo-pohtical 
position.
This was, of course, never completely achieved. The logic of equivalence 
that alluded to a pan-American sentiment which would link Mexico and indeed 
Latin America with the United States and Canada, whom in turn represented the 
West and antagonised with the East, or the same logic when used to point at the 
common interests of American and various Latin American, and certainly 
Mexican ehtes with the same Western result were also faced with the logic of 
differentiation involved in the Third World status of Mexico and Latin America in 
general. Thus, the Mexican identity can only be understood as undecidable, 
changing its meaning depending on the context in which it was deployed.
In this way, the period from 1946 to 1964 was one of growing American 
influence and intervention in the hemisphere, when the new political field was 
being defined in terms of very deep, even polarised antagonisms. The United 
States had the ability and the willingness to intervene, fostered by their victory in 
the World Wars. Latin America was closely integrated into the Western security 
system. The US had the monopoly of arms and military training as well as 
economic dominance, and there was no external challenger in the region. (Hurrell, 
1999: 156) Thus the Mexican identity as Western was thoroughly affirmed. 
Mexican administrations of this period rejected previous ones, specially the 
Cardenas one, as radical and detached themselves from it. Indeed the presidencies 
of Miguel Aleman (1946 -  1952), Ruiz Cortinez (1952 -  1958) and Lopez Mateos 
(1958 -  1964) strongly favoured the business sector, re-approached the Church 
and in many ways un-did some of the most controversial policies of the Cardenas 
administration, such as ‘socialist education’ and the land reform, which they both 
reduced in scope and progressively slowed down.
On the other hand, the period from 1965 to 1982, when the hegemony of 
the West was challenged and it was less able to articulate floating signifiers gave 
way to a shift in the positions occupied by the more developed Latin American
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countries. American hegemonic decline became obvious in Vietnam, and Western 
Europe replaced the US as main arms supplier in the region. The Alliance for 
Progress failed and produced disenchantment. In Mexico, this meant an 
opportunity to construct its national identity resorting to antagonism against the 
West, as belonging to the ‘Third World,’ re-drawing the boundaries of its ‘us’ as 
to include the very same ones it had wished to be differentiated from right after 
independence: the rest of Latin America.
The 1970s, under president Luis Echeverria (1970 -  1976), were a 
particularly active period: Mexico publicly opposed all the US Cold War policies, 
although in the détente stage at that moment, by for instance giving its unreserved 
support to the Chilean government of Salvador Allende, supplying it with oil and 
credits, and opening Mexico to Chilean refugees under the Pinochet dictatorship, 
with whom relations were immediately broken. In the United Nations, Mexico 
and Peru had a key role with the drawing and approval of the Charter of Rights 
and Duties for States, demands for a New Economic International Order and a 
new Law of the Sea as well as with the Non-aligned Movement and the formation 
of the Group of 77. Mexico voted Zionism to be a form of racial discrimination. 
The Third World identity was so embraced during the Echeverria period that an 
institution, the Centre for Studies of the Third World, was formally created in 
1976. The late 1970s under José Lopez Portillo (1977 -  1982) also pursued this 
identity, for instance fostering close links with Cuba and supporting the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. (Philip, 1991: 119-120)
From the 1980s onwards, the discourse of the revolution started to lose 
hegemony over the political field in Mexico, just as the broader international 
discourse into which it was inserted started to lose hegemony too, specially after 
1986, when Gorvachev’s glasnost and perestroika eroded the antagonistic status 
of the Eastern identity. (Pellicer, 1994: 222) Mexico downplayed protest against 
US intervention in Panama and refrained from forming a debtors cartel. (Russell, 
1994: 313)
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By 1989, the whole East/West divide discourse collapsed, and so did the 
Mexican political system.^  ^ Although the discourse of the revolution had 
effectively stopped being hegemonic by the end of the 1980s, institutional inertia 
more or less carried the PRI forward until the end of the century, when the new, 
profound dislocation that had hit the international discourse hit Mexico. The 
‘governments of the revolution,’ which had survived the death of that revolution 
for sixty years, were finally formally buried in June 2000. It is my contention that 
with them, the Mexican identity that had been so relevant for their construction 
and functioning also changed, and the discourse involved in this change, that is, 
the challenges to the discourse of the revolution, are thus analysed in chapters 
three and four.
The Domestic Realm
Undecidability was also constantly evident in the domestic realm. Democracy 
could be western or eastern: inasmuch as re-election was banned and elections 
were carried out every six years, there could be no more military or civilian 
dictators. Moreover, competitive politics did take place, albeit within the Party 
and not amongst Parties. (Hamnett, 1999: 265) And inasmuch as it was the PRI 
that remained in power, it would be ‘the government of the people.’
As for prosperity, the years of the ‘Mexican miracle’ combined with the 
high revenue during the oil boom and the strong support to private enterprise 
specially during the Miguel Aleman and Ruiz Cortmez administrations, there 
certainly was diversity, plenty to be bought, if by the privileged few only, but 
stress was always laid on the availability of goods. (Russell, 1994: 311) This 
western Mexican identity was —and is— invoked by statistics from macro­
economics such as the GDP, amount of direct and indirect (now foreign)
In a dramatic breakdown of the institutional order, PRI Candidate to the Presidency Luis 
Donaldo Colossio was assassinated on 23 May 1994 and Party Secretary General and former 
governor of the state of Guerrero José Francisco Ruiz Massieu on 28 September of the same 
year. His brother and General Attorney Mario Rmz Massieu apparently killed himself on 15 
September 1999. Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo was murdered in 1993. Also, a number 
of key PRI pohticians began to leave the Party, many to join the PAN.
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investment, literacy percentage and life expectancy, etc.^  ^On the other hand, the 
Third World identity, poor-thus-potentially-communist and a threat, mostly 
alluded to during the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo times, constructed a mirror 
image of Aleman’s Mexico: a heavily indebted, underdeveloped country. In this 
case it was microeconomics that were invoked: per capita income, inequality 
coefficient, rate of under/unemployment."^^ The country had prospered in the sense 
of covering for the bare necessities, if judged by the welfare state that provided 
social security, free education and heavily subsidised services. Despite the fact 
that regardless the degree of ‘freedom’ economic success or failure can be located 
in time, these identities were not restricted to specific dates, but adopted 
alternatively throughout as determined by the discourse."^^
By 1989 however, pressures to decide the Mexican identity as Western 
could no longer be contained, and the country underwent a series of sweeping 
reforms which dramatically altered the pohtical and economic landscapes. The 
reforms involved, in the financial sector, the hberalisation of credits and interest 
rates, the creation of instruments of large scale savings —notably additional 
pension funds AFORES—, the privatisation of the banking system and the 
introduction of foreign competition; in the fiscal sector, taxes were lowered, 
exceptions reduced and mechanisms for collection strengthened; in the trade 
sector, non tariff barriers were eliminated; All industries that belonged to the 
government except for some natural resources —Pemex among them— were 
privatised: telephones, mining, steal, agribusiness, aviation and food; the number 
of state-owned companies went from 1,044 in 1985 to 207 in 2003. (Mendez,
The latest estimations of these by the World Bank are as follows: GDP: USD$ 637.2 billion 
in 2002; life expectancy 73 years; literacy of 94 per cent for adult males and 90 per cent for 
females; Overall, the World Bank classifies Mexico as ‘upper middle income’ and ‘less 
indebted.’ (The World Bank Annual Report, 2002) More recently, membership of the OECD 
and NAFTA is also taken into account.
These were as follows: per capita income: USD$ 5,910; Gini coefficient: 53.1 (Report for 
Congress, 2002); unemployment: 2.4 (INEGI, 2002: 135); rates for underemployment are not 
available.
Indeed, this undecidabihty often led to puzzled observers either pointing out the 
contradictions, or else attempting to provide coherence by constructing explanations that 
accounted for the contradictions: politically “a Party that could embrace the leftist policies of 
Cardenas and the business-oriented policies of Aleman was ideologically bankrupt,” while the 
type of economy sponsored by the PRI was variously described as “statist,” “socialist” and “free 
enterprise.” (Meyer, 1999: 623, 636) In Mexico it often went as “state capitalism.”
A Post-Structuralist Approach to National Identity After the Cold War: the C ase  of Mexico 6 7
2004) foreign investment was encouraged in areas previously classified as 
‘collective,’ such as the building of roads, bridges and highways and 
communications; redistribution of land was officially stopped, and the Church 
was restored its former privileges. In education, new textbooks were introduced, 
especially of history, for all primary schools, whether state owned or private. 
Their versions of key passages of Mexican history upon which the legitimacy of 
the PRI largely depended, specially the revolution, were radically challenged. 
(Gonzalez, 1998: 37-65; Hamnett, 1999: 285-287)
Most historical accounts of the process whereby it became necessary to 
undertake such profound reforms provide explanations for the changes that took 
place during the 1990s on the basis of what they see as the terminal crisis of an 
inward-looking model of economic growth, where the heavy participation of the 
state attempted to develop the country, meaning to achieve industrialisation, under 
closely controlled, protected conditions, fully compatible with the aspirations, if 
not to autarky, at least to economic independence inherent in nationalism, in fact 
at times described as economic nationalism."^  ^(Smith, 1991:11) In these accounts, 
the younger cadres of the pohtical class who reached the top positions during this 
time are credited with having realised this model was no longer viable, and with 
having undertaken the set of reforms to liberalise the economy according to a 
discourse that no longer stressed the need to be economically independent, but to 
become ‘plugged,’ into the global economy. (Weintraub, 1990: 17; O’Toole, 
2002)
What I want to suggest here, however, is that this process can be better 
comprehended if these changes are conceptualised as the response to the inabihty 
to hold the boundaries that had so far sustained the identity. For it seemed that the 
situation would no longer arise when the Eastern-Third World identity would 
make sense. What had been ‘the East’ was westernising at a prodigious speed, a 
process which symbolically culminated with the membership to NATO of Russia.
Cordera and Telle, described this model as ‘the nationalist approach’ and contrast it with ‘the 
neoliberal approach’: “The nationalist approach would make the state the guiding force in 
development, directly and through its management; foster the production of capital goods in 
Mexico; strive for food self-sufficiency; deal with inflation by means other than wage 
containment; and expand large, state-owned projects in energy, petrochemicals, steel and 
fertilisers.” (Cordera and Tello, 1983: 21; also Ojeda, 1983: 315-330)
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Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union had a devastating effect for the regime 
in two ways: it considerably weakened the western subject-positions, in that the 
East/West dichotomy no longer worked as a difference-maker, and it rendered 
obsolete the other half, as it were, of the signifiers on which the Mexican identity 
depended.
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The Discourse on Film
At this point, the last section of the chapter, it will be useful to sum up what the 
main aim has been so far: in this chapter I have sought to establish what the 
discourse that constituted the national identity as ‘Mexican’ consisted in; how it 
arose, on the one hand, in opposition to the Diaz dictatorship, and on the other, as 
part of the discourse on world politics that since the end of the Second World War 
divided the world into East and West.
Having established the role of both the revolution and the Cold War in the 
articulation of the Mexican identity, we will now turn our attention to the way it 
was represented on film. As discussed in the introduction, ever since its invention 
cinema has had a key role in the making and development of national identities:
“In film we can see how the historicist vision of the nation, and its 
ethnic fund of myths, memories, symbols and traditions, is unfolded 
through an increasingly naturalistic mode of expression, and is made 
to carry an ever-wider range of meanings and emotions...to a greatly 
enlarged national membership.” (Smith, 2000: 45)
There are many instances of nationalism being enacted through films, 
ranging from Hollywood’s epics such as Griffith’s controversial Birth o f a Nation 
(1915) to Eisenstein’s various films on the Soviet Union and of course the fascist 
films of the 1930s. In all these films, the nation is brought to life as an entity with 
a past and a sense of direction and purpose.'^  ^But even when films are not openly 
dealing with questions of history and purported tradition, they always provide 
spaces where different versions of ‘who we are’ will be put forward, defended and 
contested, where earlier versions of the identity wiU be appropriated by emerging 
elites, and where alternative, sometimes contradictory or conflicting meanings 
will also be expressed. Whether directly or indirectly, films aim to “propose and
Indeed, after watching Birth of a Nation Woodrow Wilson reportedly said “it was like writing 
history with lighting.” (Scott, 2000: 139)
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impose on people a framework in which to interpret the present.” (Foucault, 1989: 
130)
In the case of Mexico, as is well documented in the literature, the 
importance of film has been paramount. (Duran et al., 1996; Hershfield and 
Maciel, 1999; Garcia and Maciel, 2001)"^ "^  Cinema was first brought to the country 
shortly after its invention in 1896 and by 1900 there were already twenty-two 
movie houses in Mexico City and a number of ‘carpas’ (tents) which travelled 
into the countryside, showing a mixture of imported and indigenous filmed 
scenes. With prices soon down from one peso to about five to two cents it became 
hugely popular. (Garcia, 1999: 6) Its main aims were regarded as providing 
entertainment, education and opportunities for the moral improvement of the 
population. (Campos et al., 2001: 44) Throughout the revolution and the early 
1920s film production began to develop into an incipient industry. Many 
documentaries of the key battles and decisive episodes of the struggle itself were 
filmed on the spot. In fact “each faction [of the revolutionary army] and almost 
every general had a more or less permanent cinematographer.” (Garcia, 1999: 9)
Shortly after Cardenas first engaged in the development of the 
revolutionary nationalism project, the film industry was the third largest in the 
country and one of the largest in the world: when the total population was around 
25 million, there were 72 producing companies employing 32,000 workers and 4 
major studios which imported their products throughout the Spanish-speaking 
world and the US southwest. There were 1,500 theatres throughout the country, 
200 of them in Mexico City, dedicating 40 per cent of screen time to the 
exhibition of Mexican films. (Fein, 1999: 128) “Even in the smallest, most remote 
villages, films were shown and enjoyed by all.” (Hershfield and Maciel, 1999: 33) 
Native stars such as Dolores del Rio and Maria Fehx, Jorge Negrete and Pedro 
Infante proved effective marketing devices that provided stereotypes and sites for 
identification. And if Diego Rivera, David Alfaro Siqueiros and José Clemente 
Orozco contributed to the ethnic formation of the nation with their depictions of
It is also worthwhile to mention the work of Carl J. Mora, who in the early 1980s undertook a 
thorough study of Mexican cinema with the explicit aim of seeking to further the understanding 
of Mexican society in the US, as “the two countries share a long border and a troubled history” 
that was partly the outcome, he thought, of representations of Mexicans circulated by 
Hollywood. (Mora, 1982: xüi)
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the glorious indigenous past and the objectification of Indians in ways discussed 
earlier, directors Fernando de Puentes, Emilio Fernandez—an ‘Indian’ himself—, 
Ismael Rodriguez and Alejandro Galindo filmed their rather equivalent 
contributions on celluloid, despite the fact that there never was an official policy 
for cinema of the kind that promoted painting. (Campos et al., 2001: 50)
Here we will deal with three issues that bore on the creation of the 
Mexican identity that prevailed for the best part of the twentieth century. These 
are the role of the revolution in delimiting the political field by opposition to the 
Diaz regime, interpellating people as national subjects, so that a whole discourse 
could be woven around the revolution and become hegemonic; the forging of 
‘Mexicanity’ through the specific, consensus-making representations of ‘Mexico’ 
and ‘Mexicans’ and crucially of ‘Mexicans’ in relation to ‘Americans’ put 
forward by the national cinema; and finally, evidence will be provided of the 
undecidability of the identity in the discourse on world politics, where ‘Mexicans’ 
were represented by Hollywood as belonging to the eastern or the western parts of 
the divide depending on the discursive context.
Negotiating The National Identity on Film 1910-1989 
The Revolution as Discursive Horizon
In 1979 a “basic filmography of the revolution” listed sixty films either narrating 
the revolution itself, or, more importantly, where the revolution is the setting in 
which the story takes place, thus turning it into the natural context in which ‘our’ 
lives or the lives of ‘our ancestors’ took place."^  ^ (Mraz, 2001: 81) Most, but not 
all of these films present the past as a long wait when injustice was suffered at the 
hands of Diaz —and before Diaz, injustice had been suffered at the hands of ‘the 
Spaniards,’ ‘the Europeans’ and ‘the Americans,’ thereby equating Diaz with 
‘them’— to be redressed in the present, the moment of realising the Self, through 
the revolution.
Apart from the “Mexicanista” school which in the 1920s accounted for 
half the total production, films dealing with the revolution were regarded as the
45 This number does not take into account the documentaries.
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first truly Mexican ones since they were, in the words of an enthusiastic critic who 
later became a —melodrama— director as well, “flesh of our flesh and breath of 
our sweet and at the same time tragic land” unlike other earlier national 
production that dealt with the same topics as Hollywood or even French and 
Italian films, also popular at that time. (Mraz, 2001: 86 quoting Juan Bustillo Oro) 
They were also deemed particularly Mexican in that they did not necessarily have 
a happy ending. In fact, some films on the revolution regarded as among the best 
were highly critical of it, but this “telling of stories that faithfully reflect our harsh 
and tragic way of being” in contrast to the “light” and “banal” content of 
Hollywood was also highlighted as a “Mexican” aesthetics. (Mraz, 2001: 88 
quoting director de Puentes) Technically too the obhque perspective favoured by 
another key director of the national cinema, Emilio Fernandez, as opposed to the 
lineal perspective of most Hollywood films, is said to have “challenged the artistic 
traditions of the West and the dominant ideology those traditions implied.” 
(Ramfrez-Berg, 2001: 124) Thus the national identity in cinema is sought by 
opposition to Hollywood as regards the choice of topics and narrative style, and in 
opposition to both Hollywood and more generally ‘the West’ as to the technical 
style of early directors. Films on the revolution or with a revolutionary setting 
ranked high on the three criteria.
Among the early ones, the trilogy filmed by Fernando de Fuentes, 
comprising El Prisionero 13 (1933), El Compadre Mendoza (1935) and the first 
Mexican blockbuster jVâmonos con Pancho Villa! (1935) has been widely 
regarded as the most influential: “the day we have a cinema on the same moral 
standing as...[de Fuentes’ films] our national identity will have been defined and 
we will be saved.'"^  ^ (Bustillo Oro in Mraz, 2001: 86, my emphasis) The three 
films deal with the losing factions of the revolution, i.e. Huertismo, Zapatismo 
and Villismo respectively, and in the three of them the portrayal that emerges of 
the struggle is a particularly pessimistic one, where the loss and pain that the 
revolution entailed by far eclipse the transformations it sought to bring about. El 
Prisionero paints a particularly negative picture of the army, where the
Indeed the canon credits El Compadre Mendoza as, arguably, the best Mexican film ever 
made, and it was chosen to be shown on the national film library opening night on 17 January 
1974, at the theatre named after de Fuentes.
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protagonist, a colonel, is a drunkard who beats his wife and whose corruption 
leads to the tragic death of his son. El Compadre is based on the treason and 
murder of Zapata, the traitor here being Mendoza, who stands metonymically for 
the whole of the revolution, and the one betrayed a Zapatista called Nieto, a 
surname meaning ‘grandchild,’ who stands for the peasants as a whole. And 
jVamonos! poses some sharp criticism of the lack of ideology of Villa and some 
of his followers who end up killing each other in the same way the revolution was 
‘killed’ by the revolutionaries. (Ibid: 98)
So how can films on the revolution in this rather dark vein have 
contributed to the making of the Barthian myth? First of all, as mentioned above, 
films critical of the revolution are a minority of the total production, and they 
were credited with the creation of a truly national aesthetics. Second, this trilogy 
in particular contributed to the de-legitimation of two of the losing factions, 
namely Huertismo and Villismo. In fact, jVamonos! was filmed on location and in 
a studio in which the Cârdenas government was a major stake-holder, Latin 
American Cinematography CLASA. ‘The revolution’ was thus becoming a 
particular version of it, namely the one sponsored by the government: cinema 
helped to ‘domesticate’ the actual events, by interpreting them, making them fit 
into the broader narrative of the national identity. Also the Zapata faction, 
although a loser in the struggle, definitely comes across as heroic, so vital for 
nationalism, and although the 1917 Constitution mostly reflects the interests of 
the —winning— middle class, Cardenas did address some of the peasants’ and the 
working class demands during his administration in order to expand his basis of 
support. (Levy and Székely, 1989: 30) Moreover, favourable, legitimating 
comparisons between the censorship that prevailed during the Diaz dictatorship 
and the openness of the revolutionary governments could be drawn. As put by de 
Fuentes himself: “We tell our people the truth because we think our people are 
now educated and mature enough to deal with the truth.” (Mraz, 2001: 88, my 
emphasis) More important however is the way these films bind signifiers together 
into a narrative that made them signify ‘Mexicanity.’ Take for instance El 
Compadre. In the establishing shot we see a furrow, later to reahse it has been 
‘dug’ by the rifle of an exhausted Zapatista on the run. In this way a link is
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created between the Zapatistas and the land, at the same time that the viewer’s 
position —and sympathy— is placed together with the Zapatistas. (Mraz, Ibid) It 
is this subtle work of creating subject positions for the viewer that address him or 
her as Mexican and in endowing land with Zapatista associations that make it a 
specific, national land that films on the revolution turned nationalist discourse into 
the practice of an identity."^ ^
Class, Ethnic and Gender Diversity Become a Unified ‘We’
Kevin Robins and Asu Askoy call “deep nation” the nation as imagined by the 
elites. “It invents the ordered image of a people and then mobilises this image 
against [the people’s] own disorderly existence.”"^  ^ (Robins and Askoy, 2000: 
208) Between 1930s and 1960s, a progressively modernising deep Mexican nation 
was put forward by a host of directors on screen. The first stage took place in the 
1930s and 1940s. Regional stereotypes were depicted as national types. Films of 
this period typically take place in the countryside and rural settings where 
‘Mexicans’ —fishermen, peasants, charros, “innocent senoritas with long braided 
hair and peppery old housekeepers”— inhabit haciendas, ranches and villages. 
(Lopez, 2000: 427) Most of these films tell the story of the revolution reaching 
forward into every distant comer of the land, bringing progress and social justice. 
The highly successful, reactionary genre comedia ranchera though, produced a 
witty critique of the agrarian reforms sponsored by Cardenas, via plots which 
revolved around people refusing the ethnic/social identities assigned to them and 
whose happy ending came about when the charro successfully returned everyone 
to ‘their place.’ Later, in a variety of melodramas charros were shown to leave 
their “class affiliations behind for the greater glory of the Mexican nation.” 
(Ramirez- Berg, 1992: 99) Again the most relevant film of the genre, Allâ en el 
Rancho Grande (1936) was filmed by de Puentes. The film
Women also figure prominently in de Puentes’ films, and the role their every day, ‘simple’ 
activities such as cooking, sewing and selling food has in allowing the revolution to happen is 
fully acknowledged. (Mraz, 2001: 97; Hershfield, 2001: 129) This did not happen in de 
Puentes’ later films, which tend to glorify Machismo and its alhance with the state’s power 
structures.
With this regard, hugely prolific and successful director Emiho Pemândez is quoted as 
saying: “there is only one Mexico —the one I made up!” (Ramirez-Berg, 2001: 110)
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“unearthed what [international] audiences seemed to have been 
looking for in the Mexican cinema; the presentation of a ‘Mexican’ 
vision of Mexico that coincided with their expectations of the nature 
of national local colour... .After Rancho Grande, the Mexican cinema 
enjoyed the prestige of authenticity granted by even the most 
adulterated folklore...it combined appealing exoticism with a 
comforting familiarity.” (Lopez, Ibid)
Rancho Grande was awarded the first prize for Mexican cinematography 
in the Venice festival. It was subtitled and distributed by United Artists 
throughout the United States and Latin America, since it was deemed “an 
exemplary Mexican film.” (Fein, 1996: 53) The formula continues to be used by 
many films addressed to a global audience.
During the 1940s and 1950s the industry continued to expand. The end of 
the Second World War was for Mexico a time of economic growth and further 
industrialisation. The city thus became the main territory where ‘Mexicans’ 
existed. ‘Mexicans’ were now people in the liberal professions, salesmen, 
students, consumers. ‘Mexico’ became the parks, universities, supermarkets and 
also the slums of the big city, where cars and motorcycles began to replace bikes. 
The state created a bank for the funding of films, launched its theatre monopoly 
and planned the creation of the National Film Library. The preferred genres 
during this period were comedy and melodrama, that “purveyor of collective 
conventions [and provider of] a sort of sentimental education for the tribe.” 
(Hemândez, 1999: 102) Although mostly didactic in content, melodrama had 
nonetheless some subversive potential. Plots revolved around the social problems 
engendered by modernisation —for instance Los Olvidados, (Bunuel: 1950)— the 
loss of tradition, the growing role of women in the economy and the changing 
nature of the family. During the administration of Miguel Aleman in particular 
there was a series of films on prostitutes. Although feminist research has carefully 
documented the way films constructed a subordinate role for Mexican women 
during the 1930s, Joanne Hershfield has persuasively argued that representations
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during the 1940s and 1950s successfully “threatened the patriarchal ideology that 
was [by then] so contradictory that it could no longer manage to exert full 
control,” thus highlighting another opposition between the Diaz regime and the 
governments ‘of the revolution.’ (Hershfield, 2001: 151)
Crucial to this period were the consensus-making films of Ismael 
Rodriguez Nosotros los Pobres (We, the Poor, 1947) and Ustedes los Ricos (You, 
the Rich, 1948), featuring pop-idol Pedro Infante, which romanticise and glorify 
poverty in a thoroughly Catholic background, portraying a nation in which 
loyalties of members cut across social class. (Ayala: 2001, 289) The same director 
also resolved race conflicts through intermarriage, as in Angelitos Negros, (Black 
Angels, 1948) where the starring Ruiz family is deployed to stand for the 
‘ethnically resolved’ Mexican family. (Hershfield, 1999: 96) The whole series of 
heroic Indians produced from the late 1930s, where ‘Indians’ were usually played 
by mestizos or white actors —such as Maria Candelaria (1943) featuring Dolores 
del Rio and Maclovia (1948), featuring Maria Felix— was also important in 
forging this new unity based on a glorious ethnic past, implicitly stressing, 
however, that the only possible ethnic present was mestizo.
‘We’ versus They’
When the Centre for the Research on North America, in the context of the North 
American integration further discussed on chapter three, commissioned from 
experts a series of articles for the book entitled México, Estados Unidos: 
Encuentros y Desencuentros en el Cine (Mexico and the United States on Film: 
Growing Apart and Coming Together) the idea was to compile a balanced account 
in which every instance of ‘growing apart’ could be countered by a case of 
‘coming together.’ It was however utterly difficult to find any ‘coming together’ 
on Mexican film. (Duran et al., 1996) While Americans had very rarely had 
starring roles or been main characters, in the few films where there are American 
characters they had consistently been the ‘they’ against whom ‘we’ must coalesce 
and unify. Campeôn sin Corona (Galindo: 1945), tells the story of a boxing 
champion, suddenly unable to beat his American rival not because of physical 
inferiority but because he realises the rival speaks English. Only when with the
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help of a friend he is able to learn the basics of the language can he retrieve his 
pugilistic skills and win. In La Rosa Blanca (Galvadon: 1961), also produced by 
CLASA, American businessmen try to force a Mexican ranch owner to sell them 
his property, where there is oil. When he refuses, because his ties to the land are 
of a deep, metaphysical nature of love for the homeland and the ancestors, they 
deceive him and murder him. In Espaldas Mojadas {Wetbacks, Galindo: 1954) the 
gringo, a Mr. Sterling, is a heartless abuser of illegal immigrants. In general, if 
Americans partly built their national identity by ‘othering’ Mexicans as 
uncivilised and barbaric, Mexicans built their identity by ‘othering’ Americans as 
a society with weak moral values and lack of conununitarian solidarity. Mexicans 
show respect for traditions, loyalty in friendship and take special care of and pride 
in the family. In short, Americans are represented on film as “rich with regards to 
money, but poor with regards to moral, human quahty.” (Tunon, 1996: 110)
Even worse than Americans themselves are precisely Mexicans who go to 
the United States and their descendents, at the time derided as Pachas. Pachas 
have been a concern of the national cinema from the very beginning. While 
Miguel Contreras’ silent El Hambre sin Patria {The Man without a Fatherland, 
1922) was the first one, the word itself is said to come from a 1945 film in which 
German Valdes Tin Tan, a local comedian, defined himself as a pacha, “a 
Mexican from Los Angeles.” (Maciel, 1996: 181) Pachas continued to be 
depicted on film now and then until the 1980s. Only American women of 
Mexican ancestry are occasionally ‘forgiven,’ as in Las Tres Garcia (Rodriguez, 
1946). Given that the change in status and social standing of Pachas, now more 
commonly referred to as ‘Chicanos,’ ‘Mexican-American’ or even what would 
have before been unthinkable, "Mexicans north of Rio Bravo’ is one of the crucial 
features of the challenge to the identity I maintain has taken place, this topic is 
further discussed in the following chapter."^ ^
49 The relative political power of a state seems often to have been linked to gendered 
representations on film. Research on European films for instance has found that in the series of 
co-productions of the 1950s and 1960s, films with German actors were only successful outside 
of Germany if they were cast in the villainous role, while the male hero was always American, 
supported by a French, Italian or German leading lady. (Bergfelder, 2000: 147)
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The film industry began to decline in the 1960s, following competition 
from television and from Hollywood/^ It improved slightly in the 1970s, when 
Echeverria attempted to use the medium for the promotion of his nationalistic 
pohcies and to co-opt those in the intelligentsia who had been opposing the 
government. But with the financial support came censorship, mostly regarding 
religion, the military and the Party, barely disguised as ‘artistic supervision.’ After 
Echeverria, rampant corruption plagued the institutions comprising the film 
industry until its near-disappearance in the 1990s. This period is further dealt with 
in chapter five below.
Mexico Between the East and the West
Together with the discourse of the revolution, I have argued here that it was also 
the discourse on world politics that created a position for the Mexican state that 
had a bearing on the transformation of the national identity as of the Cold War, to 
be challenged only recently. This was evident all along on Hollywood films, the 
function of which it was, from a discursive point of view, to articulate ‘Mexico’ 
either in chains of equivalence with ‘the United States’ by drawing borders that 
included both on the same side, or on the contrary, to articulate ‘Mexico’ as an 
antagonist by instituting a boundary between it and ‘the West,’ in turn conveyed 
through at least three key interweaving signifiers, namely ‘democracy,’ 
‘prosperity’ and ‘freedom.’ Here we will see how this was done.
Historically, the importance of Hollywood as a ‘manufacturer’ of 
cinematic representations has been undeniable.^^ Hollywood has enjoyed a 
privileged position world wide due to a number of factors: from the very 
beginning, the United States took an industrial approach to film-making, mostly 
concerned with addressing the masses for profit; there were early merges and
50 However, films continue to feature prominently as part of television programming world­
wide, in fact recently becoming the main ‘genre’ for prime-time TV schedules, so the relevance 
of the medium as regards the creation and dissemination of discourses remains high. In Mexico 
films make up about 33 per cent of AAA programming, and films are now also consumed in the 
home-video and DVD market. (Sanchez-Ruiz, 1997; Chapman, 2003: 45)
Hollywood has certainly been politically influential nationally and internationally in other 
ways as well —such as in Chile in 1971 and in South Korea since 1985— but only its cinematic 
representations are discussed here.
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takeovers of producers, distributors and exhibitors, leading to a vertically- 
integrated industry that for several years operated effectively as a mature 
oligopoly; the large domestic market allowed to promote films that were highly 
subsided when exported; and finally, the two world wars had a devastating effect 
on European film industries, Hollywood’s closest competitors. (Ellis, 1982: 198) 
At present, amidst debates on what it means to be ‘Hollywood’ under 
globalisation,^^ it is the third largest industry in the United States, generating a 
yearly income of about USD$ 9.5 bilhon domestically and USD$ 9.6 billion 
internationally plus income from ancillary products, amounting to about 
USD$37.3 billion in total. (Estrada, 2000) Entertainment is the second largest 
American export category after military hardware. Although it is not the biggest 
film industry in terms of production, it is “the one national cinema in the world 
that has a truly global reach” and it is by far the most important in terms of market 
share, especially as of 1991 with the introduction of multiplexes, further discussed 
on chapter five. (Chapman, 2003: 152, 9) American films are shown in more than 
150 countries, and although their market share varies widely, going from less than 
30 per cent in some Asian countries, it reaches almost 100 per cent in many 
others. The average for the European Union, where some of the major film- 
producing nations in the world are located, was 75 per cent in 2001.^  ^ (Eurostat, 
2001) In Mexico it has increased sharply over the years, going from 34.8 in 1980 
to almost 90 per cent in 2002. (Sanchez-Rufz, 1997; Rosenthal, 2003: 326)^ "^
Crucial to this economic success was the development of cinematic genre, 
a set of rules and expectations governing filmmaking, shared by both makers and
By 1990, six of “the big eight” Hollywood studios were “in foreign hands.” (Monaco, 2000: 
255) Columbia Tris Star is owned by Sony and Toshiba almost owns Warners. MGM and UA 
are owned by Australians and Fox by the Murdoch network. Universal belongs to Canadian 
owners of Seagram, the Bronfman family. However, these studios continue to make films in the 
very same Hollywood tradition, and most of the production, distribution and exhibition is 
arranged from headquarters based in the Los Angeles area.
It is estimated that 4,000 films are made per year worldwide. (Chapman, 2003: 9) Of this, the 
United States has for the past 14 years produced between 400 and 510 per year. (Wasko, 2003: 
27) The only exception to these figures is India, the biggest film industry in the world. 
Bollywood produces well over 900 feature films a year and Hollywood has here a market share 
of less than 14 per cent. (UNESCO, 2001)
Mexico is also among the 15 countries which account for Hollywood’s 75 per cent of all 
sales, in place 11. In 1995, it imported films for USD$125 million. (Staiger, 2002: 243; Estrada, 
2003)
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their audiences, based on a repetition that gives viewers the impression of control 
and thus generates pleasure. (Schatz, quoted in Abrams et al., 2001: 181) Genres 
are therefore effective marketing devices, both for standardisation and product 
differentiation, and were soon adopted by other film industries. Being “patterned 
narrative responses to a cluster of interconnected social and ideological 
dilemmas” they help to define what is culturally permissible. (Ranurez-Berg, 
1996: 116-117) And Hollywood genres have from the beginning provided a series 
of alternative responses to, among others, the ‘dilemma’ of national identity, with 
a ‘we’ emerging from contrasts and juxtapositions with ‘they.’ Mexicans share 
with Native Americans the earliest representations of ‘Others’ in that all- 
American genre, the Western, where they typically figured as greasers and evil 
bandits .Bom at a time when “Mexicans’ were being massively deported, the 
Western has been described as cmcial to the formation of the American national 
identity. (Noriega, 1992: xv) A key director of the genre, John Ford, believed 
Westerns incarnated “transcendent values in the historic vocation of America as a 
nation, [namely] to bring civilisation to a savage land, the garden to wildemess.”^^  
(Wollen, 1998: 54) Westerns rose to prominence during the 1950s and 1960s, 
accounting in some years for almost half the total production, but they began to 
decline in the 1970s when they were replaced by science fiction films. 
Nevertheless, Mexicans continued to feature occasionally in other genres of 
determinate, contested space, where the ritual function is the celebration of the 
values of social order, such as gangster films and detective stories. (Abrams et al., 
2001: 181)
This generated a diplomatic dispute that led to a brief boycott, backed in Latin America by 
Brazil, Argentina and Chile. France and Spain also backed it with some films. The dispute came 
to an end in 1929, when a treaty was signed whereby the studios committed themselves to 
stopping the production of such films, and to taking out of circulation the ones already in the 
market. The Mexican government for its part committed itself to doing all it could to stop 
piracy. (De los Reyes, 1996: 31) However these depictions did not disappear, but were 
attributed to other Latin Americans or occurred in unidentified places in Latin America. (Lopez, 
2000: 423)
As Grantham has remarked however, and along the lines I argue in this thesis, cowboys were 
only able to mean ‘civilisation’ in opposition to ‘the natives.’ If civilisation is, as in the world 
fairs “symbolised in the form of a woman in classical garb,” Buffalo Bill offered here “a 
strikingly different image: a virile, violent male,” far less ‘civilised.’ (Grantham, 2000: 12)
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However, although in general American films with Mexican characters 
presented until the 1990s mostly extremely negative, even stereotypical 
portrayals, this was not always the case since, as was argued above, who the Other 
is depends on where the boundaries in a discourse are located, and the Mexican 
identity remained throughout this period an undecidable one. Thus, between the 
First and the Second World Wars, when for America ‘democracy’ was the 
opposite of ‘aristocracy’ and the East/West divide did not yet exist, Hollywood 
films dealing with the Mexican revolution often depicted it as a war between the 
North and the South, that is, in the very same terms as the American Civil War. 
But during the Cold War, and coinciding with the times when Mexican presidents 
deployed an ‘Eastern’ identity as indicated earlier, films dealing with the 
revolution presented it as a bloody and very violent “fight among tribal savages 
who committed a series of atrocities and who violated American sovereignty,” 
since they came and went into the US as they pleased. (De Los Reyes, 1996: 23; 
De Orellana, 1996: 17)
As the political position of the United States grew stronger and thus their 
ability to shape the discourse of world politics increased, the national identity was 
defined in opposition to fascism. In Juarez (Dieterle: 1939), produced by Warner, 
the character of Juarez was inspired on Lincoln, with whom comparisons were 
constantly drawn and similarities pointed out.^  ^ In order to condemn Italy and 
Germany for their ‘imperial adventures,’ the film thoroughly condemns Europe’s 
imperial past, contrasting it with the democratic and freedom-loving Americas, to 
conclude that Maxilimilian of Hapsburg must die in order to expiate Europe’s 
collective guilt. (Vanderwood, 1996: 67) The film was a success in the US and 
Latin America, both at the box office and with critics. In Mexico, it was shown at 
the Fine Arts Palace, where American ambassador Josephus Daniels praised it as 
“perfect” and “historically accurate.” (Vanderwood, 1996: 71) Moreover, at the 
time when the future Head of the Motion Picture Producers’ Association, Eric
At the time other films were constructing similarities between Lincoln and Roosvelt, so by 
analogy Juarez was in this way also likened to Roosvelt. See for instance Young Mr. Lincoln 
(Ford: 1939), Abe Lincoln in Illinois (Cromwell: 1940) and documentary Lincoln in the White 
House (McGann: 1939). Moreover, actor Paul Muni, who played the role of Juârez, had in 
Bordertown (Mayo: 1935) played the part of a Mexican-American lawyer who is an admirer of 
Lincoln. (Vanderwood, 1996: 69)
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Johnston, was calling for the utilisation of “all the...tools of mass 
communications to tell the democracy story,” he insisted on the need to protect 
America from “European ideologies.”^^  (May, 2000: 176) Other films that 
constructed the American identity as ‘free’ and ‘democratic’ out of antagonism 
with European monarchies and empires rather than what later would become ‘the 
totalitarian East’ were also made around this time. Here, characters “express their 
disdain for the Old World where the people are not truly citizens but subjects of 
the upper classes” and aristocrats are despised as decadent and lazy non- 
producers.^* (May, 2000: 154)
During the Avila Camacho and Aleman administrations, as explained 
above, Mexico was placed in chains of equivalence with what now was ‘the West’ 
mostly by means of documentaries and short films that preceded the exhibition of 
the feature film. These presented an image of Mexico as free, democratic and 
prosperous, as if it were, in fact, “a developing version of the United States.” 
(Fein, 1996: 55) Recently built highways leading to Mexico suggested it was “the 
geographic continuation of the US.” (Ibid, 50) The earlier Cârdenas 
administration, which before had been decried as “conununist, totahtarian, 
backward, inward-looking and inhibiting progress” was instead portrayed as an 
alternative version of the New Deal, and although not the president anymore, 
Cardenas himself went from being a “dangerous radical” to a “progressive 
liberal.” Examples of this are Mexico builds a Democracy and Mexican Moods — 
directed by Gordon, 1942 and Ermini, 1942 respectively— but there was a whole 
series financed by the Motion Pictures Division of the Office for the Coordination 
of Inter-American Affairs OCIAA, headed by Nelson Rockefeller. (Fein, 1996: 
43) White Mexicans and westernised mestizos from the middle and upper class 
appeared in a series of advertisements for the promotion of tourism. In one such
Although there have been other instances of ‘generous’ portrayals of Mexicans in Hollywood 
films, for instance the passage from “greasers and bandits” to “Latin lovers” that took place in 
the late 1940s, depictions of food as exotic delicacies and of pre-hispanic civilisations as bearers 
of some transcendental, profound wisdom, idealisation remains a strategy of differentiation, 
with the same discursive function as ‘Indians’ as inferior savages or ‘ethnic food’ as junk or 
unhealthy. Depictions of the revolution in the terms of the American Civil war and of Juârez as 
a Lincoln are, on the contrary, strategies of equation.
Often, however, such scenes were edited when these films were later shown in Europe during 
the Cold War, especially in the UK, which was a major market that Hollywood was reluctant to 
alienate. (Vanderwood, 1996: 67)
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short film, an American woman chatting with a man at a bar tells him she finds it 
hard to believe he is Mexican, since “Mexicans are sinister people with hats who 
engage in revolutions,” and that “anybody would take him for an American” to 
which he replies that he is American, since Mexico has always belonged in North 
America. (Ibid, 54-58) Mexico builds a Democracy pointed out that Mexico had 
its own film industry and star-system, and the fact that it produced its own mass 
culture meant to present it as a society of consumers with whom the American 
people could identify.^ The whole exercise presented Mexico as a politically 
stable, attractive, capitalist country, unambiguously within the West. (Fein, 1996: 
58)
Later, fascism gave way to communism as the antagonist for what became 
in the discourse on world politics ‘the West.’ Now ‘democracy’ would be defined 
against ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’ For ‘the West’ a very persuasive identity 
could be forged out of the Eastern threat, whose very existence could from then 
on account for the fundamental social lack remaining unfulfilled. During the Cold 
War, genres such as the war film, the spy film, science fiction and thrillers began 
to appear, for as put by Peter Wollen, “the epochs of the cinema genres are also 
the epochs of crisis in America's consciousness of itself, its national identity and 
its role in history.” (Wollen, 1998: 119) All of these genres offered the 
opportunity to, in the same way that had happened on Mexican fihn of the time, 
consolidate the American nation with a social unity that cut across gender, 
ethnicity and class. While depictions of big business as villainous or of the rich as 
a moral threat were the case in up to 50 per cent the total production of the 1930s 
and 1940s, during the 1950s, amidst the witch hunts of the House Committee of 
un-American Activities HU AC, these portrayals decreased to less than 5 per cent. 
Films focusing on social reform did not disappear, but reform was now “less the 
agency of citizens operating in the autonomous civic sphere than of experts 
aligned with established institutions.” (May, 2000: 204) Equally, the incidence of
60 This expanding industry was at the time largely the result of the support received from 
Hollywood, which benefited the Mexican industry over the Argentinian one, then Mexico’s 
closest competitor in the Spanish-speaking market, since Argentina had been rather sympathetic 
to Germany and Italy during the war. Credits to purchase equipment, large amounts of then 
scarce film stock, technical assistance and even heavy investment on studios therefore went to 
Mexico instead. (Fein, 1996: 51)
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‘empowered women,’ which during the 1930s was relatively high, was replaced in 
the 1950s and 1960s by ‘patriotic domesticity’ and the ‘wife only’ heroine, 
especially on Walt Disney films, whose contribution to the construction of ‘the 
West’ was truly vital. As regards to ethnicity, the source of discontent was neither 
institutionahsed racism nor class opposition, but a clash of personalities. Along 
with the re-discovery of Westerns and the proliferation of war films, an 
unprecedented number of biblical epics were filmed. Samson and Delilah (de 
Mille: 1949), The Land of the Pharaohs (Hawks: 1955), and the Ten 
Commandments (de Mille: 1956) all focused on a sacred people, and identified 
America with the protection of the eternal and sacred values of western 
civilisation itself. (Ibid: 205-209) Science fiction films, described as “teUing 
psychoanalytic documents, paranoid fantasies of moving blobs, invading pods, 
reified ids and metamorphoses” were abundantly produced in this period, not to 
mention over a hundred spy films. (Monaco, 2000: 307; Shaw, 2001: 4) 
Conversion narratives, which are especially effective because the main characters 
—and along with them the viewers— ‘change sides’ as a result of events in the 
plot, peaked around 1948, when change took place from an alliance with an 
oppositional group to one with institutions that represent national interest, but 
remained high during the 1950s and 1960s. As for ‘prosperity,’ it was clearly 
conveyed by films boasting ever-spiralling production costs, which led from the 
‘ super-production’ of classical Hollywood to the ‘blockbuster’ of New 
Hollywood, always working on the propagation of the American dream. “The 
utopia promised by...Hollywood...is a specifically American utopia of affluence 
and material well-being.” (Chapman, 2003: 185)
Representations of Mexicans thus decreased in number, and returned to 
mainstream Hollywood only in the 1970s and 1980s as illegal aliens and drug 
dealers, when the Eastern identity was deployed by Echeverria, Lopez Portillo and 
to a lesser extent de la Madrid. Between 1970 and 1988, Mexican characters or 
characters who are American citizens of Mexican origin appear in a total of 2,644 
Hollywood feature films. (Garcia-Riera, 1990: 223) In most of these, unlike the 
“exotic characters from a by-gone epoch” of the Western, Mexicans are plain and 
ordinary maids, gardeners and thieves, “alarmingly part of everyday life in North
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America...they are not the enemy one can attack frontally as the ‘Other’ or as 
someone else, but more of a threat within the Self, a sort of cancer growing at the 
very heart of society that slowly but inexorably turns the Self into that very feared 
Other.” (Ibid, 125) In the realm of science fiction, a clear example of this was 
Quetzalcoatl (Cohen: 1982), in which threat comes from a horrible monster, a 
giant feathered serpent living on top of the Chrysler building, where it is breeding 
its young by killing defenceless Americans. The symbolism could not be any 
clearer, and although the film was not particularly successful at the box office, it 
received very enthusiastic critiques.
From the 1980s, just as de la Madrid was opposing American foreign 
pohcy in central America, Mexico was portrayed as the site whence the Soviets 
launched an invasion into the US, in films such as Red Dawn (Milius: 1984), 
Invasion USA (Zito: 1985), Terminal Entry (Kincade: 1987), Let's Get Harry 
(Rosenberg: 1986) and Bullet-proof (Carver: 1988). (Ibid, 79) Moreover, 
similarities are drawn between Mexico and some Arab nations: Egypt, in the 
context of the Maya ruins, as regards to its having hosted ‘ancient civilisations,’ 
and Palestine, in the film The Ambassador (Thompson: 1984), with reference to 
the loss of land. (Ibid, 88) As put by Cortés:
“...geographically, Hollywood’s Mexico consists of the US-Mexican 
border as a specific region and the rest of Mexico as an 
undifferentiated mass. Temporally, there is historical Mexico — 
usually portrayed with escapist equanimity— and contemporary 
Mexico, treated with ethnocentric alarm...Hollywood...often...uses 
Mexico as...a backdrop for American activity, a stage on which 
Americans conduct their own personal morality plays.” (Cortés, 1989: 
94-95)
The only exceptions to these depictions were the ones put forward by 
Chicano directors, very much in the minority, and more importantly, regarded in 
Mexico as American. In the words of prestigious scholar Emilio Garcia Riera, 
“we must insist that when we refer to Chicano cinema we mean a foreign cinema.
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a part of the North American cinema that is in no way an offshoot of Mexican 
cinema. On the contrary, Chicano cinema is a rival to Mexican cinema, a 
powerful competitor of which Mexican cinema must beware.” (Garcia-Riera, 
1990: 141) This assessment was made despite the fact that the Mexican 
government provided the funding for some of the Chicano production. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, which put an end to the undecidable, oscillating 
identity, both these American representations of Mexicans and the status of 
Chicanos and their cultural production changed significantly, both in Mexico and 
in the US, a matter that is analysed in the following chapters.
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A f t e r  t h e  C o ld  War; t h e  C h a l le n g e
In the previous chapter, the argument was advanced that the very strong state and 
political stability that followed the Mexican revolution, unique in Latin America 
during this period, can be accounted for, on the one hand, by the success of the 
political elite in establishing and hegemonising a discourse centred around the 
nodal point of the revolution whose boundaries were delimited via oppositions to 
Diaz, a discourse that constructed an intricate weaving of subject-positions that 
interpellated the people as Mexican while at the same time placing the elite as one 
and the same with the nation. On the other hand, it can also be accounted for by 
the position created for the Mexican state by the discourse on world politics, an 
undecidable position that allowed convincing meanings for the identity to be 
produced in different contexts. The combination of discourses thus exhibited a 
remarkable resilience because it supplied a framework of reference through which 
to construct identity: not only did it give meanings to the people’s lives in the 
several ways discussed above, but more importantly placed them in the way to get 
to ‘their true, authentic selves.’ All this was demonstrated through the analysis of 
a series of representations on film, the cultural industry most closely associated 
with nationalism during the twentieth century.
From the above it follows that the contingency of these identities became 
exposed and fissures in the discourse apparent when this set of relations upon 
which the Mexican national identity and the regime thereof depended were in turn 
shattered, first, by the dislocation brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union, 
and second, by the schisms that appeared as a consequence of this in the internal 
political field. This chapter will now explore what the challenges to the discourses 
outlined in chapters one and two involved, as well as the opportunities for agency 
they offered for the elites to take advantage of. These opportunities involved 
creating a new position in relation to the United States, re-framing it in terms of 
supplementarity, interpellating the people as Mexican but with a different 
meaning, within the context of the new discourse on world politics, as yet still 
unfinished.
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Challenges from ‘Outside’
The Challenge to the East/West Divide
Producing the West After the Cold War: Development, Industrialisation, 
Secularism
It would seem quite straightforward that from the 1990s onwards the Mexican 
identity would simply have to be defined in the terms of the triumphant West. The 
argument is that because the Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the fall of communism put an end to what realism called the bipolar world 
order, giving way to a ‘unipolar’ world, under the hegemony of the sole remaining 
superpower. Even more, with this defeat history itself, conceived as an 
emancipatory struggle, was said to be over. All other societies would eventually 
converge in the western ways. (Fukuyama, 1989: 3-18) There was no alternative 
narrative, so to speak, competing with neoliberalism, which by remaining, had 
proven the righteousness of its claims.
I contend however that if the Soviet demise is understood as a dislocation 
to the discourse on world politics, as this thesis argues, it then follows that its 
consequences impacted on all the actors whose identities had been during the 
Cold War fixed in relation to the framework supplied by the East/West divide, 
none the less the West itself. For the fundamental premise is that in the process of 
identity formation, what remains outside is not merely external, but constitutive of 
the inside in the sense that it is required, a sine qua non condition to be fulfilled 
for the inside to be, because the very beings of both as inside/outside depend on 
the existence of the boundaries that separate them, boundaries which create 
difference.^^ The implication is not that the West as such also collapsed, but that 
what ‘the West’ meant could no longer be defmed in opposition to the East, and 
was therefore unfixed, open to mean something else, depending on what would 
act as boundary-maker, as soon became evident from the fractures that appeared 
between Europe and the United States.
Erasure of the boundaries would seem to indicate an impossible realisation of absolute, at 
which point there would of course be no meaning any more.
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This is not to deny that ‘the West’ had and still has other meanings, in 
other discourses. In some the West is, for instance, the locus of high or late 
modernity, as mentioned above. In others, the West is “a powerful but declining 
entity battling to maintain its strength and influence in a world of multiple and 
conflicting civilisations” whereas in others yet the West “provides a universal 
model of human progress and development.” (O’Hagan on Huntington and 
Fukuyama respectively, 2002: 1) However whether the West means a post­
industrial society, a civilisation or a universal yardstick to assess progress with 
depends on in opposition to what it stands in the relevant discourse.^^
Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union exposed what had once 
appeared as the mighty enemy reduced to a mere Third World status, 
economically backward and plagued by corruption, bureaucracy and mafias. But 
paradoxically, with this the values that the West stood for suddenly seemed less 
valuable in that they were not to be fought for, but actually inevitable. In a way 
reminiscent of the Kantian argument that morality can only exist if there is free 
will, since if our actions are the way they are because they cannot be any different 
they cannot be judged neither good nor bad, capitalism and liberal democracy, 
when declared the inescapable way, also seemed far less valuable than they had 
when they had been threatened.
Attempts have for instance been made by political theorists in the United 
States and Europe to explain both the dramatic decline in turnout that has been 
taking place in several western established democracies since the end of the Cold 
War —49 per cent in the US, 59 per cent in the UK and 41 per cent in France in 
the most recent,^^ and in the case of the US, controversial, elections—and the rise 
of the far right in various European democracies —Austria, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Portugal— in terms of this logics of equivalence that 
dominated the discourse when the East/West divide collapsed:^ (Borger, 2000; 
Petras, 2000; Mount, 2000: 161) “There are many reasons for the decline in 
election turnouts over the last decade...but one of them may well be that...if all
The more hegemonic any of these or other discourses become, the more fixed the meaning of 
the West will be in that sense.
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout from 1945.
^  Although it is true that voter turnout had already been declining, it remained fairly steady in 
the period between 1945-1965, when polarisation was at its highest. Ibid.
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that the parties are offering are alternative management prospectuses, it is...not 
surprising that public engagement with politics has fallen.” (Jacobs, 2002) And 
also:
“The problem with the Social-Democrats everywhere in Europe —as 
with the Democrats in the US— is that they have moved over fifty 
years so far to the centre, and even the centre-right, that they don’t 
seem to stand for anything that will arouse voters...Jospin's defeat 
was not the earthquake. The earthquake occurred some time ago, 
when the left ceased being left, or even recognisably left of centre.” 
(Wallerstein, 2002)
Equally worrying has been the lack of involvement of the young in 
established democracies, as well as the dwindling membership of mainstream 
parties and their continuous reliance in private funding that often compromises 
their policy decisions. (Bolton, 2000) Recently, scandals relating the bankruptcy 
of some of these enterprises due to corruption, closely linked to severe falls in the 
leading stock markets, have greatly damaged the trust that is necessary for the 
system to work as well as added strains to the link between capitalism and 
prosperity that was established during the Cold War. (McFeatters, 2002) Some 
even contend that “protecting the well-off...in Western societies has become the 
essential business of elections and most aspects of pubhc policy.” (Booth, 1998: 
48) Moreover, when construed as unavoidable, the inherent limitations of the 
‘winning’ side of the confrontation, now impossible to project upon ‘the Other’ as 
described above, also seem particularly acute. In the discourses of green politics 
for instance much of the excess and surplus of the capitalist economies which 
before was described positively as ‘prosperity’ has been instead constructed 
negatively as ‘waste’ and the ‘exploitation of the planet.’ (Hores-Olea, 2002; 
Sutherland, 2000: 186-188)^  ^Even more, an excess of choice is now construed as 
the source of anxiety and resentment: ever more choice increases the feehng of
In IR, conventional concepts of security were broadened into ‘comprehensive security’ that 
would take into account ‘sustainable development’ and ‘human security,’ changing the focus 
from ‘state’ to ‘humanity.’ (Buzan, 1991; Walker, 1987; Tickner, 1995)
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missed opportunities, and this leads to self-blame when choices fail to meet 
expectations. (Schwartz, 2004) Equally, ‘freedom’ is becoming more and more 
bound to ‘risk’ in discursive chains: “The natural counterpart to a free market 
economy is a politics of insecurity.” (Gray, 2000: 25) This process has been 
described as the equivalent in politics to what the Enlightenment did to the 
religious-based worldviews: it brought disenchantment. As put by Jacobs:
“When Max Weber analysed the way in which the post-Enlightenment 
processes of rational thought gradually permeated European 
consciousness in the 18th and 19th centuries, he described the world 
as becoming ‘disenchanted.’ The rehgious worldview which the 
Enlightenment largely destroyed had made the world an enchanted 
place, filled with the magic and mystery of gods...But cold, hard 
rationality killed them off...something similar has happened 
to...pohtics in European societies. Up to the 1980s, politics...was 
enchanted...by radical idealism: the belief that the world could be 
fundamentally different. But cold, hard political realism has now done 
for radical idealism what rationality did for pre-Enlightenment 
spirituality. Politics has been disenchanted...What was the political 
equivalent of Weber's Enlightenment rationality? The answer, in part, 
is the fall of the Berlin wall.” (Jacobs, 2002)
In other words, only through growing around a void, a lack hidden behind 
a discursive ‘mystery,’ akin to a veil, i.e. a fundamental separation, an ultimate 
frontier, can discourse produce and reproduce the iterative practices, the gestures, 
utter the phrases that will, together, become the meaning-investing rituals. I 
contend therefore that the process of desacralisation implied in the loss of mystery 
set in motion a process of loss of identity reaching well beyond the former East, 
the consequences of which are only now beginning to be articulated, in the 
emerging discourse.
Nevertheless, because traditional interpretations dominated, such as the 
above-mentioned liberal triumphalism of Fukuyama or at the other extreme the
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clash of civilisations, the unsettling effects on all Cold War identities the Soviet 
collapse had brought about were largely unnoticed at the time. In fact they 
continue to be unnoticed in many accounts of IR, which take “more or less as 
axiomatic” the “facts” that the United States won the Cold War and is now 
reigning unchallenged.^^ (Laffey, 2003: 596) With the East gone, the West, as 
shorthand for urban, developed, industrialised, modem and secular societies, 
seemed to stand in opposition to ‘the Rest.’ The issue then became whether the 
Mexican national identity could be made to fit this meaning: could the boundaries 
of the West be redrawn to include Mexico? and, if they could, would the identity 
still be tenable as Mexican, when the cultural markers on which it depended, 
namely the Spanish language, the —more or less secularised— Catholic religion 
and the ‘mestizo’ ethnia were bound in signifying chains that linked them to Latin 
America and thus to poverty? How could the elite design a project that separated 
Mexico from the current chain without losing in the process what made it have a 
meaning?^^
The concern about the possibility of maintaining the national identity in 
the context of further development was based on the belief that the particular 
combination of industrialisation, modernity and secularism mentioned as 
characteristic of the West actually fosters a different discourse altogether, one that 
creates for the subject a position of consumer. Just as religion’s loss of hegemony 
through the Enlightenment gave way to the hegemony of the nation, often 
characterised as a surrogate religion for secular times, it was feared by some — 
and hailed by others— that the loss of hegemony of the nation through
^  Mearsheimer’s “back to the future,” Krauthammer’s “unipolar moment” and Kaplan’s 
“coming anarchy” were all images of international relations that held a pessimistic assessment 
as to the prospects for peace after the Cold War, while Fukyama’s ‘end of history,’ Russet’s 
‘democratic peace’ and various theories of ‘globalisation’ were optimistic instead, but none of 
these considered a fundamental change in the meaning of ‘the West’ in the light of the absence 
of the East. (Mearsheimer, 1994; Krauthammer, 1990/91; Kaplan, 2000; Fukuyama, 1989; 
Russett, 1995)
In words of Fernando Solana, then Minister of Foreign Affairs: “The crucial question was 
whether it would be possible to maintain congruence between the projects of growing economic 
association with the United States...while preserving at the same time Mexico’s Latin American 
identity in full...President Salinas’ government acknowledged this duality of Mexico’s as a fact, 
not necessarily negative, derived from the peculiar position that it occupies in the world. To 
take either option as excluding the other would only affect the country’s privileged situation in 
the continent.” (Solana, 1994: 562)
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development would give way to the hegemony of the market, whose discourse 
offers a position to subjects as consumers, but which instead of relying in the 
logics of differentiation typical of nationalism, poses an equivalence among 
consumers, unconstrained by ethnic, linguistic or territorial concerns. Moreover, 
with its emphasis on the so-called ‘individual needs’ of consumers, the discourse 
of the market, that is, the discourse that puts ‘the market’ at the centre and 
attempts to make it conceal the fundamental social lack, is continuously creating a 
subject position presented as antagonistic to collective identities, such as national 
identities. Therefore, these positions —as citizens and as consumers— can only 
be held simultaneously in some tension. (Jeffrey, 1998: 496-498)^^ To illustrate 
this point with our chosen medium, cinema, we can see that where before there 
used to be the CIA, the HUAC and the “Guidelines for Censorship” ensuring that 
Hollywood output would comply with a ‘patriotic’ depiction of the US, or 
Mexican films telling stories of cohesion and unity of and to an audience they 
addressed as a (national) whole, today there are marketing specialists doing 
‘product placement’ —i.e. featuring branded products on films for profit— and 
‘merchandising,’ and it is these two criteria that largely determine which scripts 
are approved, as reviews focus more and more on profitability “as opposed to 
being about directing and acting...[they are] profit-margin reviews.” (Wasko, 
2003: 204) Thus films now more often address —and in the process, create— 
only specific fragments of the audience, such as ‘the pre-teen’ or ‘empty-nesters 
markets,’ cutting across national boundaries ‘in the developed world.’
In his representation of nations as separate fishbowls where culture acts as 
a breathing formula that allows life, Ernest Gellner pointed to this fundamental 
similarity underlying nations in developed countries in the following terms: “The 
formula for the medium of the fiilly developed industrial goldfish bowls is fairly 
similar in type, though it is rich in relatively superficial, but deliberately stressed.
^  While these positions had obviously been compatible in Mexico before, the contexts that 
summoned them had been clearly differentiated: the government never addressed the citizen as 
consumer, only private enterprises did. Indeed, the government had more often than not been in 
the place of private enterprises.
A Post-Structuralist Approach to National Identity After the Cold War: the C ase  of Mexico 9 5
brand-differentiating characteristics.”^^  (Gellner, 1983: 52) The same point had 
been made by Adorno and Horkheimer among others, when they described the 
cultures of the developed West as undergoing ‘standardisation’ through the 
pseudo-individuation and interchangeability of cultural products.^^ Further 
evidence, although from a different perspective, has been provided in support of 
this line of argument by the works of Jean Baudrillard and Andrew Wemick on 
contemporary western societies as centred on the market through consumption, 
where the advertising function has spilt over the semiotics of the entire system of 
communication, crucial to ‘advanced’ societies, displacing all referents and 
leading to the homogenisation of the signifying mode.^  ^ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1979; Baudrillard, 1981; Wemick, 1991)
In Mexico, there certainly had been a period of growth since the revolution 
and by the 1980s a notable degree of development, especially in the north of the 
country and in all the urban centres where more than 70 per cent of the population 
now lives, was evident. However, since the beginning of the neoliberal 
administrations it has been in the realm of discourses on development and poverty 
reduction, and in the practices and behaviour these discourses have engendered, 
that the deepest changes have taken place. To offer proof of their success, 
presidents Salinas and later Zedillo did not deliberately stress the ‘brand 
differentiating characteristics’ that had been naturally stressed before under 
different economic circumstances, but quite the opposite, their administrations 
engaged in a sustained campaign, in the media as well as in the official speeches, 
textbooks, etc., to emphasise the extent to which the ‘formula’ had become similar 
in type to that of the West.
A similar process has been alluded to by Gidden’s theories of late or high modernity, where 
stress is laid on the disembedding of traditions —invented or otherwise— from the communities 
where they originated, as well as by theories of a post-modern culture that characterise it as 
devoid of primary references, nurtured instead by pastiche. (Giddens, 1991; McGuijan, 1999) 
Although the quasi-conspiratorial approach of the Frankfurt School has been seriously 
challenged by more recent theories on consumption in post-industrial societies, many of their 
key claims, among them the process of standardisation itself, remain valid.
Wemick’s explanation of the current crisis of western democracies also relies in the logics of 
equivalence, although in this case it is the ultimate equivalence in the function of all 
communication: ‘hardened scepticism’ is the reaction in the view of the ‘selhng job’ that all 
communication is ultimately doing, and from this point of view, the “cynical privatism and 
mass apathy [displayed in elections] can even be construed as a sign of resistance.” (Wemick, 
1991,192)
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To avoid the threat to the identity, the specific challenge for the elite was 
to present ‘development’ and ‘prosperity’ not as categories in the order of being, 
not something countries are or are not, not an identity marker but a behaviour, a 
set of habits one can engage in if the means are available, an external option to be 
taken if at hand, and the government’s task thus became to provide these options. 
When MacDonald’s was opened in Mexico City for the first time in 1982, far 
from representing a cheap fast food option catering mostly for children and 
teenagers, it represented American culture and was thus viewed as a symbol of 
development reaching Mexico. The outlet was located in El Pedregal, one of the 
wealthiest neighbourhoods of Mexico City, where the upper and upper middle 
classes queued for hours to purchase their rather expensively priced hamburgers. 
Ten years later, economic success was indicated by stressing the availability in the 
country’s supermarkets of what before had to be purchased —by the well off— in 
shopping trips north of the border. The supermarkets themselves were soon sold 
to trade brands Wal Mart and Costco. In the former discourse, the success of a 
particular policy, treaty or agreement would have been predicated on the benefits 
for Mexican firms, either belonging to the government or to Mexican 
businessmen, as opposed to consumers.
Academic, literary and joumahstic discourses were key in allowing this 
shift in value from benefiting local producers to benefiting local consumers to 
take place. Jorge Castaneda, then an influential academic and advisor first to PRD 
candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and later an ideologue of the Salinas regime, in a 
position representative of the recent stance of mainstream literature on bilateral 
relations between the US and Mexico after the Cold War, argued that the huge 
influence of American culture in Mexico —specially among the young— was 
actually not a sign of a weakening of the national identity, which he defines in 
terms of ‘patterns of consumption,’ but an index of the material wealth and 
prosperity achieved in the country.^^ He equates ‘Americanisation’ with 
‘modernisation’:
Jorge Castaneda was also the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the first two years of 
government of Vicente Fox.
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“The United States is where the massification of consumption first 
took place. Other countries have followed: the key question is whether 
ensuing trends are signs of Americanisation, or of a similar 
massification of consumption patterns marked by their American 
origin. The ‘Americanisation’ of Mexico should perhaps be seen more 
correctly as the ‘modernisation’ of Mexico.” (Pastor and Castaneda,
1988:340)
Present consumption patterns are now the object of study as opposed to 
production patterns, and since they are ‘modem,’ they are also ‘good.’ A later 
study by Ronald Inglehart concurred with that view, even suggesting that the three 
countries of North America were undergoing “a complex process of 
modernisation that is changing their societies in a broadly similar fashion,” and 
that although the United States was in most respects the closest, modernity 
remained a model “that none of them has yet attained.” (Inglehart et al., 1996: 81) 
In the realm of hterature rather than academia, the same point has been made by 
Monsivais, who also puts the consumer as the subject at the forefront:^^
“The actions and speeches of nationalists to try to block 
Americanisation did no good whatsoever...they made a colossal 
mistake...they identified technological progress with North American 
ideology...and their rallying cry to nationalism came close to 
requiring a rejection of all innovations...who was going to say ‘no’ to 
comfort?” (Monsivais, 1997: 113)^ "^
Likewise, journalism has since the 1990s also become concerned with the 
well-being of consumers, again depicted as the direct result of reaching a fit 
between the local culture and the ‘standard.’ In an article entitled “Trade-brand 
countries” for instance, commenting on a recent trend by many western and
Carlos Monsivais is a critic, essayist, novelist, political commentator and cultural journalist.
Monsivais also noted that the neoliberals were attempting to update the discourse by placing 
‘modernity’ —literally— where ‘the Revolution’ used to be, and replacing ‘nationahsm’ with 
‘productivity’: in their discourse “Modernity is a Noah’s ark with first and tourist class; those 
who do not arrive on time will be arrested and shot.” (Monsivais, 1996: 132-133)
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westernising countries to market them as if they were products, the writer calls for 
the government to make of ‘Mexico’ one such trade-brand, on the grounds that 
“trade-brand countries promise, just like the market itself, variety, options and 
quahty.” (Kuri, 2002) Moreover, since the welfare state was effectively 
abandoned by the neoliberal administrations and ‘the nation’ can no longer 
command the type of loyalty the welfare state fosters, this and other popular press 
articles now address formerly national subjects as stockholders in the ‘Mexico’ 
enterprise, still seeking a position from which they would view themselves as 
‘stake holders’ —rather than partakers in the community of history and destiny of 
the nationalist discourse. (Montemayor, 2003)
Privileging the consumer over the producer allowed the modernisation of 
Mexico to proceed during the 1990s without being challenged by nationalism, and 
both Castaneda and Monsivais deny that a threat to Mexican culture in which the 
national identity was rooted was posed at all. To Castaneda: “Mexico possesses an 
extraordinarily rich, diversified, historically well-anchored cultural personality of 
its own. It has its language and shapes, its rhythms and colours, its beliefs and 
fantasies” and “all the MacDonald’s in the World could never submerge them,” 
while to Monsivais “Americanisation... means that we Mexicans instead of 
thinking in Spanish the way we used to, think in Spanish the way we are now.”^^  
(Pastor and Castaneda, 1988: 341; Monsivais, 1997: 34)
This line of argument however seriously underestimates the degree to 
which nationahsm as an ideology depends on accounting for issues of origin.^^ 
For nationalism, the search for the origin implies a desire to really be who we are, 
to turn to the beginning and indefinitely defer the end, whereas any appeal to 
modernise implies a renunciation, it imphes that we cease to be who we are and 
actively engage in becoming, bringing the future to violently disrupt the present.
Thesis on the ‘Macdonaldisation’ of society however admit that indigenous alternatives to 
fast food restaurants may be put forward but still consider these ‘Macdonaldisation’ in that they 
respond to the same principles of the industrialisation of culture, in this case of food: efficiency, 
calculabüity, predictability and the search of control through technology. (Ritzer, 2002: 16-23) 
Thus were Mexico to be flooded with Taco Bells, from this perspective this would still be 
regarded as Americanisation by many —and as modernisation by Castaneda et al.
Some nationalisms which took root in societies with large immigrant populations however, 
have replaced the search for the origins for the search of a glorious future. This is the case in the 
United States. (Grantham, 2000: 15)
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The very function of the promise of a Golden Age we must one day return to is 
precisely to keep it in the future, to keep it unattainable. As Foucault noted in his 
critique to this search for the origin, we instinctively turn to it in search of the 
authenticity and purity it seems to provide. We tend to think
“...that things are most precious and essential at the moment of 
birth...that this is the moment of their greatest perfection, when they 
emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator or in the shadowless 
light of the first morning. The origin always precedes the fall.” 
(Foucault, 1991: 79)
It is not surprising that many sorts of ‘fundamentalisms’ have come back 
during the present time of challenge to nationalism. Moreover, an attempt to 
supply a narrative of who we may become must acknowledge the randomness and 
uncertainty involved, in the process appearing quite contingent when opposed to 
the accounts of origin that, in their stress of purity, tell a story of causes and 
effects that appears as the result of necessity, constructing a far more appealing 
identity. It was in fact the search for modernity as opposed to the origins that 
Porfirio Diaz was posing at the beginning of the century, and it is of course no 
coincidence that Salinas has often been compared to Diaz, whose reputation also 
underwent a thorough rehabilitation in the 1990s.^  ^ (Hamnett, 1999: 285) It must 
be remembered though that when posed with this choice, although the upper 
classes embraced this search for modernity, the vast, dispossessed majority started 
the revolution. It is as yet unclear to what extent the neoliberal boom succeeded in 
bringing the deprived majority into the middle class.^  ^ In addition, the idea of 
progress on which the very notion of modernity depends now being less
77 Not only did textbooks emphasise the role of Diaz as a hero during the war against the 
French, but his whole approach to modernising the economy with foreign capital was fully 
vindicated. The soap opera “the Eagle’s Flight,” on the life of Diaz, as well as his biography by 
historian Enrique Krauze spread this image among the general public. (Krauze, 1993)
With a population of about 104 million in 2003, recent statistics pubhshed by CEPAL suggest 
there are still 40 milhon people living in ‘poverty’ in Mexico, while 12 per cent hve in ‘extreme 
poverty.’ (CEPAL, 2003) At the same time, there were 13 Mexican billionaires quoted in 
Newsweek during the 1990s. “Only the United States, Germany and Japan have more.” 
(Monsivais, 1996: 134)
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compelling, calls to modernise cannot have the same effect they did in the early 
twentieth century.
Nevertheless, whether a Mexican identity remains at present despite the 
standardising consumption patterns of modernisation as academics, writers and 
the press contend, the subject position of the consumer has certainly challenged 
the position of the citizen, interpellating people far more often and in many more 
contexts than was the case before, and thus it has doubtlessly been a challenge to 
the revolutionary discourse.
Challenge to the Position in Relation to the U.S.
The changes in the discourse on world politics described above had for 
geographical and historical reasons a greater impact in the position of Mexico in 
relation to the United States. As mentioned in chapter one, since the times of Diaz 
the Mexican identity had been constructed in opposition to the United States, 
whose capability and willingness to use force posed a continuous threat that partly 
explains the strength of nationalism and the government’s success in depending 
on it for hegemony. In order to turn Mexico part of the post Cold War West 
however, its geographic position, not only in the Northern hemisphere but in 
contiguity with the United States, was used to claim the identity as natural.^^ The 
eventual success in redrawing this boundary would of course involve the re­
articulation of the signifiers that constructed Mexico in opposition to the United 
States to be grafted into chains that constructed that relationship as one of 
supplementarity instead. As put by Foucault:
“The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing 
[the] rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise 
themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect 
them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this
79 While maps of Mexico in the hemisphere had for a long time placed the country within North 
America, the cultural boundary had hitherto overridden the geographical one. To reverse this 
was the objective of both the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA, an attempt to set 
up economic structures that would eventually lead to some sort of political integration, in a 
manner not dissimilar from the European experience.
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complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the 
rules through their own rules.” (Foucault, 1991: 86)
I will show here that this is precisely what an influential group of the 
pohtical elite in both countries attempted to do. We now turn our attention to the 
ways this was attempted.
The Logic of the Supplement
Because relations of supplementarity involve the re-crafting of identities in such a 
way that, despite the boundaries that separate them at the outset, they can be 
regarded as a unit with respect to the issues one supplements the other for, 
establishing a position from which these relations can become possible is very 
important, since it allows profound changes in the discourse to take place. 
Discursively, a supplement is at the same time external to and part of a given 
unit.^  ^From the 1990s onwards, there is a clear trend to construct the relations 
between Mexico and the United States as supplementary.
Again, this can be observed in academic discourses. Irrespective of their 
content, books on the bilateral relation pubhshed since this period have very often 
followed a format established then, consisting in having two authors, one Mexican 
and the other American, who narrate the history of the relation from what is taken 
to represent their national perspective, classifying it into balancing headings that, 
for every ‘friction,’ ‘problem’ or negative feature included, also pose an instance 
of co-operation, solution or positive aspect.^  ^ Pastor and Castaneda classify their 
narratives under headings entitled ‘barriers,’ ‘frictions,’ ‘connections’ and ‘new 
configurations’; for Dommguez and Fernandez it is ‘conflict’ until the revolution, 
then ‘bargained negligence’ until 1989 and finaUy ‘co-operation’ since 1989,’ the 
turning point being the Salinas presidency; de la Garza and Velasco’s Bridging
80 A frequently quoted example is that of the supplement in a newspaper, which can be regarded
as additional at the outset, but nonetheless completes the unit.
I am referring here to books jointly authored as well as edited.
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the Border follows the same pattem.^^ (Pastor and Castaneda: 1988; Dommguez 
and Fernandez, 7-15; de la Garza and Velasco: 1997; see also Rodriguez and 
Vincent, 1997) In other words, not only is there a desire to re interpret —and thus 
re-write— history, but also of becoming both subject and object in the 
relationship to the other. This is in sharp contrast with the trend before 1989, 
when there are many more single-authored histories, from either American or 
Mexican historians, aiming to give their particular (received) versions.^^ (Meyer 
and Vazquez, 1989; Bosch, 1961; in journalism. Riding, 1984) The Centre for 
Research on the United States, created in 1989, was transformed into the Centre 
for Research on North America, including Mexico, in 1993. This is equally 
reflected in Journalism, with a column entitled “North American Panorama” 
dealing with the affairs of Canada, the United States and Mexico appearing in the 
conservative El Universal.
But beyond these formal aspects, the post-Cold War bilateral agenda 
revolved around political as well as economical, practical issues: Mexico’s 
external debt, the fight against drug trafficking, and illegal migration. These posed 
the opportunity to be re-interpreted: while through the revolutionary discourse of 
the PRI these issues would have appeared as dividing ‘them’ from ‘us’ into the 
traditional relation of submission euphemistically called ‘of asymmetry,’ whereby 
the United States are always in the positive and powerful position —in these cases 
as creditors, consumers and hosts, while Mexico is the debtor, supplier and 
expeller of its poor— through the discourse that many in the elite attempted to 
organise these issues were framed as part of a relationship of supplementarity. 
Instead of opposing Mexico to the United States, these issues were opportunities 
to bring them closer. Through co-ordinated policies and co-operation, it was 
hoped they could lead to a new North American ‘we’ that could re-articulate the
On the realm of film studies too, México, Estados Unidos: Encuentros y Desencuentros en el 
Cine {Mexico and the United States on Film: Growing Apart and Coming Together) was 
another instance of the same exercise, also published at the time. (Durân et al., 1996)
Trends in the United States were quite similar in their stress of conflict, with pre-1989 
textbooks emphasising the fact that the Mexican government had stubbornly refused to sell the 
land in the Southwest despite the United States’ repeated offers to buy it, for instance, or stating 
that despite Wilson’s siding with the revolutionaries in their overthrow of Huerta, this was 
regarded by distrustful Mexicans with contempt. (Greenfield, 1989: 130; Fagen, 1983: 346)
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signifiers that signified Mexicanity by grafting them into a new chain. Let us 
analyse how this was attempted in each case.
Drug Trafficking Control
Drug trafficking was one of the first issues to replace communism as a threat to 
national security in the United States. In 1985, the UN Commission for Drugs 
concluded that drug dealing and terrorism were “crimes against 
humanity...against the content and the spirit of the UN Charter.” (Arrieta, 1990: 
121) In 1989, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London stated that 
“drug-related terrorism is on par with communism as a threat to the western 
interests in Latin America.” (Ibid, 118) Various explanations for the sudden high 
priority attributed to drug trafficking were advanced. From the realist side, the 
United States simply needed to find a new reason to justify its interventions in 
Latin America:
“With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the compromise of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology largely across the globe, the United States 
can no longer use this framework to formulate policy in the region. 
Accordingly, there must be a new model for understanding US foreign 
and security policies in the hemisphere.” (Crandall, 2002: 7)
Others more willing to take the discourse on drugs at face value put it in 
terms of the authorities realising for the first time the huge scope and the 
importance of the growing problem: “Both the government and the society at 
large...decided that drug use has reached such a magnitude as to undermine the 
social fabric and future generation of productive Americans.” (Toro, 1989: 320) 
From a discourse analysis perspective however, an alternative account based on 
the re drawing of boundaries for identity-instituting purposes can be advanced, for 
what Campbell has argued with regards to HIV as a security threat also holds for 
drug trafficking:
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“those events or factors we identify as dangerous come to be ascribed 
as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of 
dangerousness. Moreover, that process of interpretation does not 
depend on the incidence of ‘objective’ factors for its veracity.” 
(Campbell, 1998: 2)
Although the issue had been a cause for concern in recent history at least 
since 1962, when president Kennedy raised it in the annual bilateral meeting with 
president Lopez Mateos, it was only in the absence of the Soviets that (foreign) 
drug cartels were interpreted in the US as the threat against whose combat unity 
should be sought. A ‘war on drugs’ was officially declared, and the topic certainly 
became the most important one in the relationship with Mexico: illegal migration 
and the external debt were almost permanent themes, but not so far characterised 
as national security threats. The Mexican government for its part had spoken of 
threats to national security only once before, with regards to the need to protect 
the territory from guerrilla incursions from Central America. By the late 1980s, 
however, fighting drugs was moved from a lower priority issue in the public 
health agenda into the foreign affairs agenda with the high priority status of a 
national security threat.(Sepulveda, 1994: 64)
Before the Salinas administration, the fight against drug trafficking kept a 
low profile and simply re-created the relationship of otherness and dependence 
between Mexico and the United States. Until 1982, there was only one major 
incident in 1969: ‘operation intercept’ whereby the American government slowed 
down all automobile crossings from the Mexican border to conduct thorough 
searches, severely delaying all traffic and causing the fall of sales and services in 
the area, to confiscate 3 kilos of cocaine. But even this incident, which led to a 
formal diplomatic complaint, hardly received any attention by the media. Things 
began to change during the de la Madrid administration. Research on Mexico as a 
topic covered in US media between 1979 and 1988 has found that notes dealing 
with drugs did not appear until 1985, and that they continuously increased in
Research on the discourses on drugs has found that a switch occurred in the construction of 
drug addiction from being construed as an illness to being described as a crime at around the 
same time —the late 1980s. (Arrieta, 1990)
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number and remained negative to Mexico and Mexican policies until 1988.^  ^
(Bailey, 1989: 55-87) A CBS News/New York Times poll published in March 
1988 showed that 48 per cent of the US pubhc regarded drugs as the main foreign 
policy challenge facing the United States, and that 63 per cent thought drugs 
“should take precedence over the anti-communist struggle.” (Crandall, 2002: 32)
The similes and metaphors involved, as in the case of illegal immigrants 
but for more obvious reasons, were mostly from a mixture of medicine and 
pohtics, i.e. those of an —otherwise healthy— body pohtic, the American nation, 
particularly the young, being infected by poisonous substances coming from 
outside, whose combat thus justified the deployment of a defence system, in this 
case agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration DEA. Their often 
unauthorised presence in Mexican territory, along with the way the United States 
handled the whole affair, specially the question of ‘certification,’ both violated 
Mexican sovereignty and became an ongoing source of resentment and of 
diplomatic tension, particularly in the mid 1980s when various scandals took 
place, but at the same time this was a source of cohesion and unity of the Mexican 
nation against the traditional American enemy.
Parallel to this obvious and commonsensical account however, an 
alternative interpretation was possible. One needs only to de-emphasise 
production —or rather, in the case of Mexico, mere supply— as cause of demand 
as was held in the original account, and reverse the relationship: whether due to 
some existential emptiness, a psychological need or simply a recreational choice, 
there is a demand for drugs in America, and it is this demand which actually 
generates supply from Colombia or elsewhere, using Mexican territory while in 
transit. That it is demand and not supply which feeds drug trafficking is evidenced 
from the fact that in Mexico, where drugs were certainly available and there was 
restricted consumption in some sectors, there was no comparable addiction
The media studied by Bailey were The New York Times, The Washington Post, ABC, CBS 
and NBC. The selection was justified on the grounds that the prestige newspapers are read by 
the elites in both countries and that these provide the materials for TV networks, where most 
Americans get information from. This research was conducted by the Government Department 
of Georgetown University.
The murder of DEA’s agent Enrique Camarena in 1985 and the events that followed — called 
“Operation Leyenda”— is a case in point.
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problem. Sources as diverse as the UN, the Mexican Ministry of Health and the 
DEA coincide on this point.^  ^ Far from violating Mexican sovereignty, DEA 
agents and the Mexican army —the country’s ‘immune system’— could work 
jointly to free Americans from consumption and Mexico from the criminal 
distribution cartels, that is, to achieve a common goal.
The political practices being thus summoned would be those of co­
operation, resulting in a relation of partnership. After all, to construct the 
‘problem of drugs’ in terms of ‘supply and demand’ more than criminalise it, 
likens the affair to a mere commercial deal. Should the time come when American 
policies legalised certain drugs, as had happened with formerly illegal alcohol 
during the 1930s, their lucrative trade might even become regulated in NAFTA. 
Salinas was initially successful in recasting the Mexican position as of 
supplementarity instead of opposition:
“During the presidency of George Bush in the USA and Salinas in 
Mexico, collaboration between US and Mexican police generally 
improved. In 1990 an elite group of police officials was formed, the 
so-called Grupo Beta, in Tijuana, designed to curb violence in the area 
and the influence of corruption...Mexican law enforcement, 
furthermore, participates since 1994 with American pohce in the 
Southwest Border Project. Also proposed are a series of Bilateral Task 
Forces comprised of US and Mexican police...Finally, there is co­
operation between the US and Mexico on matters of police training.” 
(Deflem, 2001: 71-98)
Although statistics vary depending on the specific drugs, age groups and social class 
considered, when the population at large is considered addiction in Mexico remains ‘low’ for 
marihuana —4.7 per cent compared to 32.9 in the US, the highest, and 0.6 in Boh via, the 
lowest—, and ‘moderate’ as regards to cocaine: 1.4 per cent compared to 10.5 in the US and 0.3 
in Bolivia. When only students are taken into account, percentages are 5, 49.6 and 2.9 for 
Mexico, the US and Bolivia respectively as regards marihuana, and 4.1, 8.7 and 0.2 in the same 
countries with regards to cocaine. (SSA, 2004)
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This consistently became the position of the elites during the 1990s.^  ^
Although both these accounts had been held simultaneously by the United States 
and Mexico respectively, the Mexican version became the ‘preferred reading’ in 
both countries when the subject position for Mexico derived from the partnership 
relationship posed by what I will term the post-PRI discourse, that is, the 
supplementarity relationship, began to succeed, as became evident in 
representations of Mexicans in the media, for instance television. (Rosas, 2001)
This issue is discussed in more detail in relation to films in the section on 
representations, below.
Illegal Migration
Another frequent topic in the bilateral agenda since the end of the Second World 
War, when Mexican workers were requested via the bracero programme due to 
shortages of labour power in the United States, illegal migration became an issue 
following the demise of communism, as during the Cold War, “the measure of 
Americanism was partly redefined from ‘Waspness’ to anti-communism.”^^  
(Valenzuela, 1999: 289; Kaufmann, 2004: 36) Although the word is now used to 
mean ‘Mexican migrant in the US,’ bracero acquired this meaning via a 
synecdochal use of the arms to signify the human being. Thus bracero actually 
means something hke ‘spare arms.’ By the time the programme was terminated, 
about 5 million Mexican workers had been brought into the United States as 
braceros, and it is estimated that another 5 million had entered the country 
illegally. The programme also served to institutionalise migration patterns. 
(Calavita, 1989: 158-159)^° As in the case of drug trafficking control, two 
competing narratives purporting to explain illegal migration were available: the 
earlier one constructed migration as ‘a problem’ on the face of which the US and
Madeleine Albright, then US Secretary of State, made exactly the same points in an interview 
io El Universal (Carreno, 1999)
Immigration in general became an issue in the North after the Soviet collapse. While the 
Soviet Union existed, the United States linked treatment of communist countries as most 
favoured nations to their allowing their citizens to migrate, and the Helsinki agreement on 
European security and co-operation also assumed as a basic right of individuals the right to 
emigrate.
According to specialist in migration Jorge A. Bustamante, migration becomes ‘visible’ in the 
bilateral relation every time the US economy is doing badly. (Bustamante, 1983: 259-276)
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Mexico held opposite interests and thus antagonistic positions, and the second, 
harmonious one, which attempted to become the hegemonic version in both 
countries through Mexico’s position as supplement in the post-PRI emerging 
discourse.
According to the first narrative, which Kitty Calavita calls “the myth of 
the unilateral benefit,” it was due to the country’s poor economic performance and 
underdevelopment, the lack of employment and opportunities, that those most 
deprived, specially peasants, migrated to the United States in search for better 
remunerated work, and according to the American hegemonic narrative, in search 
of the freedom and democracy enjoyed in the United States as well. Immigration 
thus benefited the inunigrants themselves, who once in the US improved their 
standard of living. (Calavita, 1989: 151) It also benefited the Mexican economy 
and society, as it supplied income from remittances and provided a ‘safety valve,’ 
allowing some of the unemployed to find a job in the US. For the United States 
however, this posed problems for various sectors of the population, typically 
because in accepting extremely low pay for the jobs they were offered, 
immigrants tended to push the general standard of salaries down; because being 
poor they would use up social security and the funds allocated to the welfare state, 
i.e. consume taxpayers’ money; and because their low level of education 
constrained their social mobility, making it more likely that they would put 
pressure on the status quo, adding to the criminal gangs, particularly drug-dealing, 
(views quoted in Simon et al., 1993) In short, the dominant view of Mexican 
immigration in the United States was that it was a crime-related phenomenon. The 
inherent contradiction of this narrative, namely that the immigrant is portrayed as 
so lazy that he is bound to live off welfare and at the same time as so eager to 
work that she is going to take up the lowest-paid jobs pushing salaries down, was 
ignored. (Shohat and Stam, 1994: 199) By the mid 1990s, various ‘solutions’ were 
put forward to deal with a Mexican migration the US had hitherto tolerated out of 
pure altruism, which ranged from mihtarising the border to erecting a “North 
American Berhn Wall.” (Hamnett, 1999: 14) This narrative, and especially the 
proposed solutions, was only contested by Southwestern growers who depended
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on abundant Mexican labour for successful harvests, and by manufacturers in the 
textile, building and other industries as well as the service sector.
Meanwhile in Mexico and among most Mexican-American academics and 
pohcy makers, the ‘unilateral benefit’ to use Calavita’s phrase, was deemed to be 
for the Americans, whose ruthless exploitation of innocent workers paid for the 
American dream. Indeed, Samora’s groundbreaking study on Mexican migration 
was dedicated “to those valiant men, women and children whose suffering is so 
basic to our affluence.” (Samora, 1971) Those remittances so much remarked 
upon by proponents of the first account came at too high a price, it was 
contended: villages lost far too many of the most valuable members of their 
population, mostly young men, entrenching the subservient role of women in 
society, and remittances had a negative effect in the local economy, increasing 
inflation and distorting patterns of consumption, promoting demand for foreign 
goods. After a thorough study of a number of villages in the key sending states, 
namely Guanajuato, Michoacan, Jalisco and Zacatecas, it was concluded that 
remittances led to “a form of internal colonialism that disturbs and reshapes the 
traditional...way of life in the village.” (Jones, 1984: 8) Moreover, the root of the 
problem was traced back to the 1847 war that severed the present Southwest of 
the US from Mexico, since it is only here that Mexican migrants settle.^  ^ (Durand, 
1991: 13) Approval of Proposition 187 in 1994, seeking to deny education, health 
care and other basic services to illegal immigrants and their children, met a very 
negative response in Mexico, where this was deemed as only adding to the long 
list of migration-related injustice.
The narrative which attempted to replace this double-sided unilateral 
benefit narrative proceeded in the same way as with drug trafficking, by denying 
the antagonism of the positions depicted. Framed in this new narrative, 
‘undocumented’ migration —the term ‘illegal’ was dropped— was not to be 
understood as a phenomenon in which the United States was a passive victim, but 
the natural result of the interaction of economic variables between the two 
countries in the context of globalisation, which led to American demand of cheap 
labour, in turn met by Mexican supply. (Cornelius, 1989: 25-48; Garcia y Griego:
91 With the exception of Illinois.
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1989: 49-94) This was beneficial not only to both the United States and Mexico, 
but to the world economy as a whole, and mechanisms ought to be found whereby 
to regulate this mutually enhancing exchange. (Ronfeldt and Ortiz, 1990: 1) 
Statistics showing that most immigrants actually do not come from the poorest 
regions in the Southeast, where most indigenous communities are located, but 
from the mid west, and from conununities where migration has become a custom, 
a kind of social trait facilitated by complex networks of kinship and employers, 
regardless of whether the immigrant was employed in Mexico or not at the time of 
migrating, and thus did not come from the poorest peasants at all but were skilled 
instead, were also used to challenge official accounts. Moreover, the role of 
immigrants once in the US, far from unduly benefiting from the welfare system 
was that of working hard, specially in jobs rejected by the native population, and 
greatly contributing to productivity. (Pastor and Castaneda, 1988: 363) By 1986, 
the Economic Report of the US President concluded that “the net effect of an 
increase in labour supply due to inunigration is to increase the aggregate income 
of the native-born population.” (Weintraub, 1990: 179) Moreover, while other 
more tolerant narratives of migration had been prevalent in the past and it would 
have been in principle possible to appeal to them, the elite did not seek to do so 
because they were founded in the paramount role that all migration had had in the 
construction of the United States, and the project espoused by them sought to 
create common ground for Mexico as North America, thus their efforts 
underscored the specific role Mexican inunigrants had had. Narratives that held 
that “the European immigrant was a reputed troublemaker...and was increasingly 
the backbone of labour strikes” were resurrected, contrasting this with the 
Mexican immigrant who provided “a fairly adequate support of labour” and did 
not often seek citizenship. (Calavita, 1989: 156) Finally, during the Salinas 
presidency it was widely held that Mexico itself was developing and raising its 
standards of living at a dramatic speed, and that in the short term it would 
officially enter the First World, which should narrow down the macro-economic 
differences that spurred migration in the first place, leading to equilibrium via 
self-correcting, economic mechanisms.^^ (Ronfeldt and Ortiz, 1990: 1)
92 Recently, accounts on migration that seek to place ‘blame’ somewhere acknowledge “50 per
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This alternative narrative met some initial success. (Carreno, 1999) In 
sharp contrast with the Simpson-Rodino Law at the time of President de la 
Madrid, which was indeed promulgated. Proposition 187 was declared 
unconstitutional and was never upheld. Moreover, in 1998 the Legal Immigration 
and Family Equity Act, allowing illegal inunigrants to apply for a resident visa if 
they had either relatives who were American citizens or a job offer without 
leaving the United States and paying a USDS 1,000 fine was also passed. In the 
short term, the idea was to replace ‘Operation Gatekeeper’ with a sort of renewed, 
albeit somewhat modified, bracero progranune that took into consideration the 
more skilled migrants in comparison to those of the 1950s and 1960s. In the long 
term, it was hoped that NAFTA would lead, through spill over, to the creation of a 
Union, with open borders in exchange for oil, gas and electricity: “With new 
leadership, the moment is ripe to consider a package deal that would involve 
major concessions and demands by both nations in trade, energy, intelligence and 
security, debt, capital flight and immigration.” (Pastor and Castaneda, 1988: 370) 
Other broad-scope research carried out at the time concluded as well that changes 
in basic values in the United States, Canada and Mexico were transforming 
economic, social and political life among them, and that these changes were 
“rooted in long-term generational differences” so they would endure, and their 
effects would be “massive.” (Inglehart et al., 1996: 171) Even more, the study 
concluded that “one provocative implication that flows from these findings is that 
the traditional, historically entrenched rationale for the existence of political 
borders separating the three North American countries seems to be eroding.” 
(Ibid) While these expectations have been challenged after 11 September 2001, it 
was at the time widely held by epistemic conununities and the ehtes in both 
Mexico and the US. (Bustamante, 1989: 293)
The Economy: the External Debt and NAFTA
cent” of the responsibility for Mexico and “50 per cent” for the United States, as if both 
countries constituted a unit. (Carreno, 2003)
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Largely supplying the framework for the whole integrationist project, the 
economy was the issue that most obviously lent itself to being framed within a 
relation of supplementarity. Throughout recent history the United States had been 
Mexico’s main trading partner.^^ During the PRI era this was interpreted as a 
disadvantage and a problem to be overcome. Most Mexican presidents until de la 
Madrid, specially Lopez Mateos and Echeverria, engaged in considerable efforts 
to diversify trading partners, with varying degrees of success, Echeverria being 
the most successful. After de la Madrid however, it was denied that such a task 
was feasible. What is more, it was regarded as mistaken, since it was argued that 
access to the American market was Mexico’s main economic strength. By the 
1990s what before was termed ‘dependence’ was legitimated as ‘integration,’ 
effectively abandoning the aspirations to autarky inherent in nationalism, 
transposing them into the wider framework of the North American region. (Silva- 
Herzog quoted on Russell, 1994: 314)
The Salinas government renegotiated the debt with this policy of 
convergence in mind, making the case for the need to get out of the “low-growth, 
high-service debt trap.” (Krueger, 1987: 163) It was in the best interests of the 
US, it was argued, that the Mexican economy improved so as to be able to meet 
its financial commitments. The relationship was thus from the outset presented as 
one of mutually beneficial partnership: not only did Mexico and the US share the 
same interests, but they also had the capacity to materialise them. Through the 
Brady Plan the negotiating team achieved a total reduction of USD$5,800 milhon, 
grace periods and debt swapping, but more importantly they also achieved a shift 
in the discursive position for Mexico. Just as the US policy-makers were telling 
Latin America that with the Cold War over, it would now have to struggle to 
survive by its own efforts, an exception was made for Mexico, which did receive 
economic assistance. (Kaletsky, 1992: 10)
This in turn, together with the developments in Europe and the economic 
bloc emerging in Asia, allowed for what was going to be the Salinas 
administration most important economic project, NAFTA, to be thinkable and
At the time, Mexico was the third trading partner for the United States, after Japan and 
Canada. (Russell, 1994: 316)
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possible, (Bertrab, 1997: 1) As put by James R. Jones, the American ambassador 
at the time, NAFTA was to become “both the symbol of our new relationship and 
the point of departure for future initiatives.” (Russell, 1994: 331) Although 
originally the idea of President Reagan’s, who proposed a free trade agreement 
that would go “from the Yukon to Yucatan” and rejected by de la Madrid over 
concerns on sovereignty, within the new framework NAFTA offered an ideal 
opportunity to construct relations of supplementarity and was thus re-adopted by 
Salinas. (Agustin, 1998: 187-188; Russell, 1994: 335) In fact, NAFTA would go 
well beyond the mere negotiation of trade tariffs, to become a sort of all- 
embracing umbrella project, whose broad scope could eventually comprise all the 
other relationships between Mexico and the United states as ‘North America.’ 
More than the common police force and common policies that managing the 
problem of drugs involved, and the search for conunon ground to try to manage 
migration, it was the set of practices fostered by NAFTA which had the greatest 
impact on the discourse that made the Mexican identity.^ "^  A measure of the extent 
to which the new discourse initially succeeded in replacing the former one can be 
attained by assessing which sorts of institutions had to be abandoned in order to 
pursue it, as well as to which new institutions it gave rise. Let us now analyse the 
practices that both these renunciations and these newly acquired habits have 
involved.
First of all, new habits required engaging in substantial lobbying. This 
involved major changes in attitudes and values in Mexico, where lobbying was 
before regarded as illegitimate interference in the affairs of a foreign country, and 
never welcomed when carried out there. It proved however very useful indeed. 
Although initially the support of public opinion and of specific economic sectors 
was remarkably difficult to gain in both countries, recourse to the ‘new 
technologies’ such as conducting a massive marketing campaign in the US media 
in favour of Mexico in general, of the Mexican president in particular and of the
Indeed, to economic historian Carlos Marichal “although trade treaties are very rarely viewed 
as fundamental for the countries that subscribe them, NAFTA will definitely be a watershed for 
Mexico.” (Marichal, 1997)
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project as a whole was key to the success of the negotiations.^^ To this end, the 
help of professional lobbyists Shearman Sterling and Burson Martseller was 
enlisted, and power-broker Charles Walker was hired, on a salary of USDS 20,000 
a month. (Marichal, 1997) Interest groups in the United States are said to have 
incurred similar expenses, with businesses devoting nearly USD$ 50 million to 
the pro-NAFTA campaign. (Russell, 1994: 343-346) All these efforts and 
resources soon shifted public perceptions. Such was the success of the campaign 
that even the left had to give support to the project in its political platform, 
effectively shifting to middle ground. By 1991, former presidential candidate 
from the left Cuauhtemoc Cardenas supported the project, although advocating a 
preferential treatment for Mexico, similar to the one enjoyed by Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain in the European project. (Russell, 1994: 351-352) In the US, NAFTA 
negotiations cut across Parties and administrations, thus cementing the treaty on 
what was then regarded as very firm ground. (Bertrab, 1997: 98) They also 
allowed the Republicans to gain the backing of some prominent Chicanos who 
had until then supported the Democrats.
A second entrenched habit that would be changed, it was hoped, related to 
voting patterns in the UN, where a higher profile was also adopted.^^ They sought 
to coincide with the votes of the US more often, in an attempt to match the voting 
pattern displayed by Canada, the United Kingdom and Israel, with whom they 
sought identification as close allies of the US, while distancing Mexico from the 
Third World.^^ Resources available at the embassy and the 43 consulates were 
also devoted to the cause. (Dommguez and Fernandez, 2001: 83) Symbohcally, 
the embassy itself was moved from a mural-adomed old mansion in a “shady
President Salinas addressed the University of Harvard during the annual meeting of the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors, and as a result “at least 45 major news stories were 
published, as well as 30 odd positive editorials or opinion columns.” (Bertrab, 1997: 25) 
Advertisements were placed in the main newspapers and on TV. Former Presidents Carter and 
Bush and other notable persons such as James Baker, Jean Kirkpatrick, Edmund Muskie, 
George Schultz, Lee lacocca, Andrew Young and Tip O’Neill endorsed the agreement publicly.
Eventually this led to Mexican participation in the Security Council, which had been 
thoroughly avoided by the PRI.
Between 1985 and 1998, the votes of Canada, the UK and Israel coincided with those of the 
US on average 78.7 per cent, 87.10 per cent and 98.15 per cent of the time respectively. 
Mexico’s vote in the UN went from coinciding with that of the US 14 per cent of the time on 
average between 1985 and 1989, to 28.8 per cent between 1990 and 1998, and continued to rise 
until recently.
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neighbourhood” to a “modem building on Pennsylvania Avenue, just three blocks 
away from the White House,” and its personnel considerably increased, 
significantly by a large number of specialists who had technical rather than 
political skills. (Dominguez and Femândez, 2001: 125) This was in Une with 
images of world politics fashionable at the time, that constructed a ‘borderless 
world’ in which pohcy would be “taken out of the hands of reportedly scheming 
pohticians, thought to have only short term interests...and passed over to the 
expert managers who will take decisions on ‘objective’ economic grounds.” 
(Clark, 2000: 82-83)
Changes embraced also occurred at a subtler but nonetheless significant 
level. Although unnecessary given Mexico’s latitude, a Summer time was 
introduced to make ‘Mexican time’ coincide with ‘American time,’ so as to allow 
transactions in banks and the stock market to be held simultaneously. At the same 
time, CNN in Spanish also included Mexican cities in their alphabetical weather 
forecast, thus viewers now find about the weather in “Acapulco” and then in 
“Atlanta” etc. The synchronisation of time and the encompassing of both 
countries in the same forecasts actually complemented the spatio-temporal unity 
sought.
As for the practices that had to be abandoned, the radically new tasks that 
the Mexican embassy was required to perform for the negotiation of NAFTA, 
which went on after the treaty had been enforced, disrupted the formal, highly 
elaborate nature of traditional diplomatic practices, now characterised as 
‘inaction,’ thus removing another one of the PRI scripts that were enacted by 
former ambassadors. These became political appointees as opposed to career 
ambassadors. The Estrada doctrine, which had been the cornerstone of Mexican 
diplomacy during the Cold War, demanding total commitment to the principles of 
non-intervention and the peoples’ rights to self-determination, was also recently 
dropped, as was the Carranza doctrine, which held it that controversies and 
disputes involving foreign countries could only be settled in Mexican courts. 
(Rusell, 1994: 349) The Carranza doctrine had come about as the product of 
earlier conflicts with American and European interests that had been affected
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through nationalisations, and it had long been regarded as crucial for the defence 
of Mexican national interests. (Philip, 1982: 203)
There was reason to believe that all these sets of changes would endure, 
leading to long-term habits and institutions. (Weintraub in Bertrab, 1997: viii) 
They spurred from some already-existing common ground, not least Mexican- 
Americans in the US Congress and other influential organisations.^^ Mexican 
negotiators were all fluent English speakers, who held doctorates from the same 
American universities as their counterparts.^^ Moreover, they all became 
prominent Cabinet Ministers in the Zedillo government, and some remain serving 
under Fox. Relevant non-govemmental actors such as members of the business 
community also had personal relations —and shared interests— with the 
American negotiators, and had prominent roles. Not only did this mean that the 
team in both countries shared beliefs and values, but a pattern akin to that 
explained by Anderson regarding the role of ‘educational pilgrimages’ in 
fostering a common identity among intelligentsias emerged, providing something 
like a territorial base for the new imagined community of North America. 
Moreover, the sudden upsurge of the Internet in Mexico early in the 1990s might 
well have had a role similar to that of printed materials in the nineteenth century 
in linking intelligentsias and government officials both in the US and Mexico. 
(Anderson, 1991: 140) And even if elite-started and led in the beginning, the 
subject positions this discourse created were soon embraced by some of the 
people:
“Empirical evidence on public opinion in North
America...surprisingly supports the shift toward the larger paradigm
for trade and commerce, indeed towards political integration
Such as Congressman Bill Richardson from New Mexico, whose mother is Mexican and lives 
in Mexico, Jim Kolbe from Arizona and Hispanics Solomon Ortiz, Kika de la Garza, Albert 
Bustamante, and Martin Frost. Also Ambassador Lalo Valdez. (Bertrab, 1997) Among the 
organisations, support of La Raza was crucial.
^  From the Mexican team, Jaime Serra and Pedro Noyola had Ph.D.s from Stanford, as did 
Carla Hills from the US. Michael Cantor from the US and Luis Alberto Aziz from Mexico had 
both studied at Georgetown and Herminio Blanco, Luis Tellez and Hermann Von Bertrab, all in 
the Mexican team, were alumni of MIT.
Especially relevant were the Business Round Table and the Chambers of Commerce.
The upper classes in Mexico, according to recent research. (Douglas, 210)
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itself., .one out of four Mexicans and Canadians is already prepared to 
accept political integration of some kind into a new collectivity.” 
(Doran, 1995: 277)
The language used to construct these sets of changes employed metaphors 
both from the ‘objective’ and detached realm of science and from the affective 
one of the family. On the one hand, the bilateral relation was cast as managed by 
professionals, as opposed to the earlier period when passion and sentiment were 
said to have played a main role. The changes were constructed as objective and 
scientific, and therefore more appropriate to advance Mexico’s interests. On the 
other hand, emotional involvement was also sought, and the similes and 
metaphors used to represent the new relationship drew on the family: in some 
accounts, the relationship of the United States with Mexico is “the least foreign” 
of its relations, whose bonds following NAFTA had “helped isolate both countries 
from the impact of the global financial crisis,” while the —rather gendered— 
image of a marriage is used explicitly by Weintraub in his book entitled as noted 
above A Marriage o f Convenience: Relations Between Mexico and the United 
States, and implicitly by Dommguez and Fernandez in their account of the majors 
of Laredo and Nuevo Laredo, a man and a woman respectively, crossing the 
border to celebrate the “arrival of the new millennium with an international hug 
and a kiss.”^^ (Ibid, 155)
Finally, upon the signing of NAFTA President Bush declared:
“Today marks the beginning of a new era on our continent, the North 
American continent...we are creating the largest, richest, and most 
productive market in the world, a USD$ 6 trillion market of 360 
million that stretches 5,000 miles from Alaska...to the Yucatan 
Peninsula.” (Quoted by Russell, 1994: 345-346)
102 analizara en México Drogas, Migracion y Comercio,” in Spanish Newswire
Services, February 14,1996.
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Emerging discourses thus constructed a North America in which Mexico 
belonged —not least on film, as shown on chapter five below. Partly based on 
discourses on world politics that were constructing a post Cold War international 
reality as “the coming age of regionalism,” these discourses were put forward by 
important sections of the elites and a variety of interest groups in both countries, 
and found almost immediate support among the upper classes and some of the 
middle classes in Mexico. (Rostow, 1990: 3-7)
Serious challenges to the meaning of national identity held by the until- 
then hegemonic discourse of the PRI had thus been mounted from what then 
seemed less and less the ‘outside.’ We now go to the equally serious challenges 
that arose from ‘inside.’
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Challenges from Inside’
Even if, as has so far been put forward, the dislocation in the discourse came 
primarily from ‘outside’ —in the sense that it was the erasure of a set of 
boundaries that made the Other and that also made a scope of undecidability 
possible that caused it— internal conditions also pushed to make the political field 
a different one from what it had been when the PRI first put in place the structures 
that allowed it to remain hegemonic for more than seventy years.
In the first place, the mere demographic growth combined with the degree 
of economic development achieved were already straining the system to its limits 
by the late 1980s. The country’s population had risen from 15 million when the 
revolution ended, to about 80 million. During this time, the country had also 
passed from having a quasi-feudal economic structure with many landlords — 
‘caciques’— performing as governors, and a mostly rural population, to an 
industrialising economy. By 1980 more than 75 per cent of the population lived in 
urban areas, had higher levels of literacy, and included a solid and expanding 
middle class with access to ever more difficult to control media and technology. 
The rate at which the system had been coping to continually renew and transform 
itself in order to adapt to the ever-changing circumstances without losing 
legitimacy had begun to slow down. Particularly, the way it stopped recruiting 
from all sectors of society to turn almost exclusively to the group of ‘technocrats’ 
considerably hindered its possibilities to keep on co-opting dissent, challenging in 
fact the very boundaries that held together the political elite itself.
The combination of an externally-induced dislocation and a more fluid 
internal political field thus allowed for the questioning of the national identity to 
be evident in Mexico at the levels usually deployed by nationalistic ideologies, 
namely linguistic, ethnic and religious. It is therefore these aspects that are 
analysed in this section.
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Ethno-linguistic Chaiienges to the identity
Perhaps the most notable blurring of the boundaries that constituted ‘Mexicans’ 
by including all inhabitants of the national territory and excluding the ones 
beyond is evidenced today in the challenge posed to mestizos as the ethnic basis 
of the nation. This challenge comes, on the one hand, from the Indigenous 
populations, and on the other, from Chicanos. The result is that the former ‘we’ is 
being fragmented: some of those who used to be included in the post­
revolutionary discursive ‘we,’ namely ‘the Indians’ now appear as ‘they’ —that 
is, as ‘Indians’ instead of as ‘Mexicans’— while those who did not use to be 
included, namely Chicanos, formerly despised for ‘betraying the nation’ and 
against whom so much resentment used to be directed, are increasingly taken to 
embody the features the Mexican identity ought to have in the position that was 
being created for Mexico in the post Cold War discourse of World Pohtics. Not 
only are they included, they are being turned into the new symbol of ethnic 
belonging, the new mestizos so to speak. Let us see how this has been done.
The Indigenous Challenge
The indigenous challenge is expressed in what appears as pressing demands for 
the long-delayed recognition, acceptance and delivery of social justice to 
indigenous minorities, now-called ‘first nations.’ These unmet demands led to the 
Chiapas uprising, and to the ensuing transformation of the National Liberation 
Zapatista Army EZLN into a peaceful movement that drew most of its legitimacy 
and effectiveness from civil society. The current view is summarised in the 
foUowing lines: “...one must understand the Chiapas rebeUion as in large measure 
the revolt of an unrecognised and unacknowledged autonomy, excluded from the 
full rights of citizenship, against a central government that was viewed as an 
imperial oppressor.” (Foster, 2002: 14) The international context is at the moment 
favourable to such demands, since enforcing respect to human rights in general 
and to those of minorities in particular has become part of the political agenda, 
especially after the Cold War in line with my argument here.
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I contend however that this apparent call for the recognition of a 
multinational Mexican state can be explained more in terms of the collapse of the 
boundaries that sustained the revolutionary ‘we’: just as Foucault, in order to 
investigate madness, eschewed the facile assumption that our current 
understanding of it came from “the happy age when madness was finally 
recognised and treated according to a truth to which we had too long remained 
blind,” the notion that we are now living a happy age in which ‘ethnic minorities’ 
are finally being ‘acknowledged’ and ‘recognised’ must be equally eschewed, and 
the ways in which they have been actively constructed through discourse must be 
traced instead. (Foucault, 1991: 141)
I thus contend that what now appears as ‘indigenous populations’ under 
the former boundaries appeared as ‘the poor, disadvantaged peasants.’ The 
discourse of the revolution included within ‘Mexicans’ a group of people who 
were far more acutely disadvantaged than the others. But this group was 
constructed in terms of social class and not of ethnicity. It is true that ‘peasants’ 
were almost without exception dark-skinned. But it is also true that many of those 
who would be regarded as ‘mestizo’ were also as dark-skinned, and sometimes 
almost as poor, only inhabiting urban areas. Moreover, several ‘mestizos,’ 
specially those from the north of the country which was mostly populated by 
Spanish settlers, are white, because, contrary to those essentialist views that hold 
it that mestizos are the ‘real Mexicans’ —i.e. the descendants from ‘the Aztecs,’ 
taken as shorthand to mean the various indigenous cultures that populated the 
central region, and ‘the Spaniards,’ again as a unified, unproblematic category, 
that would seem odd to the Basques, Catalans, Gallegos etc. of the 1500s as well 
as today— mestizo was just the signifier that signified a mythical ethnic 
‘Mexicanity,’ or in other words, a link to the territory in a relationship of 
belonging, and to the fellow Mexicans in what the doctrine of nationalism usually 
terms a community of history and destiny. Indeed, one of the reasons why 
nationalism must go to such great lengths to emphasise and detail what makes ‘us’ 
different from ‘them’ is precisely to hide the difference always already existing at 
the heart of ‘us,’ what Derrida calls “the hauntology” of collective being. (Derrida 
quoted in Shapiro, 1999: 95)
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To put this another way, the homogeneity of any ethnic category is always 
fictitious: ‘the Spaniards’ who arrived in what later became Mexico had already 
been conquered by ‘the Arabs,’ and moreover, there was such diversity amongst 
them that they could only appear as ‘Spaniards’ when pitted against ‘the 
Indians.’ This has become particularly evident in the way that separatism 
nowadays resonates in regions of Spain such as the Basque country or, in a non­
violent way, Catalonia. On the other hand, only a very crude conceptualisation — 
of the kind needed to make nationalism and other ideologies— allows for such a 
diverse set of peoples as the Aztecs, the Tlaxcaltecas or the Lacandones to be 
construed as ‘the Indians,’ for it is only when in opposition to ‘the Spaniards’ that 
they emerge as such. Before their contact with European settlers they most likely 
thought of themselves in terms of ‘empire’ in the case of the Aztecs, and 
‘subjects’ in the case of the other tribes, or something along those lines, but not as 
‘Indians’ at all. The lack of essence —and therefore, the contingency— of 
purported ethnic identities is evidenced by the fact that now “‘Spanish’ in Mexico 
means being white, blond, and blue-eyed, while in the United States it means 
being dark-skinned and having black eyes.” (Adler and Pérez, 1987: 196) In the 
same manner, the signifier ‘mestizo,’ when articulated by the revolutionary 
discourse of the PRI, beyond dark, brown, ‘Indian,’ white or any other physical, 
objective feature, simply meant ‘Mexican.’ Objective traits people bear become 
relevant only until articulated as such within a discourse: it is the discourse that 
makes the traits visible and not vice versa. When territory was the key issue, MPs 
were chosen to represent, geographically, every state. Now some want them to 
represent “all ethnic affiliations.”^^ (Valenzuela, 1999: 298)
Nor do attempts to define indigenous populations as speakers of languages 
other than Spanish succeed in setting the group that has emerged under the label 
‘indigenous peoples’ apart. By this criterion, only 6 million people qualify as 
indigenous, and of these almost 5 million speak Spanish as their second
Alternatively, they emerged as such when in antagonism to other ‘Others,’ such as ‘the 
English’ etc.
So effective did the mestizo myth become, that it has recently been invoked as a way to 
create a unified American identity: “the blend of Anglo, Afro and Indian influences is the key to 
creating a new American type that is as powerful as the mestizo...is for Mexico.” (Kaufmann, 
2004: 39)
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language/^^ It is true this still leaves about a million people who can claim an 
indigenous identity through linguistic exclusion, but it is only possible for them to 
do so now that the discourse has brought back the Indian subject-position from the 
colonial times. As Xochitl Leyva has remarked, “it was not until the arrival of the 
Zapatista movement that the inhabitants of Las Canadas used their ethnicity as a 
political instrument to make their demands heard at national level.” (Leyva, 1998: 
45) Although language is an important factor in the making of most nationalisms 
the fact that fourteen countries emerged out of Spanish-speaking Latin America 
while Swiss nationalism was able to forge Switzerland out of populations 
speaking German, Italian and French makes it evident that it is not language per 
se but rather its interaction with other cultural markers and the extent to which 
this interaction can be used to indicate difference from ‘the Other’ that is relevant. 
(Anderson: 1991; Gellner: 1983; Smith: 1991) A decade or so ago, linguistically 
classified ‘Indians’ of today would more often than not have been poor peasants 
in need of bilingual education. When demands to create a set of laws which 
specifically addressed the situation of indigenous populations were put forward, 
particularly following the Chiapas uprising, the first reaction of the government 
was to deny the need of such laws because, it was argued, the laws vahd in 
Mexico were valid for all Mexicans. But the very fact that such demands were 
being made showed that one of the most important boundaries that constituted 
‘Mexicans’ was being redrawn.
The actual figures are: 6,044,547 people speak languages other than Spanish, and of these, 
4,924,412 speak Spanish as well. National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics 
INEGI, website, consulted August 6*^ , 2002. http://www.inegi.gob.mx/difusion/ 
espanol/fietab.html.
 ^ In short, “there is simply no limit to the number of ways in which people can be classified.” 
(Gellner, 1983: 65) It is an indicator of the degree of success of a specific nationahsm however 
that they be classified in such a way as to make the match between the people inhabiting a 
territory and the territory itself as close as possible. If physical traits stand on the way, 
alternative forms of classification are sought. Members of the nation can belong in it by virtue 
of a common glorious future, a sense of mission or belonging to a common faith in combination 
with other features as necessary to make the nation unique, i.e. ‘different’ from others — 
language, common earlier grievances etc. It is for this reason, I contend, that it is a mistake to 
regard the various forms of fascism including ‘ethnic cleanses’ as ‘the ugly side of nationalism,’ 
for what they actually represent is the breakdown of nationalism, the point at which the 
discourse stops producing individuals that inhabit a given territory as national subjects.
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What is most meaningful about the emergence of Zapatismo however is 
not so much the fact that it makes the collapse of the hegemonic discourse that I 
contend took place evident, but rather the possibilities it offers for the re­
articulation of a discourse, since, as Laclau has shown, populism is not a 
discourse but a mode of articulation:
“a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology it 
presents actual contents identifiable as populistic, but because it 
shows a particular logic of articulation of those contents —whatever 
those contents are.. .Equivalential popular discourses divide, in this 
way, the social into two camps: power and the underdog.” (Laclau, 
forthcoming: 1-2)
I will thus here argue that Zapatismo is indeed populist, i.e. a mode of 
articulation that is based on drawing this radical, internal boundary that relies on 
the polarisation between two positions, that of power and that of the people;^^  ^
that the positions in question were those of ‘neoliberalism,’ ‘globahsation,’ ‘the 
Americans’ and ‘the government’ as paradigmatic equivalences in the category of 
‘power,’ while ‘Indians’ were systematically expanded to include ‘minorities,’ 
then ‘the poor’ —a majority rather than a minority— and ultimately ‘the people’ 
in the category of binary antagonism; and finally that in the forging of these two 
chains of equivalence, an attempt was made —and is still being made— to 
recover the subject-positions of the nationalist discourse of the PRI and to return it 
to hegemony, albeit to the advantage of a somewhat different political elite. Let us 
analyse the process whereby these sets of equivalences and differentiations were 
made.
The sets of equivalences have been drawn in several ways in a variety of 
texts, written as well as visual and others, from the realm of popular and high 
culture, to the intelligentsia. The popular Mexican group Mana very clearly used 
Zapatismo as an empty-signifier, as broad-encompassing as had been ‘the
Although Laclau states that the position of ‘the people’ is not the only subject-position in a 
binary opposition to power, since a political system in which demands are mostly institutionally 
satisfied produces the ‘democratic subject,’ in the particular case under analysis it is clear that 
the Mexican government was in a very weak position to offer institutional answers to the 
demands being made by Zapatismo, specially with regards to the widespread corruption of the 
collapsing system and the general distrust it inspired in most Mexicans. Also there is bound to 
be a degree of populism even in the most democratic polities. (Laclau, forthcoming)
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revolution’: “Zapatismo is not merely the protection of some Indians from 
Chiapas. Zapatismo is a concept of justice, of freedom, of land, work, health, 
education,” while in an essay on Hyeronymus Bosch’s Millennium Triptych 
British art critic John Berger draws up a parallel between hell as depicted there 
and globalisation, then posing Zapatismo as the latter’s enemy. (Cruz, 2002; 
Berger, 2001: 210) Using Alain Touraine’s classical typology of social 
movements, Manuel Castells defines globalisation as the Zapatista’s adversary: 
“[Zapatistas] place themselves in historical continuity with five hundred years of 
struggle against colonisation and oppression...[reincarnated] in the current form 
of the new global order: NAFTA and the hberal reforms undertaken by President 
Salinas.” (Castells, 1997: 77) Touraine himself compared the Zapatistas with the 
movements initiated by Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King, as well as with 
the Polish Solidarity movement. (Bellinghausen, 1996) But to show the process 
whereby populism became a mode of articulation of a discourse struggling for 
power after the post Cold War dislocation, I rely in this section on some of the 
key texts written by the Zapatistas themselves.
So how can the claim that Zapatismo is a populist discourse be sustained? 
First of all, Zapatistas were often criticised for their lack of a concrete project, for 
not going beyond “the obvious condemnation of electoral fraud,” for refusing to 
join the Party system either through the PRD or to become a political Party in 
themselves. (Castells, 1997: 81; Holloway and Pelaez, 1998) I would argue 
however that this very vagueness in the signifiers of their discourse together with 
their ongoing deferral to become was in fact the source of the strength and scope 
of their appeal, for what they stood for was so broad-encompassing it could mean 
almost anything. The central topic of the San Andrés Accords, the document 
which resulted from the negotiations between the govermnent and the Zapatistas 
in the town of San Andrés, was “that democracy, freedom and justice be available 
for all Mexicans.” (Montemayor, 1997: 150) There is also constant talk of 
‘honour,’ ‘dignity,’ ‘life’ and ‘truth.’ ‘Man,’ and ‘peace’ are as well constantly
108 It is worth noting that what Berger identifies as hell in his essay is precisely a lack of
differentiation, or in other words, the collapse of identities.
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deployed in their speeches. In other words, their demands remained so open 
almost as to become empty signifiers.
“The so-called ‘poverty’ of the populist symbols is the condition of 
their political efficacy —as their function is to bring to equivalential 
homogeneity a highly heterogeneous reality, they can only do so on 
the basis of reducing to a minimum their particularistic content. At the 
limit, this process reaches a point where the homogeneising function 
is carried out by a pure name: the name of the leader.” (Laclau, 
forthcoming)
This was actually the case of Zapatismo, which ultimately came to be 
synthesised in the name of ‘Marcos.’ “We are all Marcos” was the motto of all 
those who took part in the Zapatista march from Chiapas to Mexico City in 2000. 
The paradoxical familiarity of the leader’s covered face and his ambiguous 
identity even reached mythical proportions.^^ In addition, the tendency towards 
re-grafting signifiers in chains of equivalence, or in other words the prevalence of 
the paradigmatic pole over the syntagmatic one, is also evident in the way ‘the 
Mexican government’ became ‘the rich,’ ‘globalisation’ and ‘neoliberalism’ while 
‘the Indians’ became first ‘the poor’ and finally ‘humanity’:
“During the past years, the power of money has presented a new mask 
over its criminal face. Above borders, no matter race or colour, the 
Power of money humihates dignities, insults honesties and 
assassinates hopes. Re-named as ‘Neoliberalism’ the historic crime in 
the concentration of privileges, wealth and impunities, democratizes 
misery and hopelessness.”^
At a symbolic level, the very choice of Zapata, the one revolutionary 
whose struggle had been mostly about land, the use of horses and rifles and all the 
iconography from the revolution in a jungle setting, also point towards pre- 
modernity, towards a peasant attachment to particular territories rather than the
When President Zedillo announced, on February 9 , 1995, that the government had 
discovered the true identity of the Zapatista leaders and named ‘Marcos’ as Rafael Sebastian 
Guillén Vicente, the announcement was met with scepticism and disbelief by the population: 
‘Marcos’ was far more real that his ‘true’ identity.
“First Declaration of La Realidad for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism” pubhshed in 
January 1996, available in httD://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/ccri 1st dec real.html. 
All EZLN texts are also available in Enghsh: Subcomandante Marcos, (2001) Our Word is our 
Weapon. Seven Stories Press.
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industrial landscapes of the urban modernity they sought to antagonise, despite 
their widespread use of the media and the internet/Zapatistas found echoes to 
their concerns for the land in green Parties and environmental groups in Europe, 
who were in general very sympathetic to their movement/
Finally, as to the ways in which Zapatismo has sought to re-articulate the 
positions from the discourse under challenge, while reconstituting it to their 
advantage, we must only look to their foundational texts. From the very 
beginning, in what might be considered the ‘birth certificate’ of the movement 
since it was also the declaration of war, Zapatistas establish their link with 
historically legitimate authority, thereby branding the authority not so much of the 
PRI in general but rather of the right-wing and repressive administrations of Diaz 
Ordaz and Salinas in particular, as illegitimate, refusing official historical versions 
that set them apart from the Conservatives and as belonging to the governments of 
the revolution. Furthermore, they link them directly with ‘foreigners,’ claiming 
they receive military advice from abroad, setting them apart from ‘Mexicans’; 
drawing on the traditional metaphor of the family, they address fellow Mexicans 
as brothers and sisters, and do not fail to bring up the issue of land when they call 
for the halt of the ‘robbery of our resources’ towards the end of that text.
“We are the inheritors of the true builders of our nation. The 
dispossessed, we are millions and we thereby call upon our brothers 
and sisters to join this struggle as the only path, so that we will not 
starve due to the insatiable ambition of a 70 year dictatorship led by a 
clique of traitors that represent the most conservative and sell-out 
groups. They are the same ones that opposed Hidalgo and Morelos, 
the same ones that betrayed Vicente Guerrero, the same ones that sold 
half our country to the foreign invader, the same ones that imported a 
European prince to rule our country, the same ones that formed the 
‘scientific’ Porfirista dictatorship, the same ones that opposed the 
Petroleum Expropriation, the same ones that massacred the railroad
In fact so important is the symbol of Zapata that the Zapatistas have not been alone in their 
attempts to appropriate it: the alternative project also attempted to do the same. Krauze offered a 
re-interpretation of Zapata’s views on ejidos so that the revolutionary hero appeared to endorse 
small private property and capitalism, while accusing Cardenas of having used a mis­
representation of Zapata’s ideals for political purposes. (Aviles, 1991) In both these ways, there 
was an attempt to sever the link between Zapata and the discourse of the PRI.
Zapatista Committees in Barcelona, Berlin, Toulouse and London were particularly active. 
(Leyva, 1998: 48)
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workers in 1958 and the students in 1968, the same ones that today 
take everything from us.”^^ ^
Translating words into actions, the Zapatistas founded, in a place called 
Guadalupe Tepeyac, a settlement they called Aguascalientes and called for a 
convention to take place there, in a clear re-construction of the revolutionary 
convention that had taken place in the state of Aguascalientes on 27* October 
1914, in which the Zapatistas led by Emiliano Zapata parted from the other two 
factions also fighting the revolution, namely the forces led by Venustiano 
Carranza and Francisco Villa. They also changed the names of towns and villages 
in Chiapas, calling for instance the municipality of Las Margaritas a rather more 
Catholic-sounding ‘San Pedro Michoacan,’ Michoacan being of course the state 
of birth of that other mythical fatherly figure, Lazaro “Tata” Cardenas. The 
government for its part also actively contested the Zapatista appropriation of the 
legitimating historical narrative of the nation, but with considerably less success. 
In his message to the nation on the 6* of January 1994, President Salinas said of 
the Zapatistas: “...this is not an Indian uprising, but the action of a violent, armed 
group against the peace of the communities, public peace and the government...it 
is an action against the national interest...this group is against Mexico,” while the 
name-changing of places prompted his successor President Zedillo to state that 
“there is no Zapatista land in Chiapas. All the land in Chiapas is Mexican land,” 
i.e. Zapatista equals non-Mexican. (Montemayor, 1997: 54, 153)
The style of their later texts always mixed that of the Bible and that of 
Nahuatl literary classics. It is therefore wrong to regard Zapatismo, as some 
theories on social movements do, as having opposed the PRI.^ "^^  (Harvey, 1998; 
Leyva, 1998: 38) Although Zapatistas do oppose the political elite as re-defined 
by the borders drawn during the Salinas administration, Zapatismo in fact became 
the repository, the inheritor, as it were, of the nationalism on which the PRI had 
built its hegemony, and more generally, of all the categories that anchored the
EZLN, “First Declaration from the Lacandona Jungle,” published in a variety of media and 
available in English in their website, http://www.ezln.org
Indeed, amongst the various theories as to the origins and the funding of the Zapatistas, one 
that had some currency during the 1990s posed that a large percentage of their resources had 
come not quite from ‘the government’ as such, but from certain members of the pohtical ehte. 
(De La Grange and Rico, 1997: 347)
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meanings of their discourse. In the words of Antonio, an elderly Indian character 
who often appears in Marcos’ texts, they knew when it was time to declare the 
war because “the motherland was being sold to foreigners, and while hunger and 
starvation can be put up with, not being Mexican cannot be tolerated.”  ^
(Montemayor, 1997: 141) And since nationalism runs of course counter to 
Marxism, it is also wrong to regard Zapatismo as Marxist, despite ‘Marcos’ 
obvious attempts to emulate Che.
The loudest and clearest call to restore in the Mexican political field the 
subject-positions constructed by the revolutionary discourse is perhaps most 
compellingly expressed in the following paragraph, where Zapatistas, in the voice 
of their leader, explain what it is they seek out of their movement. They want, 
they say
“The opportunity to return again to the silence we hold still, to the 
night whence we emerge, to the death that we inhabit, the opportunity 
of disappearing in the same way we appeared at dawn, without a face, 
without a future. The opportunity to return to the bottom of history, to 
the bottom of the dream, to the bottom of the mountain.”^
In short, the Zapatistas aim at the restoration of the boundaries of 
‘revolutionary’ nationalism, inside which they seek to, once again, melt away.
The same feehng was echoed in the recent declaration of Rosendo Flores, the electricians’ 
union leader: “The government and Enron’s entenados must understand our position as 
Mexicans very clearly, which is to build our own future as that which we are: Mexican, and that 
we do not need them." (Cardenas, 2002 my emphasis) “Entenado” is a derogatory term for a 
stepchild.
Speech by “Sub-comandante Marcos” on the 8* of August 1994 at the National Democratic 
Convention in “Aguascalientes, Chiapas,” available in their website: 
http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/marcos_cnd_aug94.html.
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The Chicane Challenge
At this point, it will be useful to recapitulate the argument thus far. In chapter one, 
the argument was advanced that the Cardenas nationahst project achieved the 
subjectivisation of Mexicans as ‘mestizos,’ turning them into what we may term 
the ethnic basis of the nation, by discursive means that, among other strategies, 
involved the objectivisation of ‘the Indians’ or ‘the ancient civilizations from pre- 
Columbian Mexico’: the (conquered) Indians were turned into an object to be 
known —by present-day Mexicans—, displayed in a variety of institutional means 
available —museums, history-books narratives, cultural products such as 
paintings, etc.— in order to perform as the ancestors that would serve the triple 
function of legitimating the right of the mestizo majority to the land, of binding 
them together in a relationship of kinship, and crucially of becoming the origin, 
i.e. of representing both a mythical Golden Age, an age before injustice, and a 
source from which ‘authenticity’ could be drawn. The population that, following 
the dislocation of the discourse, now appear as Indians as discussed in the section 
above, were under the Cardenas project integrated within the mestizo population 
by their sharing with them the realm of subjectivity. The homogenising drive 
characteristic of every nationalist discourse sought to put in place a classificatory 
scheme whereby subjects would be constructed primarily in terms of social class, 
which is not a threatening cleavage to ‘the nation’—and in this case succeeded 
until the late 1980s. Around that time, American citizens of Mexican origin and 
Mexican immigrants settled in the United States, until then often referred to as 
‘Pochos’ and currently as ‘Chicanos,’ began to undergo a marked improvement in 
their social standing in Mexico. Here we will see why.
In the celebration of multiculturalism that has become characteristic of 
‘the age of globalisation,’ essentialist theories have conceptualised Chicanos — 
and others— as either a hybrid identity, i.e. a wholly new and unique identity 
resulting from the combination of two cultures, or as a juxtaposed identity, a sort 
of compound identity made up of holding two separate identities at the same time. 
(Garcia-Canclini, 1995) Within the framework of this thesis however, 
‘multiculturalism’ must be understood as a dislocation of nationalist discourses.
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and the Chicano identity must be conceptualised as a problematisation of the 
Mexican identity which it both affirms and denies. Because membership of this 
group results through simultaneously claiming the Mexican identity and the 
American identity that was its opposite, often keeping all the Mexican relevant 
cultural markers such as language and religion beyond the second generation of 
migrants, but hving this culture out of the territorial boundaries, thus questioning 
the fit between the political and the territorial unit that nationalism struggles to 
create, the Chicano identity was either ignored or rejected by the dominant 
discourse. (Paz, 1967) Its undecidability exposed the contingency of the 
hegemonic meaning of Mexicanity.
Accordingly, Chicanos were formally excluded. Mexican laws did not 
allow a double nationahty, and to be entitled to hold pubhc office it was a 
requisite not only to have been bom in Mexico and to have lived in the country 
for the previous five to ten years depending on the position, but also to be the 
child of Mexican parents.^M exican representations of Chicanos in popular 
culture were few, and when available they were always negative. Research has 
found that in the more than one hundred Mexican films depicting Chicanos 
produced in Mexico since 1922 and until the 1970s, Chicanos are always 
presented as fake, “assimilated, pro-American individuals who have lost their 
identity” in opposition to “authentic” Mexicans. (Maciel, 1992: 110) Needless to 
say there were practically no cultural products by Chicanos in the media or the 
establishment. But despite occupying these marginahsed positions, Chicanos 
continued to exert considerable influence informally, mainly through the 
remittances they sent their families, which contributed to sustain the idea of the 
United States as a sort of promised land that stood in opposition to Mexico, and 
which fostered the maintenance and development of the networks that promoted 
the further migration of whole communities through their kin.^ ^*
But the need to find an alternative representation for the ethnic Mexican 
identity that followed the decline of the hegemonic discourse posed an
Mexican nationality could be claimed either through being bom in Mexico regardless the 
nationality of the parents, or through being bom abroad if both parents were Mexican.
It has been estimated these remittances are worth USD$ 4,000 million a year. (Valenzuela, 
1999: 289)
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opportunity to reassess the Chicano position and to construct it not as the site of 
conflicting identities condemned to remain unresolved, epitomised in the 
derogatory connotations the word Chicano and its synonyms used to convey, but 
on the contrary, as the evidence that a Mexican-North American identity was both 
possible —in fact, already existing— and desirable. In short, what I contend is 
that in one of the projects contending for power, Chicanos are fulfilling some of 
the same discursive functions in the creation of a ‘we’ that indigenous populations 
fulfilled in the Cardenas project.^Firstly, because since a group of descendents 
of those Mexicans who inhabited the land of what today is the American 
southwest when it was lost by Mexico are included within the signifier “Chicano,” 
Chicanos legitimate the claim to the land north of the river. In fact some in the 
movement sustain there should be a re-definition of who the real illegal 
immigrants to that land were. As put by Chicano leader Luis Valdes, “We did not 
come to the US, actually the US came to us.” (Gorodezky, 1993: 143) Secondly, 
in most of their cultural production Chicanos stress community and family values, 
reinforcing the view of the nation as an extended family, in this case regardless 
where the members may se ttle .F in a lly , the political project is promising a 
‘Golden Age,’ but rather than to place it in the past, at the origins as nationalist 
discourses do, it is placed in the future, as befits modernising projects, and 
equating it with ‘the American dream’ closely linked to Enlightenment narratives 
of technology, science and progress.
Thus as of the late 1980s, just as ‘the Indians’ are more and more ‘them,’ 
Chicanos are more and more ‘us,’ that is, there for ‘us’ to identify with. The 
crafting of the Chicano position as one that can be adopted by Mexicans inside the 
territorial boundaries more generally has been attempted in three ways. First of
This is also evident in the way the North, more influenced by Chicanos, has tended to 
predominate in recent years, eclipsing the central region that was home to those indigenous 
civilisations that were key to the discourse of the PRI. In fact, a majority of members of the 
present cabinet either come from the state of Nuevo Leon or graduated from the Technological 
Institute for Higher Education in Monterrey. The same is true of the neoliberal PRI presidents. 
(Carrizales, 2000)
In the film Santitos (Springall: 1998) for instance, there is a scene where the main character, 
who has gone all the way from Veracruz to Los Angeles looking for her daughter, whom she 
believes has been kidnapped, finds a mural where a huge Virgin of Guadalupe has been painted. 
She thereupon remarks: “You as well came all the way here? The things one does for one’s 
children! Doesn’t one?”
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all, there has been the role of the neoliberal presidents heading the project. In a 
speech to Mexican-American elected officials in Dallas, former president Zedillo 
told them: “You are Mexicans —Mexicans who live north of the border.” 
(Buchanan, 2002) In 2000 President Fox addressed a group of Chicanos a speech 
in which he reassured them the new government would support them in their 
efforts to “dream the American dream:”
“We fully agree with you and share your views, but not because we 
wish our people to leave their own country or because we approve of 
illegality, but because we know we are not talking about Mexican or 
American families here, but rather of binational families...We 
acknowledge the fact that an integrated north-America is here, and is 
here to stay!...there shall be no more rhetoric or Mexican ambiguity, 
no more need to read between the lines.” (Venegas, 2000)
Perhaps partly as a marketing strategy in order to establish a “plebiscitary 
presidency,” he also sought to project this image himself: a tall, white Mexican 
president wearing boots and jeans and even a cowboy hat, often working from his 
ranch in Guanajuato instead of either the National Palace or the official residence 
in Los Pinos, which he is fond of calling “Mexico’s White House,” in sharp 
contrast, almost in direct opposition, to Benito Juârez, the Indian hero-president of 
the PRI. (Loaeza, 2003) The Fox government has also created a number of 
institutions to further the interests of Mexicans in the US, such as the Institute for 
the attention to the migrant, and has notoriously espoused issues such as taking 
protests against the death penalty imposed on some Mexican immigrants in the 
US to the International Court of Justice.
Apart from the image supported and projected by the president, there have 
been recent changes to the legal status of Chicanos. As of 1988, the government 
re-defined the nation in its national development plans by stating that “the 
Mexican nation goes beyond the territory that circumscribes its boundaries.” 
(Valenzuela, 1999: 282) In 1995, efforts to reincorporate Chicanos as fully-
A group which contributed enormously to the financing of the President’s campaign through 
his foundation, “The Friends of Fox.” (Aguirre, 2000)
The very key project around which he had originally sought to organise his administration 
was a negotiation to turn NAFTA into the North American Union, a project that recently 
collapsed.
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fledged Mexican citizens started, with Mexican Congress passing a law allowing 
dual nationality. It is estimated that between two and four million US residents 
who had been reluctant to give up their nationality took advantage of this to 
become American citizens.(LaFranchi, 1995) Chicanos have become closely 
involved in the political life of their communities of origin, working jointly with 
governmental authorities —and in some cases, actually replacing the authorities— 
in the planning and development of infrastructure and political participation in 
general, thus paradoxically being more present in their absence, or more 
accurately, being all the more ‘visible’ while being under erasure. (Smith, 1998: 
151; Derrida, 1976) At present mechanisms to entitle Chicanos and other Mexican 
citizens to vote from abroad is being sought. These have already been approved in 
the state of Zacatecas, where a law was also passed to create two permanent 
positions in Congress for representatives of migrants or bi-national citizens. There 
are now calls for other states with a high rate of migrant population to do the 
same, and Chicanos actively participate in the funding and setting of agendas of 
political Parties. (Amador, 2003)
Finally, Chicanos and Mexican artists who embrace their subject position 
have enjoyed an improving standing in the cultural establishment as regards to 
museums, film-making and book publishing, in detriment of the intelligentsia 
which provided the PRI with the artistic representations of the nationality. 
(Gorodezky, 1993: 140-141) Just as films by Chicanos and on Chicanos are being 
promoted, exhibitions of Chicano paintings being organised and books authored 
by Chicanos on their experience get published, key books by authors favoured by 
the PRI such as Nobel Prize winner Octavio Paz, Rosario Castellanos, Carlos 
Fuentes, Carlos Monsivais and others have been removed from the list of books to
According to the National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics INEGI, which 
significantly now collects information on Chicanos as well, 22.6 per cent of Mexican 
immigrants now living in the US have a double nationality. (INEGI, 2002: 24)
Among others, exhibitions were held between the late 1980s and the early 1990s at the 
Mexican Fine Arts Centre Museum in Chicago, the Museum of Modem Art in Mexico City, the 
Museo de Arte Contemporaneo in Mexico City, the Corcoran Museum of Washington and the 
Houston Museum. (Gorodezky, 1993: 140-141) Many more have been held since then.
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be stocked by state school libraries.(A lem an, 2002) In fact the intelligentsia 
was recently branded “the single most insurmountable obstacle for the 
establishment of a new relationship with the United States, based on a redefinition 
of the national identity,” by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge Castaneda, 
in direct opposition to Chicanos, whom the former Minister would presumably 
regard as the single best opportunity for the redefinition sought by the new elites. 
(Molinar, 2002; Monsivais, 1996: 137) Potentially, Chicanos could be conceived 
as resolving rather than problematising the Mexican identity as North American. 
In his serigraphy entitled “Yes, it can be done,” one of Vicente Fox’s slogans 
while in campaign, “visual historian of the Chicano people” Malaquias Montoya 
synthesised the claim as follows: a Mexican identity, represented in the sword­
like leaves of a spiky cactus, grows from the top of the main character’s head as if 
it were his hair, tearing in the process the protective cloth that covered his head, 
perhaps providing some shelter, the American flag. (Gorodezky, 1993: 38) The 
wall that excluded him has been left behind, but the ghost of a security mesh 
lingers on, dimly, before his eyes (see photograph 3 in the Addendum).The 
same theme, albeit in a more problematic fashion —a Mexican identity forged by 
tearing through Americannes— is echoed in Chicana feminist Jessica Roa’s poem 
“Reclamation,” also found at the Addendum.
However, the paradox here is that more often than not Chicano cultural 
products tend to ignore their Western heritage and rely on the indigenous past in 
search for authenticity. Mythical Aztlan, which is the place whence the Aztecs 
first migrated to Mexico City according to the legend, and which is vaguely 
described as ‘in the north,’ has been appropriated by the Chicano movement, with 
the claim that Aztlan may actually have been located in the area that is now the
Again drawing on an example from the realm of film, a major work on Mexican cinema 
published in 2001 explicitly states in the introduction that one of its key assets is the fact that it 
“includes Mexican, American and Chicano authors.” (Garcia and Maciel, 2001: 15)
Although this image could also be read the other way round, with the American flag being 
the hair and the cactus a sort helmet or horns, the former reading is more likely the preferred 
reading, since the cactus, being a plant, is alive.
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American southwest/^^ There are frequent quotes of Nahuatl poetry. They reject 
abstract art and prefer expressionism. In fact many have turned to muralism, in the 
same style used by Rivera and Siqueiros: in his mural entitled Mythology o f Com, 
Antonio Burciaga shows a Last Dinner where icons of Mexicanity under the PRI 
such as Zapata, Benito Juarez, Sor Juana and Frida Khalo share a table with 
Chicano leaders Joaqum Murieta, Luis Valdes and Ernesto Galarza. This mural 
says “ .. .and to all those who died, scrubbed floors, wept and fought for us” so the 
new heroism is not so much to die in a gun-battle anymore, but in a battle against 
exploitation, which also has its martyrs. (Gorodezky, 1993: 46) In short, it is not 
at all clear that Chicanos, either as objects or subjects of representations of the 
national identity can be appropriated by the political project sponsored by the elite 
headed by Fox and others, to supply new meanings to the ethnic and territorial 
dimensions of the identity. Chicanos have themselves relied on the Mexican 
national identity as constructed by the PRI and this would make it easier in 
principle for the contending project to appropriate their movement, which anyway 
has its own agenda in the
Thus it can be concluded that while the ‘ethnic’ identity constructed for 
‘Mexicans’ by the PRI has certainly been challenged by processes that involve the 
eventual exclusion of ‘Indians’ and the inclusion of Chicanos, the new political 
project has not been successful in its attempts to forge an alternative 
representation. From a discursive perspective, this failure must be interpreted as 
due to the lack of a clear ‘Other’ against whom unity must be sought. The 
‘Indians’ cannot perform this role because they cannot be construed as posing a 
threat to the nation. Their claims for autonomy can be and have been channelled
It is for this reason significant that a museum aiming at reassessing the worth of the 
indigenous tribes in the north, which had so far been dismissed as ‘uncivilised’ compared with 
the ‘ancient civilisations’ of central Mexico, was opened in 1994. Furthermore, the Museum of 
the North would be devoted to all northern pre-Columbian indigenous peoples, including those 
who lived in what now is the United States: “It will be news that we shall finally get rid of a 
political division which has never existed even if it has been drawn in the maps.” (Matadamas, 
1994: 28)
The cowboy image that Fox so cultivated during his campaign and the first years of his 
administration, can also be read as that of a Charro, that is, a wealthy, conservative. Catholic 
and nationalist member of the older generation, among whom owning a ranch and horse-riding 
has been a symbol of status and thus an identity-marker. (Adler and Pérez, 1987: 223-224) In 
the mass media, Charros have traditionally constructed the Mexican identity as Hispanic rather 
than as North American.
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through existing means of political representation in ad-hoc commissions and 
eventually in Congress. In order to re-graft signifiers in chains of equivalence, 
there must always be chains of differentiation against which the equivalences will 
derive their meaning. But probably due to the very disintegration of ‘the West’ in 
the broader discourse on World Politics discussed in chapter three, the political 
project led in Mexico by Fox has failed to convey convincing alternative 
meanings. The project organised around the figure of Marcos on the other hand 
has resonated far more among the majorities —as opposed to the upper classes 
who are still very committed to the neoliberal project— but it has done so only by 
focusing on class rather than national antagonisms: it had to go beyond the not 
very persuasive ‘Mexico/United States’ to ‘the powerful/the exploited.’ The 
recent trend in World Politics to rely on a boundary that sets ‘Christians’ apart 
from ‘Islamists’ has further contributed to the difficulties in conveying meanings 
for the Mexican identity that are any different from the proposed and cultivated by 
the hegemony of the PRI.
The Linguistic Challenge
Language had not been an issue in demarcating the political field of the nation at 
the time of independence, in the sense of distinguishing Mexico from either Spain 
or the rest of Latin America. Spanish was first codified after the foundation of the 
Royal Academy of the Spanish Language in 1713, and Mexican terms were first 
incorporated in 1884 in an attempt to “acknowledge and foster the cultural links 
that united Latin American countries with Spain,” thus signalling the formal 
acceptance of ‘Mexico’ as a sovereign nation, an acceptance symbolised in the 
recognition of the rights of local elites to have a share of the ‘correct,’ and most 
importantly, normative version of the language, i.e. a share in the hegemonic 
code. (Pérez, 2002)
The role of language in giving unity and cohesion to the nation by 
providing a common cultural basis in reference to which other differences such as 
class can be relativised became relevant after the triumph of the revolution, when 
the strong state privileged the codified version of Mexican Spanish as the national 
language, not only over the more than fifty languages spoken by indigenous
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minorities, but also over the quasi-medieval Spanish spoken in rural areas. At the 
time it was said of the Cristeros that “their educated contemporaries from the city 
did not understand one word in three of their beautiful Castilian speech of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.” (Meyer, 1976: 182) The educational system 
thus incorporated the study of Mexican Spanish under the label ‘national 
language,’ while bilingual education leading to privileging Spanish became 
available in rural areas.
At stake at present however is not the dominant status of Spanish, but its 
state of fluidity: the codified language has become, from normative and a 
prerogative of the dominant and educated classes, more a mere record of the 
language as actually spoken, that is, now it is “usage that makes the canon” and 
not vice versa. (Pérez, 2002) Now there is an attempt to update the dictionary on a 
daily basis with the help of electronic media, as opposed to the previous practice 
of editing the dictionary every ten years. This move, although not initiated by the 
Mexican academy, is strongly reminiscent of the Party’s attempt to institutionalise 
the revolution, a clear attempt to arrest the flow of meanings.
Also because the political system when hegemonised by the PRI largely 
relied on rituals to invest authority, and these rituals involved highly elaborate, 
formal scripts, the current preponderance of the informal, colloquial language that 
has been dominant in politics after the Zedillo administration points to a lack of 
alternative mechanisms to produce positions of authority. (Bourdieu, 1991: 115) 
The same sort of language that gave Vicente Fox a high rating of approval while 
in campaign has worked against him once in office, since the public perception is 
that in his refusal to enact the scripts that make the president, he is not effectively 
presiding, a case of what the speech-act theory would call ‘infelicitous 
performance.’ This can be illustrated by his characterisation of the Presidential 
Palace as “some dingy hovel” when early in his presidency he said he would not 
“lock himself up in some dingy hovel, but would be close to the people,” or in his 
description of what used to be called “micro-enterprises” as “changarros,” a rough 
equivalent to the English expression “Mac-jobs.” (Loaeza, 2003)
Political analyst Soledad Loaeza has accounted for this sort of language as 
a key component of a presidential project she calls “plebiscitary,” consisting
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mainly in manufacturing an image for the president where he is “just one of us” in 
order to capitalise on his chief asset, namely his personal charisma. (Loaeza, Ibid) 
According to Loaeza, the aim of this (failed) project would have been to give Fox 
some room for manouvre given that his Party does not control Congress. I 
contend however the situation can be better comprehended as part of the more 
general crisis in the structures of power that takes place when there is a 
dislocation in a hegemonic discourse, as was the case with the liturgy when what 
had until then been the hegemonic discourse of religion began to decline. 
(Bourdieu, 1991: 115) At first Latin was replaced by the vernaculars, which 
marked the first stage of the decline since the point for participants was, more 
than to understand the uttered words, to take their places in the ritual in which the 
priest was invested with the authority to give the people their subject-positions: 
this enabled them ‘to be’ (Catholic), i.e. it gave them a Catholic identity, with all 
the meaning-making this entailed. Later the words in prayers themselves were 
‘updated’ to mirror common usage, a second stage in the decline. Finally, the 
point was nearly reached when, as one parishioner put it, “Hail thee Mary” would 
become “Hi there!” and at that point there would be no power whatsoever left in 
such a discourse:
“What is at stake in the crisis of the liturgy is the whole system of 
conditions which must be fulfilled in order for the institution to 
function, i.e. the institution which authorises and regulates the use of 
the liturgy and which ensures its uniformity through time and space by 
ensuring the conformity of those who are delegated to carry it out. The 
crisis over language thus points to the crisis in the mechanisms which 
ensured the production of legitimate senders and receivers.” 
(Bourdieu, 1991: 115)
Likewise, the presidential institution, which in Mexico authorised and 
regulated during the era of the PRI a discourse that revolved around the nation, 
whose legitimate representatives could produce very meaningful subject-positions 
for the people as Mexicans, is now in crisis.
We will turn our attention to the link between religion and national identity in 
Mexico today in the following section.
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The Religious Identity Chailenge
Catholicism was central to the formation of the Mexican national identity from 
the very beginning, not only because of the crucial role the clergy had in the 
forging of the Mexican state, but also because through a variety of syncretic 
practices, of which the Virgin of Guadalupe and various deities of the land are the 
best examples, it allowed for the various indigenous religions to be subsumed and 
incorporated into a common faith held by nearly all those encompassed within the 
territorial boundaries. (Smith, 2003: 212) Cathohcism has had a “key and 
generally hidden role in the system of symbols that define the national.” (Luengo, 
1993: 85) However, whether based on Marxian ideas that posed all religion as an 
obstacle to be overcome to achieve progress and ultimately emancipation, and 
Catholicism in particular as part of the ideological superstructure of a backward, 
pre-capitalist mode of production, or perhaps influenced by Weberian ideas that 
attributed the economic welfare of the West to the Protestant ethics, the 
revolutionary project sought at first to forge a secular national state. As mentioned 
in chapter one, this led to the Cristera war, which the government won in military 
terms, but lost ideologically. What ensued was a compromise with the Church, 
whereby it acquiesced to retaining a somewhat privileged position while not 
pursuing its challenge to the authority of the government any further. Although all 
the laws that were promulgated against the church remained in place, they were 
largely ignored. (Muro, 1994: 15)
But more than a mere mutually reinforcing power-share, this apparently 
unlikely alliance between the recalcitrant Jacobins and the Church is to be 
understood as a key identity-making boundary, for while frequent appeals to 
‘Christianity’ are found in discourses on politics today, with ‘Christianity’ 
opposed to ‘Islam,’ at the time the Church rather served to break up the 
potentially unifying ‘Christianity’ into the Mexican Catholic and the American 
P ro tes tan t . In  other words, the Catholic Church provided an additional but 
crucial dimension to the political discourse that the revolutionaries constructed in
Efforts to develop a European identity for instance draw on Europe’s common Christian 
heritage —although in its present, secular form— as unifying.
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opposition to Diaz. They provided a social dimension in opposition to the 
Americans, at that time the most relevant Others. The Church provided a space in 
which to perform some of the ritualistic aspects of nationalism, for instance 
festivities —the day of the dead, posadas, etc.— around which time and work 
were organised and whence their meaning derived. Moreover, inasmuch as the 
Church was an interest group and a strong institution, educating and forming 
cadres and mediating between the state and society, it assumed a variety of roles 
that were vital for the stability of the regime. Mexican nationalism became a 
“secular religion,” or what Smith calls “neo-traditional,” in that it subordinated 
religion as a key component of the nation. (Smith, 2003: 13) Thus a symbiotic 
relationship between the upper hierarchy of the Church and the political 
leadership began then, and the situation did not change until the Salinas 
administration further devolved the Church all its earlier privileges and openly 
restored to it the condition of a legitimate political actor.
Several explanations were put forward by political analysts to try to 
account for these seemingly inchoate actions of President Salinas. To try to 
legitimate the power of the Catholic Church when it was already exerting enough 
within the constraints of the dominant arrangements seemed to be totally 
antagonistic to the North American re definition of the national identity he and his 
faction of the elite sought. Although this set of reforms was presented as in line 
with the broader objectives of enhancing freedom and democracy in the country, 
and thus not in opposition to the neoliberal project but a requisite for it, traditional 
explanations stressed instead the need of an extremely unpopular president who 
had clearly lost the election to draw legitimacy and support from the Church, a 
support that he obtained in exchange for the constitutional reforms that restored 
the Church its former privileges. (Aleman, 2002a; Barranco, 2002; Loaeza, 
2002a) Either way, since then the Church has participated actively and openly in 
the political life of the country, mostly to promote the interests of those factions 
within the PAN that back it up, and of the far right. In some areas it has also given 
support to emerging social movements. In sharp contrast with the low profile it 
kept after the Cristera war, it has literally ‘gone on strike’ and closed down the 
Churches as part of its involvement in political campaigns of the PAN. The
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Church also began to take over a number of the ritualistic and performative 
dimensions of the national identity that used to be within the exclusive domain of 
the state, for instance controversially singing the national anthem at the end of a 
service by Archbishop Rivera at the Cathedral in Mexico City and presiding over 
ceremonies to worship the flag. President Fox added to these controversial actions 
when he bowed and kissed the Pope’s ring during the Pontiffs most recent visit to 
the country. There are various interpretations however as to the extent that this 
very much increased participation should be regarded as proof of the power and 
influence of the Church in the political and social life of Mexico now and on the 
extent to which it still operates as a difference marker within the national identity.
Contending Interpretations
Those who argue that the Church is indeed powerful and that its influence is very 
considerable point to the mobilising power of the Pope, who during his first visit 
drew twenty million people to see him. His very active conservative Papacy has 
presided over a true revival of Catholicism in the country, crucially including the 
turning of Indian Juan Diego, to whom the Virgin of Guadalupe Arst appeared 
according to the myth, into a saint in 2002. The Basilica of Guadalupe comes 
second only to Mecca as the most visited holy place in the world, continuing to 
attract around fifteen million pilgrims every year. (Orozco, 2003) The Church 
network is ample and very responsive: five days after the earthquake in 1985 they 
had raised USD$ 850,000 in an independent trust; a month later, the figure was 
USD$3 million. 88.9 per cent of the population declare themselves Catholic, and 
although that figure is down from the early 1990s, the decline is only 1.38 per 
cent in twelve years. Protestantism has increased by 0.27 in the same period. 
(INEGI, 2002: 23; Luengo, 1993: 113-160) They also point to the Church’s 
ability to cut across social class and age divisions, with a small but very 
influential minority of the upper classes completely conunitted to its project —
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some in fact now serving in President Fox’s Cabinet— and many teenagers 
among the ranks of a few of the most fundamentalist movements.
They see evidence of the Church’s influence in the successful attempts at 
censorship it has led: museums have been closed down and directors forced to 
resign after allowing exhibitions that are deemed controversial, works of art have 
been destroyed or stolen and television programmes have been forced into self- 
censorship.^^^ (Vargas et al., 2000; Manrique, 1997) Finally, they point to the 
apparent validity of the Cathohc ethical code for most of the population: 70 per 
cent of those who get married have a religious wedding as well, and many more 
seek to baptise their children and impart sacraments to the dying. (Luengo, 1993: 
130) The majority are rather conservative with regards to moral attitudes, 
particularly sexual mores and the role of women, although they do not uphold the 
Church’s policies on contraception. In International Relations, discourses on 
world politics attempting to account for the rise of religion in politics —and for 
overlapping authorities in a given territory— drew on the metaphor of a ‘neo- 
medieval revival’ involving the shifting of loyalties and identities. (Falk, 2000)
Minister for Labour Carlos Abascal is the son of Salvador Abascal, who was until his death 
in 2000 a prominent Member of the Movement that fought the Cristera war and sought to put in 
place a regime equivalent to that of Franco’s Spain. (Martinez, 2002) Carlos Abascal, who 
pursued studies at the Institute for Business Administrators IPADE, an institution closely hnked 
to Opus Dei, is also said to be an advisor to Cardinal Norberto Rivera. Minister for 
Development Josefina Vazquez is also an IPADE alumna, while Head of the National 
Commission for Human Rights José Luis Soberanes is another member of Opus Dei. In general. 
Opus Dei is strong in Mexico, where approximately 10 per cent of its 85,000 members are 
located, all among the upper class. The creator of the Order, Spaniard Jose Maria Escriva de 
Balaguer, was turned into a Saint by Pope John Paul II in 1990. (Român, 2002)
In 1987 conservative groups backed by the Church shut down the Museum for Contemporary 
Art in Mexico City because one of the paintings in an exhibition depicted the Virgin Mary with 
the face and breasts of Marilyn Monroe, while another one showed Jesus Christ with a Pedro 
Infante face. In Aguascalientes in 1997 an exhibition of photographs by Carlos Llamas was 
postponed and some photos were stolen because they were deemed ‘immoral,’ while theatre 
play Violation to Intimacy was banned in Hidalgo in the same year on the same grounds. In 
August 2002, Yolanda Carvajal, director of the “Jose Luis Cuevas” Museum in Mexico City, 
resigned after she failed to ban the exhibition of a painting entitled La Patrona, depicting a 
naked Virgin. The painting was tom to pieces while on display the opening day, an action 
applauded by Cardinals Rivera and Sandoval. In other cities also governed by the PAN, 
attempts have been made to ban mini-skirts. (Manrique, 1997; Vargas et al., 2000) As for 
television, the Mexican version of Big Brother faced a massive withdrawal of publicity and, 
although after considerable stmggle it was allowed to go on air, it was substantially ‘toned 
down.’
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On the other hand, those who regard the importance of the Church as 
declining and its influence as very limited point to the low levels of attendance to 
Sunday service; the decline in ‘callings’ to priesthood and life in convent; the low 
rate of priests available with regards to the population; the moral crisis that the 
church is facing world-wide, with scandals of paedophilia, and in Mexico with the 
links between the Church and the drug barons exposed in the news as well. 
(Loaeza, 2002) Before the canonisation of Juan Diego, controversy was fuelled in 
May 1996, when Guillermo Schulenberg, the Abbot at the Basilica de Guadalupe, 
declared the Virgin of Guadalupe had never existed, but had been an instrument 
for the domination of the Indians by the Spaniards. Although the Abbot was 
inunediately pronounced mentally ill and parted from his temple, his declarations 
exposed deep divisions at the heart of the top hierarchy, at the moment said to be 
undergoing a fierce competition given the increasingly deteriorating health of the 
Pope. The Church also failed to boycott the exhibition of The Crime o f Father 
AmarOy a film widely regarded as highly critical of the institution in Mexico, 
despite a very thorough campaign ran with the aid of various conservative groups 
in civil society, some of whom even called to violence. Although not 
necessarily reliable, surveys conducted throughout the country after the film was 
shown indicated a vast majority of the population disapproved of the active 
political stance of the Church. (Rodriguez, 2003) Finally, the point is made that 
modernity, understood as the loss of authority in general, the weakening of family 
relations in decision-making, the loss of customs and traditions and the 
professionalisation of roles previously taken on by the Church with the emergence 
of psychologists, counsellors, charities, etc. have negatively affected the position 
of the Church. Inasmuch as it is true that “belief withdraws from a myth and 
leaves it almost intact, but without any role, transformed into a document,” the 
Church would now have turned into a mere museum that displays the nostalgic 
reminiscence of itself. (De Certau, 1984: 181) Moreover, some argue, the 
apparent comeback the Church has made since the Salinas reforms returned its 
power and privileges can be explained away if it is interpreted within the
Except for one city in the very religious state of Michoacân. The film is discussed on chapter 
four, “the challenge on film.”
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framework of postmodemity, which in ascribing science to the category of a 
metanarrative has also allowed formerly derided religion the same status. 
(Luengo, 1993: 1-14)
But both those who maintain that the Church is a leading force in 
contemporary Mexican politics and those who hold instead that its real influence 
is very little are at pains when trying to account for the continued support the 
Church has received from presidents Salinas, Zedillo, and most decidedly from 
Fox. If a need to obtain legitimacy was the reason that led Salinas to devolve to it 
power and privileges as received explanations would have it, that does not 
account for the reasons of Zedillo and Fox, who boasted reasonable margins at the 
presidential elections. This is especially puzzling in the case of Fox. The Party 
that brought him to power is internally divided between the traditional 
Conservatives in favour of the nationalist project endorsed by the Church, 
different from the revolutionary nationalism only in that they wish to undermine 
the secular basis of the state, and those who favour instead the re-definition of the 
national identity along North-American lines. While appearing in the beginning as 
willing to pursue the latter project, he has instead promoted, it is speculated that 
for personal reasons, the interests of the Church. I would contend however there is 
an alternative, discursive way to attempt to account for the role of the Church in 
contemporary Mexican politics, and more specifically on the national identity.
A Discursive Interpretation
First, it must be acknowledged that, inasmuch as ‘the Church’ as a centre of 
power was, during the PRI era, part and parcel of the ruling elite, the schism that 
split the elite into the tradition-seeking nationalists and the modernising 
technocrats also allowed for the signifier ‘the Church’ to be split into two 
contending versions of the meaning of Mexican Catholicism. As the formerly 
solid PRI hegemony fractured and political projects emerged contending for 
power, a faction of ‘the Church’ became attached to the project led by the
It must be said that others contest the link between modernity and secularism, and 
postmodemity and ‘disbelief in metanarratives,’ since the United States is supposed to have 
been modem and rehgious, while presumably it is now post-modem and still religious.
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Zapatistas, which could broadly be described as ‘progressist’ and ‘the left,’ while 
another faction, now unhindered by the constitutional reforms, openly sided with 
the PAN, which, although itself split into a number of factions, can broadly be 
described as ‘the Conservatives’ or ‘the right.’ Let us first see how this schism 
was constructed discursively.
Although Liberation Theology is a Latin American movement often traced 
back to 1971, when Dominican Father Gustavo Gutierrez from Peru first 
published his book of that title, it was not until the 1980s that it lent intellectual 
support to the faction of the Mexican Catholic Church that attempted to graft 
Catholicism within the discursive chain led by the Zapatistas. (Gutierrez, 1988) A 
group of priests with parishes in the southeast not only endorsed Zapatismo, but 
became in fact its most ardent advocates, setting themselves in opposition both to 
the Vatican —with the exception of Nuncio Justo Mullor, who was decidedly a 
sympathiser of Chiapas Bishop Samuel Ruiz and the Zapatistas— and to the Party 
leaders, on the side of ‘the people.’ (Harvey, 1998: 228) Liberation Theology was 
also successful in the dioceses of Cuernavaca, Chihuahua, Ciudad Juarez, 
Tehuantepec and Hermosillo. (Muro, 1994: 16) They used the same discursive 
strategies as the Zapatistas, namely an exclusive ‘we’ in all cases; the passive 
voice to refer to acts of the government, rendering them into impersonal 
processes; the establishment of a link of equivalence between ‘modernity,’ 
‘neoliberalism’ and ‘evil,’ while in opposition to this they placed ‘the movement,’ 
legitimated by its historical links with the Spanish priests that had defended the 
Indians at the time of the conquest, and equivalent to ‘the people.’ Samuel Ruiz, 
then Bishop of Chiapas and a leader of the movement, declared in a letter to the 
Pope:
“On the face of the challenges posed by modernity and the cruelty of 
neoliberalism, which we have experienced directly, we raise our voice 
along with the prophets,’ to say that the poverty generated by this 
lacking is an evil, and it is totally against the will of God.” (Ruiz, 
1993)
Although the political project sponsored by the modernisers is apparently in power, it is far 
more debatable to what extent it in fact has power: none of the key government initiatives has 
been passed by Congress in four years.
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In the same letter, he expressed his wish to form “an authoctonous 
Church...which finds expression in [the people’s] culture, which enriches itself 
from their values.” (Ibid) An instance of how this was attempted in practice would 
be the application of the biblical exodus to the specific case of displacement 
suffered by various Indigenous communities, who could then interpret the Bible 
as making reference to them directly, and use this to legitimate the re-colonisation 
of the zones where they relocated. (Leyva, 1998: 41) Ruiz then established a 
frontier between the Vatican and the Church he represented, by placing the former 
in a chain of equivalence with the —illegitimate— political elite:
“The Church has, at various times, wisely complied with its prophetic 
mission. However, at other times it became mundane, legitimating the 
colonial or the independent state’s governments, or enjoying 
privileges it was thereon granted to attain property and power. Our 
local Church, marked by the evangelical faith of Fray Bartolomé de 
las Casas, has chosen in recent decades to occupy its rightful place at 
the margins of society, side by side with its poorest members.” (Rufz,
Ibid)
Compare this with representative of Opus Dei in Mexico, Monsignor 
Rafael Fiol Mateos’ call to reach sainthood via the delivery of top quality 
performance at work:
“If all of us Mexicans resolved to avoid mediocrity we would see the 
indicators of competitiveness and other indicators of the quality of 
work rise. And those who, according to their faith, decided to offer 
their work to God, the nurse or the peasant, the electrician, the 
businessman, the housewife or the lawyer, would be contributing to 
their own sainthood, because sainthood is not ‘only’ to work, but to 
work for the love of God and our fellow men. ‘Sainthood’ is a word 
that has been misunderstood for centuries.” (Fiol, 2003)
Elsewhere in his same piece Monsignor Fiol also quotes US former 
Treasurer of Mexican origin Rosario Marm as an example of what it means to be 
a “successful” Cathohc. Marin renounced to her job in George W. Bush’s 
government in order to run for the US Senate for the state of California in 2004. 
While Monsignor Fiol’s interpretation of the meaning of (Mexican) Cathohcism 
—the pursuit of sainthood via work, preferably leading to the United States—
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may be shared by some of the Catholic members of the upper class in the far right, 
so far it is the view put forward by Samuel Ruiz that has found echo in the 
majorities.
But to account for the contradictory interpretations of the role of the 
Church in contemporary politics it is not enough to acknowledge that the 
institution, like the PRI, was divided after the fall of the Soviet Union and that 
among the factions there is a struggle for the meaning of Catholicism, so as to 
graft it within the contending projects they espouse.T here  is also a struggle on 
the meaning of ‘the nation’ and nationalism, for just as the particular Catholicism 
practised in Mexico became a cohesive force in the development of the national 
identity, the Mexican Church equally derived its power from being recognised as 
‘our’ Church, and from being ‘threatened’ by a ‘hostile’ government. The 
Charisma of the Pope and his continuous efforts to revive the faith would not have 
resonated nearly as much were the Catholic religion viewed as an import from 
either ‘the Vatican’ or ‘Europe,’ and aided by a government at times viewed as 
corrupt and unjust. The Salinas reforms, therefore, in granting a higher profile to 
the Church, in making its overwhelming importance visible, also exposed it to be 
undermined, rendering it vulnerable. But while for Theologians of Liberation 
there is no contradiction in their interpellating the people as Mexican from within 
the revolutionary nationalism discourse, since as discussed above Zapatistas seek 
to restore this project, only becoming the ‘true inheritors’ of the revolution, the 
Church on the right too must interpellate ‘Mexican Catholics’ from within the 
revolutionary nationalism discourse —that is, a Mexicanity ethnically based on 
Indian ancestors and antagonistic to the United States— as it is from this that they 
too derive their power. Archbishop Rivera knew this when he said, in relation to 
Schulenberg’s declarations: “the controversy generated around the milagro 
Guadalupano has unmasked those who would like to see the country divided, 
without faith, without hope, devoid of patriotic symbols and in danger of being 
absorbed by alien cultures and alien powers.” (Guameros, 1996) And Ciisteros
Again, paradoxically, the fall of the Soviet Union deprived the Pope of a valuable enemy 
against whom he built part of his stature as a statesman in the West during the 1980s.
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before the Cardinal had already denounced Liberals as “Yankee-phillic” and “un- 
Mexican.” (Martinez, 2002)
To sum up, the Church is internally divided and thus not only do ‘its’ 
actions appear as contradictory, but ‘it’ also appears to be drawing support —and 
attacks— from unexpected, contending interest groups in a currently dislocated 
society. The Mexican people that the Church has interpellated as ‘the faithful’ 
since Cardenas consolidated the revolutionary project have become very 
heterogeneous, due to the reasons discussed in the introduction to the chapter and 
of course to the dislocation itself. Moreover, although the Church was in the 
beginning mostly the institutionalisation of a religious discourse, it acquired 
during modernity and its co-existence with other discourses various social 
dimensions. All these factors render its influence uneven among the high 
percentage of the population that declare themselves Catholic. Finally, the 
Catholic Church in Mexico was instrumental in the forging of the national identity 
and is by its very nature committed to the revolutionary nationalism sponsored 
and promoted by the PRI. The most evident obstacle the Liberation Theologians 
face to succeed in articulating their meaning for Mexican Catholicism is that ‘the 
Other’ against whom the discourse they need to rely on has also changed. On the 
other hand, the greatest challenge faced by the conservative faction of the clergy 
is to be able to support the group within the PAN that seeks to redefine the 
Mexican identity as North-American, perhaps by appealing to ‘Christianity’ 
instead of ‘Catholicism,’ or, less likely, by seeking that religion is not one of the 
boundaries used in the establishment of an identity.
An alternative account to the one I have put forward here conceives of the Mexican Catholic 
Church as simply attempting to survive in an increasingly secularising society, thus tending to 
side with whichever happened to be the hegemonic group: for as long as the political system 
was not seriously challenged, it sided with the elite, while in those areas where ‘the right’ is 
now hegemonic Opus Dei and Legions of Christ dominate, and in the areas where there is a 
majority of organised resistance such as Chiapas the ‘pastoral line’ adopted Liberation 
Theology strategies. (Muro, 1994) This hypothesis is persuasive, but it fails to address the link 
between the Church and national identity, which can be accounted for through discourse 
analysis.
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The Challenge on Film: 1989-2002
The last section of chapter two was dedicated to the analysis of, on the one hand, 
the interpellation that national cinema did of subjects as Mexican, among other 
ways, through the provision of persuasive representations for identification, and 
on the other, to the positions created for Mexico as represented on Hollywood 
films during the Cold War, oscillating between a developing member of the West 
and a trustworthy ally, and a communist or a cultural/ethnic threat in the making. 
Likewise, we will now turn to films produced and consumed after the end of the 
Cold War to provide evidence of the challenges to the hegemonic discourse that 
constituted the identity and which have been dealt with throughout chapters three 
and four.
In short, I have argued that the end of the Cold War radically challenged 
the hegemonic discourse in that it did away with the sets of oppositions that in 
most contexts invested meaning to ‘Mexicanity.’ This threatened, to varying 
degrees, existing political and social institutions as well as ethnic and religious 
basis of the identity. But this also posed an opportunity to re-frame the relation 
between Mexico and the United States in terms of supplementarity rather than 
antagonism. Although film production of the past decade is vast and not free from 
fragmentation and contradiction, there is evidence of both the challenges posed 
and the opportunities involved in three sets of films: first, there were those 
Hollywood films which presented alternative representations of Mexicans, 
especially as regards migration, their role in drug traffic control and their 
involvement in the economy. Then there were those Mexican films that sought to 
present Mexico as already belonging in the West, that is, as industrialised and 
developed, and as a country whose Christian heritage still informs social values 
and ethics but is mostly devoid of religious fervour. And finally, there are those 
films that sought to undermine the legitimacy of the political system, and to a 
lesser extent the Church since it too belonged in the PRI alliance, calling for 
démocratisation. We will now discuss these three sets of films in turn.
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The View from Hollywood: Representations of Supplementarity
As explained in chapter two, Hollywood enjoyed throughout the Cold War a 
privileged position as a manufacturer and disseminator of representations, and this 
position was strengthened when the Cold War came to an end, as it enabled the 
same sort of vertical integration of the industry that had originally taken place 
domestically to take place world-wide, with Hollywood becoming a major stake 
holder in the production, distribution and especially the exhibition of films 
through the ‘multiplex’ system, albeit to varying extents in the different 
geographical regions. (Balio, 2003: 58) The balance between domestic and 
foreign revenues shifted in the US film industry throughout the 1990s towards a 
ratio of 40:60 and even 30:70 for some blockbusters produced with the 
international market it mind. (Chapman, 2003: 152) This trend would have been 
aided by the fact that films were negotiated as industrial rather than cultural 
products under NAFTA, which gave Hollywood far more access to the Mexican 
film market, worth approximately USDS 360 million in ticket sales annually. 
(Sânchez and Ugarte, 2000) Today, about 60 per cent of all new films screened 
every year are American, and more importantly, they are shown on 75 per cent of 
all theatres for much longer periods of time than the national production. 
Although there are 122 distributors in the country, 90 per cent of the highest 
grossing films were all distributed by just 3 enterprises, two of them American. 
(Sanchez-Rmz, 1997) It may be because of this that after the signing of NAFTA, 
representations of Mexicans increased slightly in number and were generally 
regarded as less negative. (Wood, 2002) By 1989 the view of depictions on 
television, also applicable to film was that:
137 Although around 150 million tickets are reportedly sold in Mexico annually, these are cheap 
compared to other countries, costing around USD$3.70 in 2000. In the same year, tickets in the 
US and Japan cost around USD$9, while the world average price was USD$6. (Estrada, 2003; 
Sanchez and Ugarte, 2000)
United International Pictures, Columbia and Videocine, account for the distribution of 91.73 
per cent of all films. (Sânchez-Rufz, 1997) In Mexico it is estimated that distributors receive 
approximately 40 per cent of every dollar spent on tickets, while producers get about 12 per 
cent. (Estrada, 2003)
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“...we are entering a new era. US Latinos now star as admirable 
Hispanic characters in television dramatic series: Edward James 
Olmos as a stalwart, astute police lieutenant Martin Castillo in Miami 
Vice, for example, and Jimmy Smits as slick, articulate lawyer Victor 
Sifuentes in L.A. Law.” (Cortés, 1989: 117)
It would thus seem that apart from NAFTA, another factor driving the 
change is the growing Hispanic population, on the one hand, as consumers. 
Historically, Chicanos have been assiduous movie-goers, since films provided the 
opportunity “to escape from their hard and often oppressive world, [while at the 
same time allowing] them to keep the culture, values and Mexican traditions 
within the community, including the Spanish language. Films effectively fought 
assimilationist trends.” (Maciel, 1966: 165) They also provided alternative 
“history lessons,” compensating for the neglect with which the official curriculum 
treated the Chicano Mexican heritage. (Ibid) All Mexican stars paid visits to 
theatres in the US, especially the Million Dollar in Los Angeles. In fact, attending 
cinema was a distinctive way to partake in the community: early on, politicians 
and personnel from the consulates were often invited to the opening night, and 
theatres were adorned with the Mexican flag. Audience participation and reaction 
to the films was very high. (Iglesias, 1999: 242-244) And although Mexican films 
dealing with Chicanos were not always shown, for they tended to reflect the 
resentment felt in Mexico against its migrants, whole new genres dealing with the 
border developed in order to cater for this particular segment of the population. At 
present, with 37 million citizens —13 per cent of the total population—, 
Hispanics are now the United States’ largest ‘minority’ and the fastest growing, 
increasingly becoming a market of a considerable size.^^  ^25 million of them are 
of Mexican origin. (Census, 2000)^ "^  ^ Thus more favourable depictions could 
simply be the result of a need to adapt to the tastes and demands of the expanding 
market in Mexico and the emerging market in the US, in the search for profit: the
The American population of Hispanic origin is said to grow at a rate five times higher than 
that of the white population and other minorities. (Valenzuela, 1999: 289)
Indeed, persons of Mexican ancestry in the United States outnumber those of French, Polish 
and Scottish ancestry, ranking after those of English, German, Irish and Italian origin. (Russell, 
1994: 326)
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careful balance between repetition and innovation that characterises genre films 
would thus tilt towards innovation as regards the roles of Hispanics. Moreover, 
research on content analysis has identified cinematic representations of minorities 
in Hollywood films as going through four stages: at first they are ignored, then 
ridiculed, then they appear in regulatory roles and finally on roles of equality. 
(Herrera and Ballesteros, 2001) It would thus seem that Chicanos are currently 
undergoing the third stage.
One such instance would be Stand and Deliver. (Menéndez, 1988) The 
film is based on the ‘real’ story of Jaime Escalante, played by Chicano actor and 
activist Edward James Olmos. Originally from Bolivia where he is now retired, 
professor Escalante taught mathematics in Garfield High School, an east-end Los 
Angeles school with little material resources, where he led a group of 
disadvantaged and under-performing Chicano students with a very limited 
competence in mathematics to achieve remarkable success in their advanced 
placement exams on calculus. The racist authorities refused to accept the results, 
accusing them of cheating. The students decide to take the test again, closely 
guarded by dedicated invigilators, and again pass with the highest marks. They — 
and the educational system— are vindicated. Interspersed with complimentary 
remarks on the students’ Maya ancestors ‘who invented the zero’ and ‘contributed 
enormously’ to advance our knowledge of mathematics, and with sub-plots 
depicting the many hardships the students must face at home to be able to pursue 
their studies, the film was hugely successful and for many years became a staple 
in high school classes and faculty workshops. In fact Mr. Escalante’s class was 
visited even by such celebrities as former President George Bush.
On the other hand, it is not only as consumers that Hispanics may be 
driving the change. Some Chicanos have themselves become cultural producers 
reaching beyond the marginal scope they used to be allowed and into the 
mainstream. Among them, film directors such as Robert Rodriguez {El Mariachi: 
1992, Desperado: 1995, Once Upon a Time in Mexico: 2003) and Gregory Nava 
{El Norte: 1984; My Family/Mi Familia: 1995, produced by Coppola; Selena: 
1997) have directed films which, although conforming to Hollywood’s traditional 
codes, display further polysemy than usual, i.e. tell more ambiguous stories, and
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thus offer more alternatives for viewers to engage with the films and negotiate 
meanings. In El Mariachi, for example, a kind of homage paid to Quentin 
Tarantino, Rodriguez goes beyond mere polysemy and actually reverses 
stereotypes. It is a fight between good and evil, there is the bad guy and the hero, 
there is technology versus tradition. But it is the ‘gringo’ who is the drug dealer 
and the hero who is Mexican, and what makes him a hero is not being strong nor 
handsome but being educated and having an artistic sensitivity. He does not even 
smoke nor drink, which makes him a kind of anti-macho hero. Technology, in the 
form of electronic keyboards, sound equipment and other gadgets is the source of 
evil, as it is the cause that this traditional Mariachi fails in his attempts to find a 
job, when all he wants to do is play the guitar and sing, ‘as his father and his 
grandfather had done before him.’ Although Columbia did agree to distribute the 
film after signing in Rodriguez for a major two film contract, El Mariachi was 
deemed “stunning but unmarketable” because it differed too much from viewers 
expectations and would likely result in a box-office dud. (Ramirez-Berg, 1996: 
119) It was thus remade so that it became ‘less ethnic’ and was sold through the 
video and DVD market together with its remake. Desperado.
But it is perhaps the work of Luis Valdez that best exemplifies the 
discursive transition I argue Chicanos have been undergoing: from the story of 
estrangement and isolation told in films such as Zootsuit (1982) —and others with 
titles like Please don't Bury me Alive (Gutierrez, 1976) and Roots o f Blood, 
(Trevino: 1977)— it goes full circle to tell a mainstream triumph story in La 
Bamba, (1987) itself about a Chicano singer, Ricardo Valenzuela, who pursued 
and attained the American dream, becoming rich and famous. The film was a 
commercial success. (Noriega, 1992: 147) Back in 1987, when Valdez was 
criticised in Mexico for La Bamba, he retorted: “I am Indian and a peasant, but I 
am North American too because I belong in the twentieth century.” (Garcia-Riera, 
1990: 139) Needless to say, a film such as La Bamba would hardly draw any 
criticism in Mexico today. Apart from Chicano directors, the work of academics 
and film critics such as Professors Charles Ramirez Berg, Chon Noriega, David 
Maciel, and Chicana feminist Rosalinda Fregoso has also added to the importance
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of ‘Chicano Cinema,’ now a field of research in its own right. (Ramfrez-Berg, 
1996; Noriega, 1996; Maciel, 2001; Fregoso, 1996)
Other favourable representations of Mexicans have come from Mexican 
directors and actors who joined Hollywood during the 1990s. Like Water for 
Chocolate (Arau: 1992) presented a romanticised vision of a rural Mexico from 
the times of the revolution, readily packaged for the consumption of ‘tradition,’ 
including recipes of local dishes. As a film made with the international market in 
mind, it was careful not to alienate its Mexican audience. (Tenenbaum, 1997: 162) 
Although this was an instance of constructing ‘the Other’ through ideaUsation in 
the fashion of those films mentioned in chapter two, what is different this time is 
that this is being done by Mexicans and that the aim is to provide a certain — 
sizeable— segment of the American public, namely the more conservative, a 
representation of Mexicans they can identify with: according to critics, American 
audiences, especially women, liked the film because it evoked in them
“a baffled nostalgia for a time when mothers really mattered and 
women’s work was defined differently than it is today, when dinner all 
too often for all too many comes from a box and satisfies only the 
most elemental hunger. There is something alluring for them about a 
solid family tradition, according to which children hve at home until 
marriage and do not move so far away they carmot come back for 
Sunday dinner every week.” (Tenenbaum, 1997: 171)^ "^ ^
Other Mexican directors also successful in Hollywood have been Alfonso 
Cuaron (Great Expectations: 1998; Harry Potter: 2004), Luis Mandoki (Message 
in a Bottle: 1999) and horror movie specialist Guillermo Del Toro (Cronos: 1992; 
The DeviVs Backbone: 2001). However only Cuarôn has dealt with 
representations of Mexico and Mexicans in films such as Solo con tu Pareja 
(1991), the comedy that initiated the yuppie cycle discussed below, and Y tu
Some Hollywood films have featured Mexican maids which stand for strong family values, 
and the children they care for become strongly attached to them. Such was the case in 
Irreconcilable Differences (Shyer: 1984), Another Man’s Child (Erman: 1983), Goonies 
(Donner: 1985) and The Believers (Schlesinger: 1987). (Garcfa-Riera, 1990: 108)
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Mama También (2001), a sort of road movie and travelogue that received some 
very positive critiques.
Apart from the more noticeable presence of Chicanos and Mexicans in 
Hollywood, even some American directors display the same shift in their 
representations of Mexicans, a shift consistent with the attempt to re-graft 
signifiers in new discursive chains that I maintain has been taking place. In 1987 
Robert Redford directed The Milagro Beanfield War, a story about the struggle of 
the (Chicano) poor against an almighty corporation, where the poor win. Julie 
Taymore recently directed Frida (Taymore: 2002) on the life of Mexican and 
nationalist painter Frida Khalo, featuring Mexican actress Salma Hayek.^^  ^ As 
was the case in Like Water for Chocolate, Frida too contributed to the ‘othering’ 
of the Mexican identity through the strategy of idealisation, selling similarly 
packaged ‘ethnicity’ and ‘tradition.’ However, the fact that Mexico is posed as a 
site of ‘culture’ and ‘high art’ breaks with the pattern of Mexico as ‘nature’ in 
opposition to (American) ‘civilisation,’ and has roles for Mexicans other than 
greasers, bandits and drug dealers. Other films display a similar polysemy to that 
of Chicano and Mexican directors, and confirm the hypothesis put forward in this 
thesis: what makes Mexicans and Mexican-American ‘better characters’ in 
Hollywood recently is the fact that they are conceived of as supplementary to the 
US instead of antagonistic, as will become evident from Traffic (Sodenbergh,
2000) and Bread and Roses (Loach: 2000) discussed below.
Traffic
Because it is a film about drug-trafficking, this film’s very release is a 
contribution to ‘writing’ this issue as a problem that needs to be addressed, and as 
one where Mexico has an utmost importance. What is more, in its bid for reahsm, 
the film blurs the distinction between ‘documentary’ and ‘entertainment’ :
Earlier attempts to take Frida to the screen had failed as the choice of actress became 
politicised: “When Luis Valdez selected Laura San Giacomo to play the lead in Frida and 
Diego, Latino actors and actresses in Los Angeles protested vehemently...accusing the Chicano 
director of seUing out and of replicating Hollywood practices of marginalisation.” Although 
Valdez defended his choice when he rephed “Who is to say what determines a Latino identity if 
we start counting drops of blood?” referring to Frida’s German father, eventually he abandoned 
the project. (Stock, 1999: 269)
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California Democrat Senator Barbara Boxer, directly involved in the debate at the 
time, makes a cameo in the film and both the director Steven Sodenbergh and 
screenwriter Stephen Gaghan gave interviews admitting they had had experiences 
with drugs, the latter stating he had used his previous experience as an addict to 
add layers to one of the characters —Caroline, the judge’s daughter. (Mitchell, 
2001; Schaefer, 2001) This contributed to the writing of drug trafficking as a 
problematic link between the US and Mexico from two perspectives 
simultaneously: the discourse of popular culture, reflecting but also actively 
crafting widely spread behefs and values, and the supposedly more authoritative 
discourse of institutionally-sanctioned knowledge, i.e. that of experts and of those 
with first-hand, unmediated experience.
Adapted by Bill Patterson from a 1989 six-hour BBC mini-series whose 
plot took place in Asia, Europe and the UK, Traffic transposes the action to the 
United States and Mexico. It tells different versions of the story of the ‘war on 
drugs’ from three different perspectives: that of the newly appointed anti-drug 
tsar, a former judge with an impeccable record whose daughter is herself a drug- 
addict, that of the naïve wife of a dealer who is being tried for trafficking, and that 
of an honest Mexican pohceman, doing his best to fight the cartels almost by 
himself, despite facing many shortcomings. Although these stories only 
tangentially intersect, it becomes clear that they are really the same story, one 
whose referents in ‘real-life’ are found in the cases of mafia drug baron Amado 
Carrillo, said to have died during a plastic surgery operation, the Tijuana and the 
Juarez cartels, and the controversial arrest in February 1997 of the Mexican anti­
drugs tsar. General Juan Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, under drug dealing and 
corruption charges.
Traffic is a heist crime, thus all the elements comprising the genre that 
needed to be iterated were duly included: the film can be read as a typical 
Hollywood mainstream film, posing at the outset a conflict which needs to be 
resolved through violence, telling the story of a fight between good and evil, 
where the actions of mostly male heroes is required, specially that of the white, 
upper class American, to bring about the happy ending. Hollywood being an 
industry where the star system is used in the process of marketing particular stars
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appealing to specific target audiences, Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta Jones 
in the leading roles connoted the escapist experience of the traditional thriller they 
often feature in/"^  ^ (Dyer, 1983) And this is in many ways what the film is all 
about.
Indeed, the film reinforces conventional wisdom and stereotypes, and in 
general conforms to the version of Mexico as drawing its meaning from its 
opposition to the United States in many ways. From the very beginning, when 
introducing the settings, the film establishes an opposition between nature and 
civilisation, i.e. between Mexico and the US: through a sepia filter similar to the 
colour of early photographs, thus connoting backwardness and decay, Mexico is 
introduced as a wild, dry, dusty, deserted landscape, where the law is about to be 
broken, not only by criminals themselves but also by those in charge of fighting 
crime, namely the Mexican army —when ‘confiscating’ the drugs, they even steal 
the policemen’s handcuffs! This is in sharp contrast with the way the United 
States is introduced: filtered through a blue light, connoting modernity and cool 
detachment, we are taken to a Court of Justice, where a criminal is being tried 
and, despite being rich and influential and thus benefiting from the defence of a 
top class lawyer, he is being rebuffed; no place for corruption here, justice is 
being done. In addition, while the United States is Ohio, California and 
Washington D C., Mexico is only the border city of Tijuana, and briefly and 
remotely —only in one scene— Mexico City. And while we are introduced to 
places in the US via shots that show facades frontally from the ground level 
perspective, thus including the spectator in the scene from the beginning, Mexico 
City is introduced via a trip, from above, from a helicopter, objectifying it while 
putting the viewer in a position of power in relation to it. Monstrously huge as it 
is, once it has been sepia-filtered and quickly panned through by the camera it is 
possible for the judge in the helicopter —and for us as the audience, since it is 
him we are meant to identify with— to tame its threat and to gain control over it.
In the case of Michael Douglas, there is also a history of involvement in conveying social 
messages through films. In 1987 he starred in Oliver Stone’s criticism of the greedy aspects of 
capitalism in the film Wall Street, albeit in the villain role, and he is a campaigner for the 
abolition of nuclear weapons, a registered charity in the US which he sponsors. He was also 
named “UN messenger for peace” by Koffi Annan in July 1998. See 
http://www.michaeldouglas.com
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When dealing with characters, the film fares no better. While most 
Mexican characters are rather caricatured, conveyed mostly through dressing and 
props, the American characters are presented with more depth. The Mexican 
general, a bald, brute, insensitive, tough man, capable of torture and murder, with 
scars and tics, whose idea of treatment is that the addicts ‘treat themselves’ — 
“eventually” he tells the judge “the addicts just overdose and then there is one less 
to care about”— is a synecdoche for the whole of the Mexican government: an 
authoritarian mockery of institutional order, the illegitimate authority of weapons 
easily turned against the people, existing only to aid and abet crime perpetrators, 
driven exclusively by greed and self-interest. Although it is acknowledged that 
there is one honest Mexican policeman, Javier Rodriguez, he is clearly meant as 
the exception rather than the rule.^"  ^Any American bad guys are either Latino or 
black —although some good guys are black as well—, and even when a Latino is 
cast as a good Mexican-American policeman, he is nonetheless a male chauvinist, 
who keeps on telling silly sexist jokes, and more than a bit stupid: there is a scene 
where he simply panics after a shooting and begins to shoot his gun quite 
recklessly, killing or wounding someone by mistake. He is sceptical about the 
drug dealer’s wife innocence, and on this he is more or less vindicated when the 
(Latino) wife, although forced by the circumstances, does enter the trafficking 
business herself. He is portrayed as dishonest, if in a harmless way, when he bets 
the wife is guilty and fails to return his partner’s change to a ten-dollar note. 
Finally, he also fails to realise the danger that lurks in the parking lot and gets 
killed while trying to get in the car where a bomb has been hidden. His black 
counterpart is far more clever, more efficient and committed, and even has a 
better sense of humour. The film is also negative to homosexuals, in that Frankie 
Flowers, a ruthless serial killer working for the drug lords, is a Latino gay and 
when he gets caught early in the film it is because he had attended a gay bar.
On the American side however, the judge is an honest, incorruptible, 
intelligent and sensitive man. He is also very virile: in the opening scene from
The theme of the honest Mexican pohceman dates back at least from Orson Wells’ Touch of 
Evil (1958), also made at a time when Hollywood was constructing Mexico as a reliable partner. 
So much so that the Mexican character was acted by an American: Charlton Heston. On this 
film ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are equally found in the US and Mexico.
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Washington, a strong drink makes his black assistant cough, but the judge does 
not so much as blink. His daughter Caroline is not merely young, innocent and 
beautiful but also an achiever, popular, good in sports, who always comes top of 
her class. It is clear that here the judge is a synecdoche for the American 
government, strong, wise, institutional, loving and caring to its people and fully 
committed to their well-being, while his daughter is one of the American people 
in danger and in need of being rescued. The metaphor of the family, so dear to 
nationalism, and traditional gender roles are being here deployed to symbolise the 
relationship between the two, the government in the powerful, parenting position, 
the daughter as weak and dependent but respectful and right in leaving it all in the 
hands of her father. Of course why the daughter in such a happy family that has it 
all turns to drugs in the first place is in this case conveniently overlooked. The 
film also betrays its realist pretensions in its overly optimistic assessment of the 
daughter’s speedy and unproblematic recovery, and she never appears to have 
really sunk that low in the first place.
How then could such an account be read as positing Mexico under any 
mildly favourable light, let alone in the position of a supplement? I contend that 
the key issue here, the one which crucially allows for a change in signifiers of 
Mexicanity to open up and signify something else, is that the very negative 
approach taken to the formerly hegemonic nationalist discourse of the PRI, 
represented here institutionally in the army, is diametrically opposed to a very 
positive approach taken towards the newly emerging post-PRI discourse, 
represented in the film by individual members of the civil society, that is, by the 
Mexican people as opposed to its institutions. While the authoritarianism and 
moral rot of the army is a metonymy for the whole post-revolutionary Mexican 
political system, portrayals of the people are far more generous —Javier’s friend 
Manolo, who was originally going to help the DBA agents, albeit for money 
instead of for real concern regarding the drug problem, is nonetheless presented as 
a policeman who is not corrupt, as a loyal friend and a good husband. In the hour 
of his death, he regrets any wrongdoing, apparently sincerely, his thoughts are 
about dying with dignity and for his wife Ana. She too, is a trustworthy and 
decent young woman, caring and hardworking —in the film we see her
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ironing^ "^ ^— and who struggles hard to get by —in another scene, we see Javier 
carrying heavy water tanks to bring them to her small, poor flat.
Even Javier, a key character whose performance won actor Benicio de 
Toro an academy award for his role as best supporting actor, is more relevant as 
an honest man, since the police to which he belongs is almost as hopeless as the 
army itself and he ends up working for the DE A anyway. But Javier is there to do 
more than that: he is there to represent the new North American Mexico, one 
which shares common interests with the United States. In the opening scene, 
Javier is telling his friend Manolo about a nightmare he had the night before. His 
mother, he says, was drowning in front of his bed, and there was nothing he could 
do to help her. Given that both the United States and Mexico can be construed as 
drowning motherlands, in the film one in drugs and the other in corruption, and 
that what is relevant about Javier is his desire to fight the traffic, there is an 
ambiguity as to which of the two is Javier’s mother: perhaps both. In a scene later 
on, Javier refuses bribes and makes it clear to the DE A agents that his only 
concern is “that children in Tijuana can be safe to continue playing baseball,” that 
all-American sport. Finally, although he says he feels “like a traitor,” he shares 
the insider information he has gained with the Americans both because it is the 
right and moral thing to do, i.e. the American youth is no different from the 
Mexican youth, and out of loyalty to his friend Manolo. More importantly, 
Javier’s co-operation proves crucial, both for the success of the DEA operation 
and for the fall of corrupt members of the Mexican government.
But Javier’s character is not the only way this position is laid for Mexico. 
During the cocktail party when Senator Boxer makes her appearance, the Mexican 
version that the best way to deal with ‘the drug issue’ is to focus on consumption 
rather than production is explicitly endorsed by various characters, while the 
views that ‘a war on drugs’ is the wrong metaphor and the need to construct the 
issue as a health problem and not as a crime problem are also voiced. Besides, at 
one point the judge himself draws a parallelism between Washington and the 
Third World —Calcutta, meaning Mexico by displacement—, saying he finds
145 And in other household chores, as traditional gender roles are not challenged by the film.
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them pretty similar at core, although with the difference that there is considerably 
more wealth in the US.
Geographically too, the physical border, when shown, is not the massive 
wall often described as the Berlin Wall of the Americas but a mere plate in the 
ground: it is small and round, and it has a parting down the middle: “United 
States” and “Mexico” can be read on the top and bottom respectively. The 
characters talk about the border actually disappearing after NAFTA. And in fact, 
what we are shown on screen is that crossing the border by car implies, at worst, 
no more than putting up with a bit of a traffic jam. Moreover the very fact that 
there are so many Mexican-American characters is itself indicative of the degree 
to which Mexico is part of the United States. There is the issue of language as 
well. Although more than a third of the film is in Spanish, it is not always 
translated. This one, too, is a language spoken in its own right in this part of the 
world.
Ultimately and despite its rather low budget, it is all these challenges to 
conventional meanings, this refusal to comply with the straightforward, 
Manichean repetition of received but increasingly outdated narratives what made 
Traffic different and innovative, what won it acclaim in the form of academy 
awards for Sodenbergh and del Toro, and what made it a box office hit.^ "^  ^While 
before Traffic Sodenbergh was merely characterised as an independent director 
whose work was of “widely varying quality,” after Traffic his reputation was 
much improved. Recently he has been compared to Martin Scorcese, Robert 
Altman and Francis Ford Coppola for “crafting movies that deepened and 
advanced filmmaking” and he recently did a remake of Tarkovsky’s Solaris. 
(Gilbey, 2003)
However, Traffic has so far been almost an isolated case, and although 
important, the contribution from Hollywood to the shaping of the discourse where 
Mexico is conceived as a supplement to the US is marginal when compared to the 
work of Chicanos and Mexican directors, critics and actors. It is evidence of a 
struggle to impose a discourse, rather than of any already hegemonic meanings.
146 Traffic was made with 49 million dollars.
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Bread and Roses
To those familiar with the work of Ken Loach, whether admirers or detractors, it 
might seem odd to include his Bread and Roses (2001) in a section dealing with 
Hollywood films. In fact, his work is often described as anti-Hollywood. 
Moreover, production for this film was wholly European, and it was far more 
successful here than in the United States. But since Bread and Roses is, as I will 
show here, a contribution to the writing of Mexico as a supplement to the US, 
equivalent to Traffic in many respects but with regards to migration, it is 
nonetheless appropriate to deal with it in the section devoted to Hollywood. 
Moreover, while not exactly ‘Hollywood’ in its choice of topic and the case it 
seeks to make, there are other ways, I shall argue, in which this film shares some 
aspects of the Hollywood product.
Based on the success of the 1990 “Justice for Janitors” strike at Century 
City, L.A., Bread and Roses is about the plight of Mexican —and Central 
American— illegal hnmigrants, told from the perspective of Maya, a girl who 
crosses the border with the help of her sister Rosa, who is herself married to an 
American Eind has lived in the US for some years. Maya joins her in her job as a 
cleaner in an office building belonging to Los Angeles entertainment-indu stry 
power brokers, where at USD$5 an hour and no benefits, and forced to relinquish 
their first month pay as a ‘commission’ to the manager who hires them, they are 
thoroughly exploited. Soon she meets Sam, a union organiser who helps the 
janitors strike, and although they face some difficulties, by the end they succeed 
in obtaining a rise and benefits. The end is not completely a happy one though as
147 This film shares a number of features with Traffic: it too is a docu-drama, albeit in the British 
social realism style that has been the hallmark of Loach. To this end, there are cameos, here by 
Benicio del Toro, Tim Roth and Ron Perlman who appear in a party scene meant to reflect the 
Hollywood environment. And equivalent to Douglas’ credentials to star on Traffic, leading actor 
Adrian Brody had previously participated on films about the pHght of —Jewish— minorities 
suffering discrimination: he starred as Van Kurtzman in Liberty Heights (Levinson: 1999) and 
went on to win the Oscar for the best actor in a leading role for The Pianist (Polanski: 2002). 
Elpidia Carrillo too has starred in a number of films on the fate of Latin Americans, such as The 
Border (Richardson: 1982), Salvador (Stone: 1986) and My Family/Mi Familia (Nava: 1995). 
Finally, there is some influence of Loach in Sodenbergh, who used scenes from Poor Cow 
(Loach: 1967) as footage for his thriller The Limey (1999).
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Maya, who had previously robbed a shop so that a fellow worker could attend 
Law School, is caught and deported.
The film got a mixed reception. On the one hand, critics and audiences ‘on 
the right’ quickly dismissed it as a predictable drama of class struggle, didactic in 
nature and using a standard formula: lovable working-class characters confront 
the faceless agents of corporate oppression, and win. It was “insultingly simplistic 
and overstated,” with “one-dimensional characters” and it presented conflicts 
stripped of all nuance. (Kehr, 2001; O’Hehir, 2001) Some critics also regarded it 
as an instance of “European anti-Americanism.” (Lurio, 2001) But beyond the 
arguments made on its artistic merits —or rather, the lack of them— all these 
critics held the view that the main premise on which the film built its case was 
simply wrong. There are no grounds, they argue, on which somebody who has 
broken the law should demand a minimum wage or benefits, nor join a union. In 
short, this audience subscribes to the narrative that regards Mexican migration as 
a crime-related phenomenon suffered by the United States, or “the unilateral 
benefit myth” as discussed in chapter three above.
On the other hand, most critics and audiences ‘on the left,’ including 
critics of the New York Times, praised the film in equally vehement terms, 
describing it as “an impassioned work of integrity,” making “a timely, powerfully 
persuasive case” and “a human drama of observation, insight, and great import.” 
(Wood, 2001; Scott, 2001) The work immigrants do in the United States is 
necessary, they argue. The economy depends on workers who will accept 
substandard wages. What is more, such low wages mean that both parents will 
have to work and their children will be led to trouble. It is thus low pay that is at 
the root of the over-crowded American prisons, in which ethnic minorities are 
grossly over-represented. The film does a good job raising all these issues. (Ebert, 
2(X)1) This audience increasingly subscribes to the mutual benefit, supplementary 
account.
Both audiences agree this is a film on the under privileged, exposing the 
injustice Latino immigrants endure at the hands of the Americans, but while the 
latter audience celebrates the fact that such a film is made, the former audience 
deplores it, contesting the view that the exploitation suffered is at all undeserved.
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The point is particularly accurately made in a climatic scene towards the end of 
the film, when Rosa, who has sold out her fellow co-workers in order to get a 
promotion that will enable her to pay for medical treatment for her diabetic 
husband, confesses to Maya that she was only able to support her family for all 
those years through prostitution, and that this was the source of her remittances. 
While the latter audience found this scene deeply moving and immediately 
sympathised with Rosa, the former described the scene as providing an alibi for a 
Latino character who has committed a despicable act to remain ‘morally worthy.’ 
The director himself manifested he had wanted to show
“just the way people [in Latin America] are forced into sending kids 
away; the kids have to send money back, who knows what they’re 
doing on the other end. We obviously went down to Tijuana when we 
were researching [the movie]. The sadness of those lines in the red 
light district is just really desperate...The pain of that is part of what it 
means to be in America’s backyard.” [Thus the movie tagline:] “The 
balance of power is about to change.” (Loach in interview with 
Adams, 2001)
So just how can a film which almost subscribes to the narrative on 
migration that used to be held in Mexico when the identity drew its meaning from 
its relationship of antagonism with the US, namely the myth of the unilateral 
benefit for the Americans, be construed as forging a supplementary position for 
Mexico? Beyond the plot and the manifest intentions of the director, it is the way 
the story is told and the paradigmatic choices that were made to tell this particular 
version of the story that we will focus on to answer this question.
First of all, this film is truly bilingual. All characters, Mexican and 
American, slip into and out of English and Spanish in a seemingly perfectly 
natural way, regardless of whether they are speaking to fellow Mexicans or 
Americans. Subtitles translate whichever one of the two languages is being 
spoken. This use of subtitles naturalises both languages for the same
148 Although DVD versions subtitle either Spanish or English, depending on the region.
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communities on a par level, sharing the role as main means of communication on 
an equal basis. Those who liked the film praised this original feature as ‘realistic,’ 
while those who did not resented it, ostensibly on the grounds that it “made it 
difficult” for the viewer to follow the dialogue. (Lurio: 2001) What actually 
happens, I would argue, is that those who enjoyed it were happy to be 
interpellated as belonging to this particular community, while those who rejected 
it do not find here an appealing position to take up in the construction of their 
identity, both in the US and in Mexico where the film was not short of critics. 
Moreover, a large number of American citizens of Mexican origin appear in 
various roles, notably as policemen and managers as well as guards and janitors. 
Del Toro also appears in his role of successful Latino actor. Apart from the ways 
the various audiences engaged with this feature of the film, its role as text is 
certainly putting forward a United States in which if Mexicans were foreigners at 
the outset, they are now as ‘natural’ as Americans themselves. Also romance 
develops between Sam and Maya, despite the fact that she had an alternative 
honest and hard working Mexican suitor.
The second important feature is that in setting out the meaning-making 
oppositions on which the film is based in terms of class and gender, the film 
overlooks —indeed, almost effaces, despite the manifest intentions of the director, 
his prior work and the way critics from both sides of the spectrum chose to engage 
with his film— the opposition between the United States and Mexico, turning it 
on its head and presenting a wholly supplementary position instead. Let us deal 
with the class-based opposition first. This is evident in a number of ways, 
beginning with the choice of actors for the leading roles. Although there are two 
Latino women, —Pilar Padilla and Elpidia Carrillo playing Maya and Rosa 
respectively— for the film is ostensibly about empowering the disenfranchised as 
is evident from its very title, they nonetheless share credits with a white American 
male —Adrien Brody playing Sam— whose intervention is necessary to solve the 
problem posed by the plot, albeit on more or less equal grounds with the women.
Most of the Mexican audience was thus alienated, reading Maya as La Malinche, who 
thereby loses all heroism and the sympathy for her character the director was seeking from 
viewers. For such a representation to succeed in the Mexican market, it would have to be a 
Mexican male falling in love with an American woman.
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Rosa’s husband, a white, poor American, is also good and definitely part of a ‘we’ 
which includes his wife, sister in law and Sam, who are in fact fighting so that he 
can gain access to medical treatment. There are also a few other white American 
janitors fighting for justice along the Mexican immigrants.
Apart from there being poor white Americans on the side of Mexicans, 
there are also Mexicans among the powerful, against whom ‘we’ —that is, the 
‘we’ in which the film seeks to involve its viewers— must fight. It is Mexican 
‘coyotes’ who demand outrageous fees in order to help immigrants cross the 
border and later abuse them, in fact one of them almost succeeds in raping Maya. 
While in other films it is the border patrol —“la migra”— that brutally assaults 
and even kills would-be immigrants, in Loach’s film injustice and misfortune for 
Mexicans in the US come from (certain) Mexicans themselves. The first job Maya 
gets before becoming a janitor is as a waitress in a bar where most customers are 
Latino immigrants, and there she is abused by men from Central America. The 
company manager who eventually hires her, demanding the first month of her pay 
in return, is Mexican, or rather, a Chicano. What is more, it is he alone who is to 
blame for there being illegal immigrants, since it is he who hires them. His boss, 
as they say, ‘knows but doesn’t know.’ And the —American— boss of his boss 
“doesn’t know and doesn’t care,” so Americans, although involved, are not 
actually directly responsible. Far from being about what it means to be “in 
America’s backyard,” Loach’s film is faithful to a truly Marxist perspective where 
it is the poor against the rich and nations do not matter.
As for the opposition in terms of gender, women tend to be good and when 
they are not, as in the case of Rosa as noted above, they have very good reasons 
not to, while men tend to be the source of trouble. The smugglers (coyotes), 
customers, manager and building owner are all male characters, the first three 
Mexican. Then while Rosa is confessing to having resorted to prostitution, the 
reason she identifies at the root of her and her family’s problems is her father 
having abandoned her mother, thus she as the eldest sister had to take on the 
responsibility for raising her family. The cause for the poverty that in some 
narratives is what actually impels some to migrate is thus not institutional, it does 
not have to do with the Mexican government being corrupt or pursuing the wrong
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economic policies or being a victim of American imperialism draining Mexico of 
its resources, all reasons frequently mentioned in various competing accounts, but 
rather the irresponsible behaviour of some men who, for personal reasons, 
abandon their families depriving them of a bread-winner. Consistently, female 
characters choose community over individuality and sacrifice themselves if need 
be. Rosa did it for her family and later for her husband. Maya robbed the shop so 
that her friend Ruben could attend law school. Earlier she had lectured him about 
solidarity when he had stated his intentions not to participate in the strike because 
he would not risk his studies. Other women cleaners who appear as secondary 
characters support their families in their home countries as well as in the US, and 
show solidarity in every way: Bertha, a character who gets fired for refusing to 
tell who had organised the strike; another lady who also gets fired for arriving late 
and forgetting her glasses receives plenty of support; and a black woman who 
teaches Maya how to vacuum clean following a rhythmic pattern, as if she were 
dancing and the appliance were ‘her man.’ And in the scene where Maya robs the 
shop, she locks the shop assistant up in the toilet, telling a customer who has just 
entered that she locked him there because he is a pervert.
A third way in which this film avoids the opposition that would have 
constructed a Mexican ‘we’ versus an American ‘they’ is by avoiding contrasts. 
Although as in Traffic, Mexico is introduced as ‘nature,’ this time in a scene that 
takes place in the jungle, through sharp camera movements that suggest viewers 
are running among the immigrants, followed by American ‘civilisation’ in a scene 
that takes place in a city with wide freeways, no further contrasts are made. For 
instance, Rosa’s home, which is not particularly poor, looks quite similar to the 
American union-organiser’s flat. Family photos and plants adorn her home, as 
would be the case in any American home. Conspicuously, religious icons, always 
a staple in any mise-en-scène depicting Mexicanity, are missing here. We do see 
some Mexican snacks at her table, but again it is of the type available in Western 
supermarkets and consumed around the world. Finally, parallel to a party attended
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by Hollywood stars the janitors too attend a party of their own. In sum, all 
opportunities for the crafting of antagonism are renounced.
Finally, and crucially, the end vindicates the system: justice means earning 
USD$8 instead of USD$5 and it is achievable through orderly demonstrations in 
which both police and demonstrators are thoroughly polite and civilised, the 
former in fact are even kind, no repression whatsoever is suffered. Maya is 
deported, but the community as a whole has gained a great deal and she might try 
again as most inunigrants do. What is more, those janitors who have the wül 
power find time to study and eventually, as in Stand and Deliver, even make it to 
Law School. According to Loach “it seemed like it would be nice to make a film 
about the immigrants, particularly the Mexicans...in Los Angeles, because it’s the 
city where they make the American Dream, but [they]... are just invisible here.” 
(Ibid) The film does make Mexicans visible, and moreover it tells them that the 
American Dream that they ‘make happen’ for Americans can also happen to them 
in the United States. Those in the US who disliked the film did not do so because 
of its purported anti-Americanism, but rather because the meaning for the 
American national identity it puts forward is one they wish to contest. This film 
encourages Mexicans to dream the American dream, which with decent pay can 
work for everyone concerned. Pure partnership here, concluding with a 
resounding rallying cry, that might as well have been Chicano: Yes, it can be 
done!
The View from Mexico: Chalienges to the identity
Perhaps the best evidence of the close relationship between national cinema and 
national identity can be found in the fact that historically the rise of the industry 
has been linked to periods of dislocation or challenge to the hegemonic discourse.
Other films made around the same time that also follow the strategy of equating Mexico and 
the US through the avoidance of contrasts were The Garden of Eden (Novaro: 1994), where 
poor peasants who leave Mexico do not end up in a ghttering high-tech American metropolis, 
but rather working as peasants in the southwest American countryside, which is identical to the 
Mexican north where we formerly saw them. And in Santitos (Springall: 1998) the US is 
presented as a continuation of Mexico: a woman named Hope beheves her daughter has been 
kidnapped and taken to the US where she is being forced into prostitution. Her journey to find 
her begins in Veracruz and continues through Tijuana and Los Angeles, which appears to be a 
Mexican city in every respect.
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and therefore periods when the ‘people’ are interpellated as ‘Mexican’ in specific 
ways by the elites, while national production has declined at times when a 
discourse has succeeded in becoming hegem onic .Thus  the early years of 
cinema, which coincided with the revolution, the years of Cardenismo and the 
presidency of Miguel Aleman were among the most prolific as regards to films 
that dealt with telling stories of who ‘we’ are, depicting a bounded community 
with clear-cut parameters for inclusion and exclusion, and putting forward their 
different sites for identification, as shown in the section on cinema in chapter two. 
Another particularly prolific period came with the presidency of Echeverrfa, who 
for political and personal reasons had a special interest in cinema. (Maciel, 1999: 
201) The state became the major film producer, a unique case in a non-socialist 
country, and quotas requiring theatres to devote half the screen time to Mexican 
productions as well as low fixed-price tickets were imposed. (Garcia Riera, 1990: 
16; Maciel, 1999: 202) However during the L6pez Portillo and de la Madrid 
administrations these trends were reversed, with the private sector accounting for 
95 per cent the total production, and production itself began to decline. (Maciel, 
2001: 305) This was despite the fact that IMCINE, the Mexican Fihn Institute, 
was founded during the de la Madrid administration in 1983. During the Salinas 
administration IMCINE, headed by Ignacio Duran, was instrumental in the 
production of the comedies discussed below.
As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War opened new markets for 
Hollywood and the American film industry became truly global in every respect. 
(Chapman, 2003: 158) As Hollywood doubled its market share, national film 
industries around the world declined severely during the 1990s.^^  ^ The Mexican
By national cinema I mean here those films that dealt with themes of nation, rather than all 
the film production in the country. ‘Themes of nation are topical, rather than perennial, and 
involve a process of marking and flagging [the ‘national’] that distinguishes them.” (Hjort, 
2000: 103) This is hardly surprising since “topical works are frequently politically motivated 
and serve as interventions in ongoing discussions within a given social context.” (Ibid, 106) 
Ignacio Durân later became cultural attaché at the embassy in Washington, where he directed 
a sustained effort to “win the hearts and minds” of people in the United States through the 
promotion of Mexican culture since “people who appreciate the culture of a foreign country can 
feel identified with that nation.” Cinema was central to these efforts: a festival of Mexican 
cinema, screening 120 films ranging from 1932 to the present was organised in 2001. (Duran 
quoted in Notimex website at http://www.terra.com.mx/ArteyCultura/articulo/099150/).
With the caveats for Asia mentioned in chapter one.
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industry under NAFTA was no exception. In 1993 the Salinas administration 
introduced major changes with the privatisation of a media package for USD$ 645 
million, including the state near-monopoly of theatres, Compama Operadora de 
Teatros and the second largest studio. It also introduced a price liberalisation that 
brought with it a reconfiguration of the audience. These developments meant that 
many theatres catering for the working classes were forced to close down, while 
the multiplex system opened state-of-the-art facilities in the wealthier urban areas 
of the country in 1994. The decline of the industry from then on was dramatic, 
both in terms of production and market share. Between 1988 and 1997, 591 films 
were made in Mexico, 442 funded by the private sector, 86 funded by the 
government and 63 made with foreign capital. (Maciel, 2001: 313) The lowest 
point was reached under Zedillo in 1998, when an industry that had in its heyday 
produced well over a hundred films per year produced a mere ten. Market share 
for local films had dropped to 9.8 per cent by 2003. (Mateos, 2(XX); Rosenthal, 
2003: 326) Key topics of these films were a re-interpretation of the past, the 
economic crisis, the border, the provinces and the pressures on women and the 
family, often from a feminist perspective.A nd most importantly, a series of 
overtly political films and of highly successful erotic comedies, a genre which, 
through humour, strongly pre-disposes its audiences into a favourable mood for 
the reception of messages put forward. Indeed, inasmuch as laughter is self- 
effacing behaviour, when humour is used on films chances for audience 
identification with characters increase. Humour is also a challenge to the 
solemnity required by authority for the performance of meaning-investing rituals. 
“Laughing can be subversive of the order we take as sovereign.. .The unconscious 
erupts in laughter. Laughter is in some sense unmasterable.” (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 
1999:10)
Indeed, the 1990s was an especially fruitful decade for women directors. While only 14 films 
by women were made throughout the century and until 1990, in that decade alone 26 such films 
were made. (Vega, 1999) Among them, the work of Maria Novaro, Maria Elena Velazquez and 
Maria del Carmen De Lara dealt directly with national identity. This would seem to point to a 
re-appropriation of the nation by groups that were formerly disadvantaged, enabled by the 
challenge to the discourse. “The fact that nations are invented and fictional means that they can 
be re-defined and re-appropriated...in other words, a repossessing of the nation by excluded 
groups is possible.” (Hayward, 2000: 99)
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Despite the events of the 1990s the Mexican film industry is at present still 
among the ten largest in the country, and it is the second source of foreign 
currency. There are now 2,618 theatres, 452 of these in Mexico City. (Mantecon,
2001) And although current sales of 150 million tickets per year are still well 
below the 302 million sold by the end of the 1980s, perhaps partly due to 
availability of VCRs and DVDs, audiences continue to attend frequently, on 
average ten performances per year, recently increasingly demanding local 
alternatives. (Estrada, 2003; Bonfil, 2003: 212) Moreover, rather than fighting 
Hollywood, recent —albeit scant— production has benefited from a partnership 
with the ‘majors,’ especially Fox and Columbia. More important for our purposes 
here however is the way that films then aided in the creation of ‘classificatory 
frameworks’ that would put ‘Mexico’ within ‘the West,’ and how they eroded the 
moments of the until then hegemonic discourse of the PRI by disarticulating 
chains of equivalence and differentiation that comprised that discourse —for 
instance the equation of “Catholic ‘mestizos’ living within the territorial 
boundaries” with ‘Mexicans’ and the differentiation that constructed ‘Mexicans’ 
as the opposite of ‘Americans.’ This is the topic that we will discuss in this, the 
last section of the chapter.
Representations of Mexico as a Member of the Post-Cold War West'
As I have argued above, when the opposition between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’ 
collapsed, a period of uncertainty followed when various alternative narratives on 
world politics were contending to become hegemonic, i.e. to become the preferred 
interpretative framework with which to make sense of international reality in a 
persuasive and enduring way, just as the Cold War divide had been during the 
second half of the twentieth century. While these various narratives continue to 
contend, with varying degrees of success, ‘the West’ as the opposite of ‘the Rest,’ 
also construed as a division between the North and the South, provided a new 
meaning for ‘the West’ as developed, industrialised and secular. During the 1990s 
erotic comedies similar to those of other national cinemas about “young upscale 
urbanites working in a sector of the culture industry” whose protagonists were 
“attractive, successful and around thirty” became the preferred genre. (Rentschler,
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2000: 263) The narratives occupied “the liminal space between a bohemian 
everyday and a bourgeois existence...With their triangulated desires and 
mismatched partners, their schematic constellations and formulaic trajectories, 
these yuppie comedies of errors follow strictly codified pattems.”^^  ^ (Ibid) Far 
from indigenous ancestors, charros, fallen women, the poor or people in the 
liberal professions, the middle and especially the upper classes became the 
subjects of these films, all of which presented thoroughly positive, even somewhat 
heroic portrayals of businessmen, executives and entrepreneurs.Especially 
successful were Solo con tu Pareja (Cuaron: 1991), the film that began the trend, 
and both Cilantro y Perejil (Montero: 1996) and Sex, Shame and Tears (Serrano: 
1999), the highest grossing Mexican films in those years respectively. Here we 
will discuss their general features as well as the individual contributions they 
made to the construction of Mexico as Western in the sense described earlier.
First of all, and contrary to most films discussed in this thesis so far, which 
introduce ‘Mexico’ within the context of an opposition between nature and 
civilisation as ‘nature,’ either in the form of a desert or a jungle, to be contrasted 
with ‘America’ in the form of a variety of urban spaces, all of these films 
introduce ‘Mexico’ as a developed metropolis: the settings are various upmarket 
neighbourhoods of Mexico City, and tall, modem buildings, broad freeways and 
spacious, well furnished mansions or flats figure prominently. Development is 
further connoted through expensive cars, luxurious restaurants, state-of-the-art 
apphances and gadgets, especially computers, mobile phones and video and 
photographic equipment, which in some cases provide the anecdote around which 
the problem to be solved takes place. The main characters are highly educated.
An alternative explanation to the rise of this type of films in many national cinemas at 
around the same period is that: “The rise of all national cinemas...has been contingent on the 
rise of a self-conscious national bourgeoisie. With the rise of global capitalism, national 
bourgeoisies are incessantly mutated into a globalised civil society bereft of any organic, 
enduring institution of national consciousness.” (Dabashi, 2002) In the specific case of Mexico 
however this was also part of an ongoing effort to re-detine the national identity within the 
framework of a new discourse.
The exception being those films made to mark the 500 anniversary of the discovery of the 
Americas, funded mostly by the Spanish government, which did deal with the indigenous past 
from various perspectives.
Additionally, in S6I0 con tu Pareja, where the story is presented in a series of ‘chapters,’ 
each introduced with a related epigraph, quotes are drawn equally from poems by E.E. 
Cununings, Mexican popular songs and poems and slogans in Latin.
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well-travelled, smartly dressed and lead healthy life-styles including exercise and 
health-conscious diets. In short, what David Foster said of characters in Sex, 
Shame and Tears is also applicable to other comedies of the series: they are 
“privileged, end-of-the-millennium high-rise apartment dwellers... with
sophisticated tastes and wide experiential horizons...[who] hve comfortably and 
with a notable degree of ostentatious splendour...they adhere to a US comfortable 
middle class norm.” (Foster, 2002: 36)
More importantly, their sexual mores are distinctly different from what is 
the norm in a conservative. Catholic society where adults leave home only at the 
time of marriage. All characters in these films are single or divorced people in 
their own flats and engage in a number of safe-sex affairs. Challenging the 
extended family which is the unit of Mexican society, these films are starred by 
childless couples or where there are children they are seen as obstacles to 
individual fulfilment or are in other ways the source of trouble. Women enjoy 
sexual relationships with various partners and in the most conservative of these 
films. Cilantro y Perejil, although marriage is fully vindicated and the family 
values upheld in the end, there is a homosexual character who is shown to be 
honest, noble and highly educated, whose relationship with his partner is in 
everyway equivalent to the heterosexual relations of the other characters. 
Machismo is often put into question, and the main female character explicitly 
deplores the sense of partnership and team she built in her relationship with her 
ex-husband, which she decries as dependence, since it is really ‘only the 
individual’ that matters.
Mexico is also shown to be industrialised. In Solo con tu Pareja airplanes 
and the airport are directly relevant to the action, and the main character, Tomas, 
is in charge of a publicity campaign for a food packaging factory. In Cilantro 
secondary characters mention they are attending the heavy machinery fair in 
Atlanta in order to shop around. Secularism is also conveyed in various ways. 
Religious rituals are restricted to weddings and it is made clear that it is for social 
reasons rather than for reasons of faith that religious marriages take place. Two of 
the characters in Solo con tu Pareja even have intercourse the day the woman is 
getting married to someone else, in her wedding gown. Religious icons and
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paintings adorning houses are there as works of art rather than as objects for 
worship, or are shown to be at the same level as yoga, holistic medicine and 
esoteric beliefs held simultaneously by some of the most eccentric characters. 
And finally, it is science that is used as the ultimate guarantor of ‘truth,’ in the 
form of psychologists and doctors, whose accounts of interpersonal relations are 
given credence and held as authoritative.
Nevertheless, while this mixture of secularism, development and 
industrialisation tended to minimise national specificity, presenting Mexico as 
pretty much any ‘Western’ country, or as would have been put by Gellner, 
emphasised the similarities of the formula “for the medium of the fully developed 
industrial goldfish bowl,” they also deliberately stressed brand-differentiating 
characteristics. (Gellner, 1983: 52) From among the ‘flagging approaches’ of the 
national identified by Hjort, namely the monocultural, consisting of “a hyper­
saturation of the audiovisual field with national elements,” and the intercultural, 
based on “the contrastive mobilisation of different national cultures” it is the latter 
and more effective that is used on these films. (Hjort, 2000: 111, emphasis in 
original) Notably, however, the contrastive culture is not the American, but the 
Japanese in Solo and the French in Cilantro. In the former, Japanese doctors 
attending a congress for the medical profession provide the counterpoint to 
Mexican mariachis, serenades, cacti, puns, tequila and tours to landmarks such as 
the Latin American Tower. Moreover, Mexicanity is also conveyed in the 
nightmares suffered by the main character, all related to perceived threats to his 
masculinity arising from his emancipated female boss, his ethnic past and the 
relative power of the Japanese. In Cilantro, French characters are somewhat of a 
nuisance with their demands to experience authenticity in the form of typical 
dishes. Sexo merely stresses the global citizenship of the characters, some of 
which have just returned from South Africa while another one lived for long 
periods in London, Paris and Tokyo.
In brief, given the strategies employed, the representation of the country 
put forward by all these films is one that, while distinctively ‘Western,’ is also 
distinctively ‘Mexican.’
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Challenges to the Ethnic, Religious and Political Dimensions of the Nation
Parallel to the various representations of Mexico as Western that were put forward 
on film during the 1990s, efforts were also made to undermine the legitimacy of 
the PRI and the discourse on ‘Mexicanity’ it involved. This trend started with the 
privatisation of the industry explained above, which enabled alternative groups to 
forge and circulate their own versions of the identity, and continued with the 
selective removal of censorship, including the passage of the Film Institute from 
the Home Office into the Ministry of Culture. (Maciel, 1999: 223) During the 
Salinas administration, films openly critical of the Party were shown for 
prolonged periods for the first time, including Im  Sombra del Caudillo (Bracho: 
1960), on the series of betrayals and assassinations that had taken place shortly 
after the revolution among the leaders themselves, and on the way the presidential 
succession worked within the Party. The film had been banned for over thirty 
years. Rojo Amanecer (Fons: 1990), dealing with the role of the army in the 
student repression on 2 October 1968 was also shown, and became the highest 
grossing national film that year. Equally successful from then on were other films 
in the same vein. Here we will discuss the most relevant, both in terms of being 
the ones posing challenges to the discourse, and in terms of the reach and 
resonance they had among domestic and in some cases foreign audiences: Amores 
Perros (Gonzalez-Inarritu: 2000), The Crime o f Father Amaro (Carrera: 2002) 
and Herod’s Law (Estrada: 2000) all produced by Altavista Films.
Amores Perros (Love’s a Bitch)
Like Traffic, Amores Perros tells three apparently different but interconnected 
stories, which can also be understood as parts of a broader story about life in 
present-day Mexico City, and like in Traffic there is a ‘social problem’ common 
to the three, in this case urban violence. It also shares with Sodenbergh’s film the 
bid for realism, using “real people from the dog-fighting world and...some real 
fighting dogs” whenever possible as opposed to actors or extras. (Romney, 2000) 
Perhaps for reasons of budget, no attempt was made to use stars to help market
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the film so no additional meanings were connoted by the use of actors and 
actresses: these people could be ‘anybody.’ But unlike Traffic, Gonzâlez’s film 
does not stick to one genre but mixes drama, thriller and some suspense. Although 
it would be exaggerated to cast Amores Perros as a direct response to Traffic, 
Gonzalez is certainly aware of participating in a debate about what it means to be 
Mexican. “I am not a Mexican with a moustache and a sombrero and a bottle of 
tequila, nor am I a corrupt cop or a drug trafficker. There are milhons like me. 
And this is the world I hve in and the one I want to show.”^^ * (Gonzalez in 
interview with Patterson, 2001)
The first story is one of poverty and hopelessness. Octavio falls in love 
with Susana, his violent brother’s teenage wife, and because of the lack of 
opportunities for social mobility is forced to enter his dog into dog-fighting in 
order to get the money to leave the family home and take her and her son away 
with him. His hopes however are dealt a fatal blow when a gang leader attempts 
to kill his dog, and after stabbing him he is forced to escape his murderous 
accomplices in a frantic chase, which ends up in a horrendous accident. The car he 
crashes against is driven by top-model at the peak of her career Valeria Amaya, 
who has just moved into a brand-new flat with her wealthy married lover Daniel. 
The crash however leaves her legs horribly scarred, eventually she even has one 
amputated, and she suffers further when her dog falls into a hole in the floor and 
is trapped somewhere inside, while she is unable to help. At the time of the crash 
“El Chivo,” a former guerrilla-fighter, now a dog-loving tramp who makes his 
living out of trash-collecting and as occasional hit man for a cop, tries to help 
both Octavio and Valeria and rescues Octavio’s dog, whom he later nurses back 
into health. ‘El Chivo’ has his own story of family loss and is trying to reunite 
with the daughter he abandoned as a child to join the guerrilla, who believes he is 
dead.
It can be argued that the Mexico and Mexicans represented in the film in 
many ways reinforce the identities that were in place in the post-revolutionary
However unhke the comedies discussed above the film meets expectations of inherent 
violence and lawlessness that have been a feature of Hollywood’s Mexico: In Amores Perros it 
becomes evident that “the devastating portrait of visceral violence and fatalism becomes the 
privileged image of Mexico that most successfully travels abroad.” (Elena, 2003: 229)
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project. Despite the desire to appeal to a broad market, Mexican dialect is used 
throughout as opposed to more standard Spanish. Gender identities are certainly 
reinforced, with all the female characters introduced either in the kitchen, cooking 
typical food or performing household chores, with the exception of the model, 
whose job anyway conforms to gender expectations, while male characters are 
depicted as breadwinners and are almost always introduced in scenes of violence. 
Avoiding crude stereotypes, there is a broad array of Mexican people from all 
social classes and occupations in the film. There is also religion in the 
background, in the shrine to the Virgin of Guadalupe and the picture of the Pope 
in Octavio’s poor home as well as in the silver crucifix in Daniel’s colonial-style 
family home. And where the director could have chosen an anonymous highway 
for the chase sequence a landmark of the city can be seen: the Latin American 
Tower.
But despite all this, it can also be argued that the film is too about 
exposing the contingency of these identities, showing them in the process of being 
unfixed. From the beginning, the film starts with a nostalgic dedication “to 
Luciano, because we are also that which we have lost,” indicating this will be a 
film about being and loss, or rather being through loss, i.e. being as a process of 
becoming. Indeed, over and over the characters in Amores Perros are shown 
either among photographs, as in the love scenes between Octavio and Susana, or 
contemplating photographs, as the model when remembering her former, beautiful 
self and Daniel when looking at the family pictures on his office desk, or “El 
Chivo” when examining the wallet he stole from Octavio during the crash, and 
earlier when avidly examining his daughter’s photographs when entering her 
house. It is as if in these ‘post-modern’ Mexico, characters had a need to have 
their identities confirmed by the photographs, as if they were looking forward to 
their reminding them who they and others are, as if they were relying on them as 
sorts of aids for their telling themselves the stories of their lives, for their 
articulating a coherent narrative giving them meaning.
Evidence of the dissolution of boundaries is also found in the 
representations of the family. Not only is it that the parents are absent “as a sign 
of the dissolution of authority.” (Arriaga in Mateos, 2000) The family, often
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drawn upon as a metaphor for the nation in nationalist discourses, is under siege 
in the film both among the poor and among the rich: if Octavio and his sister in 
law challenge its boundaries and even its legitimacy, so does businessman 
Gustavo, who hires “El Chivo” to kill his brother, although he says he is merely 
his dishonest partner. The role of “El Chivo” itself is very interesting, since he 
symbolises the old guerrilla movements that the PRI was always able to control as 
well as the EZLN, which it was unable to control. And it is precisely “El Chivo,” 
now a wiser, older and ‘post-modern’ guerrilla who manages to get hold of 
Gustavo’s wealthy brother when he is coming out from a Blockbuster video 
outlet: just when that bit of Mexico, the upper classes, were entering into 
development and the First World symbolised by America, that other Mexico, the 
guerrilla, caught it by surprise and brought it back to a harsh reality at home. In 
the film however the role of the guerrilla is quite positive, because it does not help 
rich Mexicans to kill one another, to kill ‘their brothers’ as it were, but just forces 
them to face each other and invites them to sort out their differences through 
argument, even if it does leave a gun on the floor for them ‘in case they cannot 
talk their problems out.’ It is also very concerned with the safety of its ‘daughter,’ 
one would think civil society, in that it was very much the politicisation of the 
middle classes what prevented the government from crushing the EZLN, and the 
movement is often credited with raising awareness in this layer of the population, 
one which was crucial for Fox’s democratic victory in 2000, and one which is 
regarded as young, fragile and in need of protection.^^^
Other than ‘El Chivo,’ upper classes in the film also badly collide with the 
poor in the shape of Octavio’s car, and ultimately it is this savage crash and not 
the sort of more intellectual challenge of the guerrilla itself that causes the real 
pain and suffering to both rich and poor, male and female, with religious and 
secular beliefs, but this is quite by accident. And if the accident is conceptualised, 
following Paul Virilio, as “both diagnostic for an excessively accelerating 
technology and as potential event for the re-establishment of human agency” the
Marcos described the birth of Mexican civil society in the following terms: “We thought that 
either the whole Mexican people would rise up in arms with us to fight for the same thing, or 
that everyone would be against us and we would be crushed...it never occurred to us that a 
movement would emerge that would place itself in the middle, this that we call ‘civil society.’” 
(Montemayor, 1997: 146)
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role of the United States in the Mexican crash, symbolised in the ‘excessively 
accelerating technology’ of the car, as well as that of the possibility of agency by 
the people in the re-shaping of their identities, becomes clear. (Virilio quoted by 
Der Derian, 2001: 671) Inasmuch as the accident is “before all else a disruption in 
the predictable flow of events, a breakdown of the present en route to the past, a 
rude awakening into the contingency of the future” the crash in the film can be 
read as a further indication of the contingency of what had hitherto seemed 
essential identities, allowing for the re-grafting of what before signified the 
identity into new discursive chains in order to produce new meanings. (Der 
Derian, 2001: 674)
But important as it is in binding the individual stories together and thus 
rendering them into one single, coherent overall story of the city, more than the 
accident, it is the fact that all those involved in it own dogs that stands out. The 
dogs as metonymies for the fate of their owners, and of dog fighting as 
symbolising the violence of the city, where ‘dog eats dog,’ are often mentioned in 
critiques and reviews of the film. The dogs are as helpless to influence the lives of 
their owners, especially in relation to them, as their owners are it seems in 
attempting to control their own destinies: “If you want to make God laugh, tell 
him your plans,” says a character. But although plausible these observations are 
only too evident. The very preponderant role of dogs and their relations with 
humans and among themselves in the film begs the question about what the dog 
stands for as a symbol. A first, obvious meaning connoted by dogs, in their role of 
man’s best friend, is that of faithfulness, and in the film the dogs as symbols of 
fidelity are ironically juxtaposed to the stories of infidelity in which their owners 
star. From Octavio and Susana who betray brother and husband Ramiro to Valeria 
and Daniel who betray Daniel’s wife to “El Chivo’s” wealthy victim who is also 
cheating on his wife with a married colleague from work, the characters in 
Amores Perros are overwhelmingly unfaithful. Thus one of the meanings 
connoted by dogs is successfully deployed by the director to establish an 
opposition with which to contrast —and define— the identities of the characters.
Dogs have also symbolised courage and bravery, and it is connoting these 
meanings that they are often used as metaphors for guardians and in the case of
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nations, the army. They were so deployed in Orwell’s allegory, Animal Farm. But 
although brave, the dogs in Amores Perros, do not have a clear role of 
guardianship or protection. Only Octavio’s dog is condemned to continuously 
fighting for his life. Ritchie, the model’s dog, is more of a lapdog, for company. 
And apart from them, the other relevant dogs in the story belong to ‘El Chivo.’ 
And it is here that the challenge to the identities as traditionally articulated is 
more forceful and evident. For what the drunkard tramp ‘El Chivo’ actually stands 
for, inasmuch as he is an outcast, a pariah not so much at the outskirts but rather 
out of society, living like a dog and among dogs, is a present day Diogenes, 
systematically denigrating the familiar and embracing the foreign, ‘cynically’ 
displaying ‘the performative politics of exile’ : “Through a strategy of alterity and 
defamiliarity, the Dog reclaims the polis from its ‘low’ materiality or ‘high 
idealism.’ The canine motto...becomes the need to ‘alter the political currency.’” 
(Constantinou, 2001: 794-795)
And in the film it is ‘El Chivo’ who, through his contempt for riches, 
pleasure and comfort, honour and glory, in short through his contempt for 
everything the others hold dear, is able to save himself. While all the other stories 
have unhappy endings, ‘El Chivo’ who searches neither love nor money gets them 
both and gives them away, and it is him who is able to ‘learn from his dogs,’ to 
understand the violence trap into which he is caught, and ultimately to escape it. 
Not only does he not kill Octavio’s dog ‘Cofi’ when he discovers Cofi has killed 
all his dogs, but he forgives him: “you are not guilty,” he says “this is what you 
were taught to do.” ‘El Chivo’ and his dogs thus symbolise the ultimate challenge 
to established identities.
Thus on balance, although the film does make reference to ‘that which we 
have been,’ it is only to tell us the extent to which we have lost it. We are too 
what we have lost, but we are definitely being something else in the process.
The Crime of Father Amaro
Greatly helped by the interest arose upon the sudden lifting of long-held 
censorship and by the intense campaign the Church and groups on the far right 
orchestrated against it —as well as by the marketing campaign sustained by its
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distributor Columbia Tristar— The Crime o f Father Amaro was shown in 400 
theatres throughout the country on its opening night, slightly more than those 
allocated to Spider-Man (Raimi: 2002) and Attack of the Clones (Lucas: 2002). It 
also beat these Hollywood blockbusters in the box office, where tickets were sold 
for USD$15 million. Many theatres had sold-out tickets for the opening night 
from internet bookings and disappointed movie-goers flocked from the early 
hours of the morning to try to get tickets for other performances, unique in the 
history of Mexican film. Father Amaro thus became the most conunercially 
successful national film so far, as well as the one that has produced the most 
reflection and debate.
Loosely based on the homonymous novel written in 1878 by Portuguese 
writer José Maria Eça de Queiroz, the film is the story of Amaro, a young priest 
who arrives in the small village of Los Reyes, full of enthusiasm and eager to 
serve the community. However he soon realises he is surrounded by hypocrisy. 
Father Benito, who is in charge of the parish Amaro has been assigned to, has had 
a relationship for several years with ‘Sanjuanera,’ a woman who runs a small 
eatery, thus breaking his celibacy vows. Moreover, Father Benito is having a 
hospital built with funds given to him by well-known drug baron “el Chato” 
Aguilar. There are accusations that Natalio, another priest in a nearby parish, is 
involved in the guerrilla. And to complicate matters further Amaro himself falls in 
love with Sanjuanera’s young teenage daughter, Amelia. The girl eventually gets 
pregnant and dies while having an abortion that Amaro persuaded her to undergo. 
To save his reputation —and his future career— Amaro spreads the word that 
Amelia, desperate because she was pregnant by her former boyfriend Ruben, died 
while Amaro was trying to help her, taking her to a hospital. The film ends with a 
mass being held for the sake of Amelia, with Father Amaro leading an “I 
confess.” Although the film’s narrative structure is quite straightforward, with 
events focusing around the main character and unfolding in a linear sequence, 
expressing meanings at a far more denotative than connotative level, it is
160 Before Amaro the Church on films was “a silent presence, a structuring absence.” (Ramfrez-
Berg, 1992: 26)
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nonetheless ambiguous and it gives grounds for at least three different ‘preferred’ 
readings:
The one preferred by the media and public debate, took for granted that, 
despite the director’s vehement protestations to the contrary, the film was first and 
foremost a very specific attack on the Mexican Catholic Church. There were 
various reasons for this. First of all, to succeed on its bid for the suspension of 
disbelief the film largely relies on the monocultural flagging approach mentioned 
above, depicting a ‘national reality’: a rural setting has been chosen instead of an 
urban one, featuring traditional, colonial architecture and colourful landscapes, 
and focusing mostly on the poor; all food depicted is traditional; the main 
character, Amaro, speaks with a local accent; the lyrics of one of the songs sung 
during a mass state “may Jesus forever reign in our motherland and our soil, the 
nation belongs to Mary”; in sum, the film leaves no doubt this is a local ‘reality.’ 
Then, although the director argued the film should be seen as a story about the 
gradual personal degradation of an individual in his relentless pursuit of power, a 
story that “might as well have been about a film director willing to sell out his 
principles and film a story he did not believe in” the fact is it is not only Amaro’s 
crimes that constitute the plot. (Carrera: 2002) In fact, only the last third of the 
film is devoted to the story between Amaro and Amelia, the only anecdote from 
the original novel, the other two thirds dividing almost equally between Benito’s 
links with the drug barons and Natalio’s involvement with the guerrillas. 
Moreover, even secondary characters such as the two priests from a nearby parish 
who once attend a meeting are shown to indulge in excess, both through gluttony 
and drink. And the upper hierarchs are just as guilty of other crimes: the bishop 
turns a blind eye to the origins of Benito’s parish income and blackmails the 
owner of a newspaper that covered the story threatening to have the publicity, and 
thus the paper’s main source of income, withdrawn ‘with a single telephone call.’ 
He also harasses and eventually excommunicates Natalio for failing to comply 
with the Church’s demands. The Church’s basic narrative itself sounds cheap and 
hollow when Amelia is teaching her Sunday school: ‘This old man with the beard
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in the picture is God’ she tells her student ‘and this one here is the holy spirit: you 
can see the little wings, right?’
At the institutional level then, Amaro would stand for a corrupt, decadent 
Church, that blatantly deceives that —vast— sector of the Mexican people who 
are the most disadvantaged, the naïve, ignorant and vulnerable. Those from 
among them who realise this and eventually denounce it —such as Martin, the 
Sacristan that tells Benito about the affair— are punished: Martin was thrown out 
from his home despite having a severely disabled daughter. Those who are 
better educated, the middle classes represented by Amelia’s boyfriend Ruben, 
who is a journalist, are sometimes able to face the Church more successfully but 
at the cost of alienating the poor: Amelia is furious and breaks up with Ruben 
after he published his article. The government, here in the form of the 
municipal president, unwilling to alienate the masses, is reluctantly driven to 
support the Church. In the end the Church would be a vivid incarnation of 
everything that it supposedly condemns. The fihn would thus, according to this 
interpretation, be a call for those being ‘seduced’ to realise the treacherous nature 
of the Catholic Church and desert it.
There are however other possible ‘preferred’ readings for this film. It 
could be said to do the very opposite work, namely to legitimate the Church with 
a tale that renews the validity of its central (patriarchal) narrative. For Amelia here 
is of course Eve the temptress, and Amaro falls down only after doing his best to 
resist her various advances. She agreed to be compared to the Virgin Mary and to 
wear her shawl during intercourse, a sacrilege. Moreover, perhaps in order to 
avoid censorship and reach adolescent viewers, the sexual scenes themselves are 
thoroughly marked by the extreme Puritanism of Catholic morals: there is never a 
full frontal nude and when Amelia dons the shawl she is wearing her underwear.
Sometimes attention was also drawn to the Ripstein family, the Jewish producers who 
supplied most of the financing for the film. But given their long career on Mexican cinema, and 
the wide variety of the topics they have covered, this point did not always receive much 
credence.
It is a slightly sarcastic detail that, upon being sacked, when Martin has packed his few 
possessions and put them and his paralysed daughter on a cart for their departure, we can see he 
has used empty cardboard boxes of a well known Mexican detergent called “Roma”!
In another earlier scene when he voices scepticism to the Church’s narrative Amelia is 
alarmed and accuses him of being a Communist.
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Besides she died only because she was herself attempting to murder her innocent 
child, so her death can be interpreted as deserved punishment. This view is 
reinforced since at the moment she is dying, the very same words Amaro uttered 
to her when they had sexual relations, namely verses from The Song o f Songs 
complimenting her on her beauty are heard at the background. Other female 
characters fare no better: appropriately named Dyonisia, a sort of witch who only 
appears to have embraced Catholicism but who in reality continues to perform 
pagan magical rituals, who lives surrounded by cats, is the person to take Amaro 
and Amelia to the abortion clinic and thus to Ameha’s d e a t h .A m e l i a ’s 
unmarried mother has been involved with Father Benito. The Sacristan’s disabled 
daughter, who is mute and paralyzed, is called Getsemani, a place of utmost 
suffering for Christ. On the other hand in the enlightened middle classes there are 
hardly any women. Ruben’s family consists of only his father, and all people in 
the professions —the doctor, a photographer— are men. Even the municipal 
president’s wife, in theory better educated, is depicted as rather plain, silly and 
banal.
Moreover, Father Benito may have had a relationship with ‘Sanjuanera,’ 
but we find from the film that he also supported her economically and emotionally 
when her partner abandoned her, and by the middle of the film he has thoroughly 
repented. He may take money from drug barons but he does not use this for 
personal gain but for the good of the people. Thus the Church was actually 
assisted by the film, to turn the ‘real’ story of the very lucrative links between 
Nuncio Prigione and the Guzman brothers into far less questionable links 
involving merely an ordinary village priest and crucially allowing him to 
exculpate the Church via the honest use he gives the funds. Besides, while the 
audience will draw on their cultural background for their condemnation of drug 
barons, the film is not at all negative in their depiction: they are shown to be 
people like everybody else —albeit admittedly better off—, christening their new 
bom child and generously assisting Father Benito to undergo an operation when 
he falls ill. This is consistent with what happens in some regions of the country 
where dealers have very nearly replaced the state, especially investing and
164 Dionysia is in many ways the female equivalent to ‘El Chivo’ in Amores Perros.
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providing infrastructure for the communities: they are known to enjoy the support 
of the majority of the population. (Manrique, 1998)
The key point is that the Church is ultimately legitimated: it is not the 
institution that fails, but the people. And inasmuch as they repent, they too are 
saved. From the paradigmatic point of view, it is significant that a very willing 
beautiful young lady is chosen instead of an abused child, which has been the case 
in the news very often recently. From the syntagmatic point of view, it is also 
significant that the statues of saints and the virgin all appear in long shots 
followed by close ups, either lateral or from below, shots which put them in a 
separate, higher realm from our human one. At no point do the walls of the church 
itself crumble to the ground, which would really have spelt the end. But had the 
director made these alternative choices, it is most likely that the film would only 
have been shown, if at all, among outbursts of v iolence.This  would explain 
why, despite the stance against the film taken by most priests and most bishops, it 
was not the stance taken by Cardinal Norberto Rivera, who, although ambiguous 
and evasive, did not oppose the exhibition. (Român, 2002) This would also 
explain the apparent contradiction between Fox’s personal ostentatious 
Catholicism, his conservative government largely composed by active members 
of the religious far right and the —relatively minor— economic support lent to the 
film, as well as their refusal to censor it.^ ^^
But the film also gives grounds for yet another ‘preferred’ reading, one 
that calls for a negotiation between the two perspectives outlined above. Inasmuch 
as it is true that the story is one of an individual fall down, the question must be 
asked what role the institution plays in this fall. Amaro was after all honourable 
when he first arrived in Los Reyes. The bus in which he was travelling had been 
burgled and he had helped a fellow traveller, a poor old peasant, by giving him all 
the money he had. When tempted with promises of a career in Rome he had 
sincerely resisted them explaining all he wanted to do was to serve his
This was indeed the case of Canoa (Cazals: 1975), a film that tells the ‘true story’ of a group 
of students who were lynched by a mob in Puebla after a priest accused them of being 
communists.
3.5 million pesos, approximately (Editorial of Evangelizacion Activa, a publication of the 
Monterrey dioceses, available online at
http://www.arquidiocesismty.org.mx/circulares/2002/2002-circular-019.htm.
A Post-Structuralist Approach to National Identity After the Cold War: the C ase  of Mexico 1 8 9
community. At one point he questions the grounds for celibacy vows, stating that 
priests are also men and that human beings are as much body as they are soul. 
From this perspective, with which many young viewers identified, more than an 
attack on the Church the film would be a call for the Church to modernise, to 
attempt to redress the mismatch between an outdated moral code and the actual 
way people attempt to live their lives. More than a criminal, Amaro is as much a 
victim as Amelia of an obsolete ideology obsessed with the sexuality it so 
thoroughly represses. This was clearly conveyed in one of the trailers, where the 
words “The Crime” appear at the top and at the bottom “Amar,” ‘to love’ in 
Spanish. Then the phrase is completed with “of Father” appearing next to “The 
Crime” and an “o” completing his name. After all according to specialists on 
religion, rather than a growing secularisation as has been the case in Europe, in 
Mexico there has been a phenomenon of people adapting religious tenets in a way 
that suits their personal beliefs. (Masferrer in Roman, 2002) If it is true that on 
films dealing with social taboos actors can be regarded as surrogates for the 
audience as some psychoanalytic theories of film contend, viewers would find 
The Crime o f Father Amaro a cathartic, and thus rewarding transgressing 
experience. (Monaco, 2000: 276)
Furthermore, the film is thoroughly positive towards Liberation Theology, 
represented by Father Na t a l i o . I t  is true that various characters in the film, from 
all sectors of society express condemnation, notably the bishop. Father Benito and 
Ruben’s atheist father, who are both Spaniard, as opposed to Natalio, who is 
Mexican, but he is presented, throughout, as a conunitted, responsible, principled 
character, the only one who does not betray the spirit of the Church and who 
stands by his ideals regardless the consequences. While religious music is used in 
scenes relating to the Church and Northern folk music — ‘narco-corridos’— in 
scenes where drug dealers appear, thus establishing an opposition between them, 
only sound effects and background noise are heard when Father Natalio appears. 
Natalio is seen chopping wood and building lodges, making coffee and in the 
wake of a peasant that has been murdered. The government systematically fails to 
convey any idea of ‘the law,’ in fact it is quite the opposite, the municipal
167 Which means, in Spanish, to be bom.
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president plays poker and drinks, whereas Natalie’s work in the jungle is clearly 
praiseworthy. At this point it will be useful to compare this film with Herod's 
Law, for the parallelisms are truly remarkable, to the point that they could be 
regarded as twin stories, the one dealing with the Church, via drama, the other 
with the Party, through comedy, proceeding in exactly the same way in terms of 
script and narrative structure, and even in terms of cast.
Herod’s Law
Like Amaro, Herod's Law was also first shown amidst scandal and pressures for 
censorship. It was actually shown for only four days in two theatres and then 
withdrawn, but shortly before the elections its exhibition in 250 theatres was 
finally authorised and it proved a great success. It relies on the same anecdote: in 
1947 a well-meaning PRI member, Vargas, is sent to a tiny village in the sierra to 
replace the municipal president, who has been murdered. He is honest, 
enthusiastic and has the best intentions, but soon discovers he is doomed to failure 
due to the utter corruption that surrounds him and gradually sinks as low as it is 
possible to conceive. In his merciless exploitation of the peasants he is aided by 
the local priest, who gives him handy tips, obtained from confessions, on Vargas’ 
enemies, mainly the village doctor, a puritan member of the PAN who also speaks 
English. His wife runs away with an American engineer he was forced to host at 
home, since he had contracted with him a debt he had been unable to repay. The 
owner of the restaurant, the only truly honest character in the film, is forced to 
leave when he is unable to afford crippling taxes. The situation gets so bad that 
Vargas’ boss is forced to intervene. But having lost all touch with reality, Vargas 
has no scruples in killing even the boss. The ‘Indians’ have no choice but to 
attempt to get rid of yet another municipal president, but just as they are running 
after Vargas he is saved by a group of gangsters that were after his boss, working 
for a rival. A new municipal president is sent over to the village, bound to repeat 
the story, the audience knows. Vargas however is totally rewarded: the film ends
This is an intertextual reference to Rio Escondido (Fernandez: 1947) where diva Maria Felix 
played the role of a young rural teacher who had been sent by president Miguel Aleman to 
spread the modernising policies of the PRI in a tiny village. That film, however, was meant to 
glorify the achievements of the regime, while Herod thoroughly contests them.
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with the new Senator addressing fellow members of Congress in a speech about 
how their aim shall be to remain in power ever after, for they alone can uphold the 
true meaning of the revolution, to a standing ovation.
The two films are thus obviously part of the same project, and so is 
Amores Perros, although in a more artistic, less obvious way. Amaro and Herod 
share the basic outline for the plot as well as several narrative devices. Amaro, 
concerned with repressed sex, is overflowing with cats, Herod, dealing with 
politics, follows the Orwellian metaphor with pigs, and Amores Perros, on 
betrayal, with dogs, the symbols of fidelity. The two films also share screenwriter 
Vicente Lenero and most of the actors, who play their roughly equivalent 
characters: Ernesto Gomez, who plays the governor in Herod's Law also plays the 
bishop in Amaro. Pedro Armendariz, Vargas’ boss, is the municipal president in 
Amaro. Vargas himself, Damian Alcazar, is Father Natalio. Herod deals with the 
Church only tangentially, through a secondary character, while Amaro deals with 
the government in the same tangential way. In both the Church is criticised for the 
misuse it gives information obtained in confession. Hit men characters in both 
films are called “Tiburon.” And Amaro, which came later, makes a reference to 
Herod when Father Benito says in a confession: ‘Like Herod, I too chopped off 
the heads of innocents.’ Finally, the three depict a complex relationship with the 
United States, differing in their assessment of whether it is good or bad, but 
crucially, unlike the erotic comedies of the 1990s from the Salinas and Zedillo 
days, the Americans figure consistently as an ‘Other.’
Perhaps because of their focus on the poor rather than the upper classes, it 
is easier to tell the ‘Mexicanity’ of the characters. Amores Perros makes reference 
to ‘the North’ —not the US, but the border city of Tijuana— as, if not a promised 
land, at least a space to overcome the economic and social constraints of the 
characters’ asphyxiating existence. In Amaro there is an open reference to the US 
as a promised land —but with that very Mexican expression long used to signify 
the United States, ‘the other side’— from the peasant who is burgled in the bus at 
the beginning of the film: ‘If my plans to set up a shop fail. I’ll go to the other 
side. I have a daughter there.’ Herod is also ambiguous: on the one hand, the 
American character is an engineer, connoting higher education and technology.
The Challenge on Film 1 9 2
This is evident when he helps Vargas to bring in electricity into the village, i.e. 
‘progress and modernity,’ when he helps him repair his car, i.e. industrialise, and 
when he teaches English to his wife. He also brings technology in the form of a 
phonograph into Vargas’ home, which his wife very much enjoys. He is a bit of a 
swindler when he significantly overprices his services to Vargas and demands 
upfront payments and high interests, but it was wholly Vargas’ responsibility to 
hire him, and at one point Vargas attempts to leave without paying, so he is not 
very honest himself. Besides, he does not force Vargas’ ill-treated wife to go with 
him but, like the Church, seduces her into it. However, it is also true that at one 
point of the story when conservative PAN Candidate —appropriately called Dr. 
Morales— asks the American engineer, in English, whether Americans consider 
democracy to be the best form of government, he rephes ‘Not necessarily, we also 
quite like some dictatorships, hke yours’ and to the question of whether his 
government was still angry about the oil expropriation he replied ‘A little, but we 
know that one day we will recover everything we have lost and more. We just 
have to be patient.’ It could thus be argued that the film portrays the US as 
utilitarian, cynical and hypocritical about their relationship with Mexico, in the 
very style of traditional PRI narratives, especially since this scene is not essential 
to the plot and might as well have been omitted. Be it as it may, ‘the American,’ 
either in a role of direct involvement as a key actor in the making of ‘Mexico’ as 
represented in Herod, or as a remote presence constructing the limits of the 
discursive horizon of ‘Mexico’ as in Amores and Amaro, through its presence as 
‘the Other Side,’ is absolutely crucial for the making of the Mexican identity in all 
three cases.
However, the three films put these similar features to work for very 
different ends. In Amaro, the Church is apparently denounced, but only in order to 
save it. There are grounds for various ‘preferred readings.’ ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ 
characters are not so clear-cut, and the responsibility for ‘bad’ actions is not that 
clear either. There is sin but there is repentance. Gael Garcia, who plays Father 
Amaro and with whom the audience is asked to identify, was also Octavio in 
Amores Perros, and has starred in other highly successful films as the hero. In 
Herod, on the contrary, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the film is an
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attack against the PRI, which systematically assaulted the poor, murdered and 
betrayed to remain in power, exposed the middle class to the influence of a 
foreign culture until this was assumed as ‘her own’ —for the narrative is highly 
gendered as well—, offended and harassed the private sector until it was forced to 
flee the country and rewarded the corruption that perpetuated it/^^ Significantly, it 
is a brothel that Vargas initially fails to shut down, which was nearly the only 
sound business in town, the brothel standing as a metaphor for the whole of the 
Mexican pohtical system. And all references to ‘the Law’ are made via ‘the 
Constitution,’ characterised by brothel-owner Dona Lupe as ‘that thick book,’ i.e. 
dead letter as regards to justice, although a powerful weapon to raise ‘funds,’ 
especially if used in conjunction with Vargas’ gun, which his boss gave him. By 
the end of the film Vargas is even re-writing the constitution to suit his —‘tax’ 
collecting— ends. There can be no misunderstandings. Only Lazaro Cardenas is 
vindicated, when a character explains ‘the school was built in the times of Tata 
Cardenas’ but municipal presidents who came later ‘sold even the bricks.’ This 
renders evident the attempts to the appropriation of the very myth on which the 
PRI relied, namely that of Cardenas, by an alternative political project that seeks 
to bind it in its own —perhaps soon to become hegemonic— discourse. If the 
American engineer brings the ‘know how’ for the progress of the village, it is all 
those anonymous Indians who cannot even speak Spanish that the audience sees 
supplying the labour power to make it happen. They may not have a single 
character to represent them, but their background presence as ‘the masses’ that 
economically supported the whole edifice is definitely highly visible. This, 
together with the stance taken against the American engineer, the fact that PAN 
Candidate Dr. Morales turns out to be molesting his teenage indigenous maid, and 
the duplicitous role of the ambitious priest means that Herod*s Law could very 
well be the version of contemporary Mexican history for the masses told from a
In this way, the lack of a place in the conceptual architecture of Christianity for a woman 
other than that of virgin or whore is in Mexico expressed through the binary opposition between 
the Virgin of Guadalupe and ‘La Malinche,’ the Indian princess said to have taken sides with 
the Spaniards and who thus stands for treason. To portray the middle and the upper class as 
traitors here, they are gendered female and incarnated into Vargas’ wife as a modem day 
Malinche, preferring the American engineer to the ‘husband’ —in its sense of administrator— 
of her own kind.
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PRD-friendly perspective. The favourable stance taken towards Liberation 
Theology in Amaro and the Chiapas insurrection in Amores Perros could well be 
understood in the same way.
To sum up, although the films that attempted to undermine the PRI regime 
through the questioning of the ethnic, rehgious and political basis of the identity 
were persuasive and acutely critical, they did not necessarily endorse the project 
that sought to define the national identity in the way the other films discussed here 
did. These films have been more ambiguous, and although they have certainly 
challenged the hegemonic discourse, they seem to be sponsored by alternative 
power centres, making attempts at the construction of contending discourses, of a 
kind that put forward positions for identification that are appealing to a broader 
range of the population. Moreover, recent discourses on world politics opposing 
‘the United States and new Europe’ to ‘(Islamic) terrorism’ offer no position for 
Latin America. The whole discursive project on which the emergent neoliberal 
elite depended, constructed at a time when one of the images on world politics 
most successfully deployed was the one of a “coming of regionalism” has all but 
collapsed. (Rostow, 1990)
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Conclusions
It only remains at this point to summarise the main arguments that have been put 
forward in this thesis and to add a few concluding remarks that can be drawn from 
them, both at a general, theoretical level and for the specific case of Mexico, that 
was analysed as case study. The theoretical background is discussed at some 
length because it is the basis on which all claims are made. Chapters one and two 
are summarised more succinctly as their function is mostly that of setting the 
historical background and establishing the meaning of the national identity before 
the challenge to the hegemonic discourse that 1 have demonstrated took place. 
Chapters three and four, where all key contentions are made, are summarised to 
comparably more length. Finally, reference is also made to the films, which were 
deployed as evidence on chapter five.
The Methodology
This research was undertaken as an attempt to apply to the study of national 
identity some of the key tenets of a relatively recent but increasingly important 
tradition in International Relations theory based on ‘continental philosophy.’ 
(Foucault, 1978; Derrida, 1984) While not claiming that this theoretical 
framework helps to fully explain every single aspect involved in the formation 
and transformation of national identities, 1 do contend that it goes a long way into 
accounting for the phenomena as perceived in the Mexican case in the period 
under study, that some findings can be extrapolated, and that it is without doubt a 
better, fuller account than either its phenomenologist or its structuralist-based 
predecessors, the former relying too much on individual agency, the latter unable 
to account for change. The key tenets underpinning this research are as follows.
Firstly, that it is indeed possible and fruitful to conceive of international 
relations as a discourse on world pohtics, which on the basis of various sets of 
sub-discourses, such as the academic discipline of IR itself and other related 
disciplines and social sciences but also, and crucially, on the basis of the mediated 
discourses of the news and the output of the media more generally, systematically
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construct the identities of its objects of study, among them national states, 
understood primarily as territorially-based units of belonging to which large 
numbers of people subscribe and on the basis of which they and their 
governments interact with each other and with one another. (Shapiro, 1990, 1993; 
Der Derian, 1989; Campbell, 1990; Edkins, 1999; O’Hagan and Fry, 2000)
Secondly, that difference is at the root of all identity and it is the interplay 
of difference that produces meaning. I have thus argued that (national) identity 
can only be conceived as a result of the interaction with the Other(s) —as the 
enactment, so to speak, of this play of difference— and that these Other(s) are in 
turn formed by procedures that institute boundaries, i.e. by the application of 
‘classificatory frameworks’ which help make sense of reality by bringing a given 
subjectivity into existence. Far from being independent, accidental and/or external 
to the self, the Other should be instead regarded as constitutive, as that which lays 
the conditions under which the self can exist as such. I have argued that for these 
very reasons the study of nationahsm and national identity on the basis of this 
methodological framework is a particularly well suited task to be undertaken in 
International Relations studies, since it has implications both at the theoretical 
level, bearing on the way IR engages with its subject ontologically, and at the 
level of foreign policy decision making and other boundary-construction 
processes.
But the discourses that forge identities can never be final, for three 
reasons. The first one is that all identities are contingent, that is, nothing binds the 
signifiers that convey them and their meaning beyond the links between them 
performed by discourse itself. (Laclau, 1996: 90) Discourse can, in fact, be 
understood as an attempt to bring suture to identities and become ‘final’ but it is 
by its very nature bound to fail on this endeavour. The second reason is that 
discourses are the result of the exercise of power and power is always 
permanently contested: “power, whether it be ‘in’ or ‘behind’ discourse, is never 
definitively held by any one person or social grouping, because power can be won 
and exercised only in and through social struggles in which it may also be lost.” 
(Fairclough, 1989: 43) And the third reason is the inherent impossibility of
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accounting for everything: there is always a “non-symbolisable surplus.” (Edkins 
and Pin-Fat, 1999: 5)
Thus any discourse will by necessity be constructed around a fundamental 
lack, the impossibility of realising a transcendental identity, which it attempts to 
hide through the articulation of a coherent narrative that provides a provisional 
identity, a national identity in this case. Due to the crucial role of difference, the 
more polarised the binary oppositions that constitute and delimit a discourse, the 
less the contingency of the identities will seem to be. Precarious and unfinished, 
discourses can only become hegemonic inasmuch as they successfully articulate a 
majority of signifiers into a coherent narrative that gives (national) identity a 
meaning. But this narrative will continuously be challenged by rival political 
projects which will attempt to appropriate key hegemonic signifiers and to weave 
these and any signifiers not articulated by the hegemonic discourse —that is, 
‘floating signifiers’—, into an alternative narrative of their own. The process 
whereby signifiers are appropriated and woven into discourses consists of either 
binding them into chains of equivalence or breaking their current bindings to set 
them apart. In other words, signifiers are articulated into contending discursive 
chains by means of re-grafting them into either equivalence or differentiation with 
other signifiers.
Therefore, in order to analyse a discourse and gain insight into the 
identities it engenders, attention must be given to the representations of signifiers 
that it produces and puts forward, since it is in this way that they are appropriated 
and articulated. Representations are a way to interpellate their addressees so as to 
seek to place them within a subject-position that gives them an identity that makes 
sense within the broader discourse:
“...the subject is interpellated into the social or symbolic order 
through a process that takes place in terms of language...This 
interpellation or hailing, constitutes the subject at the level of the 
symbolic: the subject becomes that which occupies a certain place — 
as citizen, consumer, intellectual— in the social order.” (Edkins and 
Pin-Fat, 1999: 4)
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Since representations are both the product of and in turn produce the 
reality they claim to represent, representations act also as the empirical evidence 
on which research can rely in order to test hypotheses as to the nature of a 
particular discourse and the way it is producing subjects. These attempts at 
interpellation however are not always successful, and even when they are and a 
discourse is relatively stable over a long period of time, the fundamental lack 
around which it is built and the challenges from competing, would-be-hegemonic 
groups and the floating signifiers it is unable to articulate eventually cause a 
dislocation, a crisis that exposes it in its vacuity —thus the ‘empty signifier’—, 
and social change takes place.
The specific discourses that produce national identity will seek to produce 
‘the national subject’ by means of complex narratives regarding a series of 
‘cultural’ treats that bind her or him with the national territory, to which they are 
thereby historically entitled, and that bind them with their fellow nationals in a 
community of history and destiny, setting them apart from all Others. These traits 
are typically a combination of language, religion and ‘ethnicity,’ interacting 
together to set the physical —territorial— and the mythical boundaries of the 
group. For these reasons, metaphors of the national subjects as an extended family 
and/or a chosen people, of the territory as a homeland, and gendered metaphors of 
the nation as the mother constitute the backbone of the nationalist imagery. 
Discourses that produce national identities therefore can be thought of as a 
particular type of Kantian ‘productive understandings’ or ‘classificatory schemes’ 
that classify people according to a dynamic combination of linguistic, religious 
and ‘ethnic’ criteria, criteria which, although ‘objective’ in the sense that it is 
effectively borne by the subjects so classified, is wholly contingent, there is 
absolutely nothing necessary about it except that it is the criteria articulated by 
power for the specific ends of the (re)production of the national state. At the same 
time, discourses on world politics contribute to the reification of the national state 
through their construction of a place for it that fits the given narratives being 
offered as theories or explanations of international relations, be they clashes of 
civilisations, a bi-polar Cold War order, an age of regionalism, etc.
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Thus conceived, discourses of national identity would be part of the 
discursive formation of modernity, a period when the level of technological 
advance made it possible for representations of the nation and the national subject 
to circulate within a conununity, firstly among the literate elites, by means of the 
printed word and later, with the development of the visual media, photography but 
especially cinema and later television, among the masses. (Anderson, 1991) The 
national subject-position has proven a remarkably resilient one, perhaps because 
of the way it has successfully addressed deep psychological imperatives and 
because of the way it intertwines practical aspects of everyday life with 
fundamental emotional issues of dignity and transcendence, in a way that 
alternatives such as ‘market states’ and pan-regional states cannot. (Bobbitt, 2003) 
Although the discursive formation of modernity in which the national state 
originated may now be exhausted, since the narrative of the Enlightenment on 
which it crucially depends is fast ceasing to be hegemonic and technology now 
allows for a veritable prohferation of contending narratives from all fronts, people 
all over the world still resort to varying extents to their national identities as a 
means to make sense of reality and their lives.
The Case of Mexico
So how does all this translate when the abstract theoretical concepts are faced 
with dealing with the practical case of the Mexican national identity? What 
evidence is there to claim that there has been an attempt of transformation? What 
has been the role of the Other(s) that was described above as so fundamental? 
Which types of representations of the identity have been forged and put in 
circulation and by whom? Are these representations constructing persuasive 
subject-positions that ‘the Mexican people’ embrace? And what does this tell us 
about the meaning of being Mexican, and about Mexico’s ‘international 
relations’? Can any of these answers be, at least partly, extrapolated to other 
national identities ‘in the age of globalisation’? These are the very questions that 
this research set to answer. Let us now rehearse them briefly again here.
The Beginning: from ‘creoles,’ ‘mestizos’ and ‘natives’ to ‘Mexicans’
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Applying the methodological framework outlined above, the architects of the 
Latin American nations were the descendents from the Spanish conquerors who, 
in a process well documented in the hterature on the field, engaged into 
constructing the Spaniards hving in Spain, with whom they shared language, 
religion, ethnicity and every cultural treat involved in the national subject position 
except for place of birth, as ‘the Other,’ and the native population and the 
offspring of their inter-marriages as ‘We.’ (Anderson, 1991: 47-66) Apart from 
the ‘cultural pilgrimages’ that gave this elite an awareness of being a group with 
interests in conunon, crucial to the early nation-constructing process were literary 
representations of the identity in the nineteenth century novel, which introduced 
concepts of chronological simultaneity whereby anyone in the position of the 
‘national subject’ could imagine others they would never meet in a similar 
position at the same time, and which also endowed all those reading them with a 
shared cultural background. During the 20^ Century it would be cinematic 
representations that, through features such as parallel editing and the chronotope, 
served the same function, bringing the nation to the masses.
While Spain was for obvious reasons the most relevant Other at the time, 
or in other words, the identity the descendents from the European settlers most 
sought to differentiate themselves and the inhabitants of Hispanic America from, 
once they succeeded in their wars of independence their unity broke and a 
succession of challenges to territorial authority saw a number of differentiated 
countries emerging, which again were populated by groups of people that shared 
in common the culture that three hundred years of Spanish empire had imposed on 
their ancestors and which they had inherited. This time therefore Others were 
made by reclaiming particular links with the indigenous populations that had 
inhabited specific territories before the invasion. This depended on the actual 
proportion of European descendents and Native American descendents, with 
countries mostly in Central America having the highest proportion of the latter.
170 As put by historian Alfonso Reyes on the Mexican rejection to the Spaniards’ spelling of 
“Méjico”: “Those differences that appear as most striking are the ones between similarities: the 
differences on that which is most hke us impress us the most. The clash can be perceived even 
as grotesque.” (Reyes, quoted in De Los Reyes, 1987: 1)
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‘Mexico’ emerged from the northern lands of ‘the New Spain’ around the Aztec 
empire which had flourished in its central region and which was chosen to 
represent, i.e. to stand for, all Native Americans. Almost every cultural product 
from an indigenous origin had to be reassessed so as to form the background for 
the national heritage. (Smith, 2003: 203) Formerly ‘pagan idols’ that ought to be 
destroyed became instead ‘works of art’ to be gathered and exhibited in museums. 
The ‘blood thirsty savages’ that the discourse of the Enhghtenment —and, some 
contend, European fantasies and repressed desires— had carved out of the Native 
American populations became instead ‘ancient civilisations’ and the times before 
the empire, the Golden Age when a free society had prospered in justice and 
freedom.” * (Hall, 1992: 276-314)
Throughout this early period the United States was simply not present in 
the awareness of the masses and it was certainly not perceived as a threatening 
Other by the elites. On the contrary, the Liberals, who became hegemonic, in the 
processes of making an Other out of Spain systematically pointed out the 
similarities between Mexico and the United States, attempting to put them into a 
chain of equivalence. The United States had been the first country to recognise the 
new nation. Both countries, they argued, had been bom out of the stmggle against 
unjust (European) imperial domination. And both were committed to democracy 
—that is, ‘democracy’ as the opposite of ‘monarchy’— since it provides 
legitimacy, and thus a way out of the ‘national conundrum’: to the question ‘who 
should govern?’ the answer is ‘we should govern ourselves,’ i.e. ‘us.’ The 
American economy did not seem hugely superior: a dollar was worth as much as a 
peso until the early 1970s and by the end of the 1960s inflation was actually 
lower. (Philip, 1991: 71) And, significantly, the first meeting ever to take place 
between a Mexican and an American president happened at the border, with 
neither of them crossing their territory. (Dominguez and Fernandez, 2001: 84) 
Finally, although the Americans certainly became a threat to the territorial 
integrity of the nation after the invasion in 1847, Europe continued to loom for the 
Liberals as more of a threat, perhaps because it did not come only in the form of
171 The account of the ‘Indians’ hving in peaceful ownership of their land until the arrival of the 
Spaniards was always challenged by ‘criollo’ elites, who stood by the ‘civihsing mission’ 
version, but it became more hegemonic as the proportion of mestizo population increased.
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fears of another European empire but also from the challenge of the Catholic 
Church to their civil authority, and the legitimacy the Church lent instead to the 
Conservatives. The American government provided some help and support for the 
government of Benito Juarez when he faced would-be emperor Maximilian of 
Habsburg, and later to the Liberals who fought against Diaz during the early 
stages of the revolutionary war.
After their victory against the French, the Liberals bound ‘the 
Conservatives’ into ‘Otherness’: they had been the ones responsible for bringing a 
foreigner into the country, for seeking the enslavement of Mexico under alien rule 
again. They were trying, in short, to prevent ‘us’ from being. Well until the end of 
the twentieth century, the word ‘Conservative’ still powerfully connoted 
backwardness and treason. In the early stages it belonged into the 
Liberal/Conservative dichotomy, where the former were linked to progress, 
modernity, secularism, social justice and the United States. The latter were linked 
to the reaction, to dubious traditions dating from the empire, to the Catholic 
Church, subjugation and to Europe.
The Revolution: from Outward-looking Modernity Seekers to Authenticity- 
cravers
Building on earlier research carried out on the Mexican revolution from the 
discursive perspective, I have argued here that after the successive fights against 
foreigners, the revolution provided the most recent opportunity to engage into 
becoming ‘us.’^^  ^It came at a time when society was bitterly divided between an 
upper-class. Conservative minority that looked up to Europe —to France— for its 
models of modernity and a majority of dispossessed, oppressed peasants and an 
emerging middle class who longed instead for ‘authenticity,’ and thus back to ‘the 
origins.’ The claims and grievances that the various groups had in common, 
although wholly unrelated, were bound into a chain of equivalence by virtue of 
being opposed to the Diaz regime —it was this that united them and gave them 
coherence. Thus demands for ‘land and freedom,’ for ‘no re-election,’ for the
For earlier research on the Mexican Revolution from a discourse-analysis perspective see 
Buenfil, 2000: 86-99.
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defence of the rights of workers and the creation of trade unions, etc. all became 
demands for ‘social justice,’ demands for ‘the revolution.’ The different groups 
that carried out the various battles later became, put together, ‘the revolution’ 
itself. Therefore upon its triumph, i.e. upon the ousting of Diaz, ‘the revolution’ 
had been emptied of the meaning of the several different demands that had 
originally sparked the conflict, but had acquired instead the status of a master, 
empty signifier around which a whole discourse providing a meaning for the 
national identity could emerge.
I have also argued that this discourse took the form of an opposition to the 
Diaz regime on every front. Where he had stood for private ownership of the land 
to the benefit of the landed few, most of them still European descendants, and to 
the detriment of the hacienda pawns and of mostly indigenous peasants, the 
revolution proposed, as the other term of a binary opposition, ‘ejidos,’ a form of 
collective land ownership from pre-Columbian times, aimed above all at 
guaranteeing subsistence. Where Diaz had privileged foreign investment for the 
industrialisation of the country, the governments of the revolution would privilege 
domestic investment, in fact mostly government-generated. Where Diaz had 
privileged the tiny circle of those closest to him known as ‘the scientists,’ in that 
all sorts of positive connotations attached to them from their high standing in the 
status quo, the governments of the revolution sought to put the working classes 
and peasants at the heart, for instance turning them into both subjects of high art, 
as their object of representation, and as consumers of it. To the patriarchal 
hierarchies of the times of Diaz, women’s rights were exphcitly defended in the 
Constitution and other laws, and by the mid twentieth century the government 
‘granted from above’ the right of women to vote without any demands being 
made from below. The imagery of the revolution was particularly keen on the 
depiction of ‘Adelitas’ and ‘soldaderas,’ the women who had helped the rebels 
fight the revolution and who would therefore have a (subordinate) subject position 
of their own within the broader national subject position, that would subsume 
their gender identity. Finally, to the capitalist emphasis that Diaz had placed on 
individuality, the inheritors of the revolution opposed an emphasis on the
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community, which they depicted as ‘natural,’ as ‘authentically Mexican,’ while 
the Diaz one appeared as alien, temporary and aberrant/
A detailed description of the process whereby this discourse became 
hegemonic can be found in chapter one. It started with the creation of the Party, 
above all a consensus-making mechanism whose main objective was to ensure the 
unity of the new political class, known as ‘the revolutionary family.’ (Bailey, 
1979: 94) The Party ensured there were no further military challenges to the 
government and effectively became the whole political system. The process 
continued with an ambitious, very large-scale state building in which the regime 
engaged. The welfare state is one of the most successful media to foster loyalty 
and identification with the national community. The Mexican state became very 
large over the twentieth century, and it made a point of providing compulsory and 
free education for all, with the use of freely distributed textbooks, where of course 
the historical narratives attached Diaz to the illegitimacy of foreigners and the 
Conservatives, the most pervasive obstacles that should be surmounted so as to 
realise the national self. Centralised education at the same time ensured a general 
background that would be shared by all Mexicans, regardless of how they chose 
to engage themselves with it at later stages in their lives. The provision of free 
health care through the national health service (IMSS) was also key in fostering a 
sense of community. Almost all other social services, from transport to tourism, 
were provided by the state, which also heavily subsidised some food and the 
provision of water and electricity in Mexico City. (Philip, 1991: 111) It had a 
large bureaucracy who enjoyed even further state-granted privileges. For several 
years it remained broadly open, recruiting from all social layers, seeking to co-opt 
dissent, specially amongst the intelligentsia, and resorting to very selective 
repression. Finally, after the ‘Guerra Cristera’ the political class settled into a 
somewhat distant but symbiotic relationship with the Catholic Church that further 
consolidated the hegemony of discourse, epitomised in the ‘institutionalised 
revolution’ of the Party.
Another less emphasised difference between the Diaz regime and the early revolutionary 
governments is that the former was anti-American and pro-French, while the latter were pro- 
American and anti-French.
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The Cardenas Administration: Land Reform, Art and Nationalisation
But while all of the elements mentioned above were relevant, it was without doubt 
the radical administration by Lazaro Cardenas that turned out to be essential. It 
was the only one which, if briefly, attempted to incarnate the spirit of the 
revolution and it provided a myth that all subsequent administrations would draw 
on in search for legitimacy until the collapse of the Party. The Cardenas 
administration was crucial in at least three ways: in binding the national territory 
to the national subject position by means of the ‘ejido,’ endowed with the 
‘authenticity’ that its indigenous origins conferred; in binding the national subject 
in the community of history and destiny by means of the objectivisation of the 
indigenous past, and the ‘Mexicanisation’ of any living descendents of the Native 
Americans and mestizos by means of the centralised educational system and of 
representations of the government in a powerful, fatherly position that took care 
of its children/people; and finally, in uniting Mexicans across gender and class in 
antagonism with foreign, mostly American and British, owners of the oil industry 
which President Cardenas nationalised.
With regards to the land, during the Cardenas administration, the most 
thorough land reform that the PRl regime would ever undertake was carried out, 
bringing the national land to bear deeply and directly on the national identity. 
After Cârdenas, ‘ejidos’ became a key signifier that any group contending for 
power would have to articulate if it was to produce a persuasive alternative 
discourse. During the Aleman government for instance ‘ejidos’ were re­
interpreted as pieces of land granted to the poor not in order to be owned by the 
community and jointly cultivated for subsistence, but in order to set the basis for 
small-scale private property that would form part of a capitalist market. Before 
Sahnas ended the land reform and allowed ejidos to be sold, a re-interpretation of 
revolutionary hero Emiliano Zapata’s ‘real ideals’ regarding land ownership, was 
offered by historian Krauze, which he posed as being those of the “petit 
bourgeoisie.” (Krauze in Aviles, 1991)
174 See ‘ontopology.’ (Derrida, 1994: 82)
A Post-Structuralist Approach to National Identity After the Cold War: the C ase  of Mexico 2 0 7
The Cardenas nationalisation of the oil industry is perhaps the PRFs most 
lasting legacy to the national identity. Ail nationalistic metaphors, from the 
extended family to the remains of ancestors becoming the very soil that provides 
the population’s subsistence, the soil in whose depths lies the oil that would 
become the basis for the autarkic aspirations of later governments, and of course 
the battle against the foreign enemy were deployed in a way that struck deeply 
into the psychological cord of ‘the nation.’ Rituals were constructed around the 
nationalisation, including the turn of March 18^ into a public holiday. Even 
during the Salinas presidency, when the whole of the PRI discourse was 
systematically challenged and undermined by the President and his team and 
when neoliberalism as a prescriptive interpretative framework on the ownership 
of property was at its highest in Latin America and pressures for privatisation 
strongest, it proved impossible to undo this key, foundational myth. Recent 
attempts by the current government to question how ‘something’ that belongs to 
‘everyone in general’ can have a meaning to the individual people as belonging to 
them in particular have been met with scepticism by a majority.
In short, the discourse based on the revolution as an empty signifier which 
the victorious elite constructed in opposition to Diaz, briefly attempted into 
existence by the unique administration of Cardenas, whose main contribution to 
the stability of the regime was perhaps laying the foundations of the revolutionary 
myth, set up a subject position, through a variety of means including 
representation, that provided a persuasive answer to the question ‘who are we?’ 
the answer ‘we are Mexican.’ Later administrations relied on the symbology of 
the revolution for hegemony.
During the Cold War: Undecidability
Another key contention I have put forward in this work is that, just as the 
revolution was a dislocatory experience for people in Mexico, the First and 
especially the Second World Wars were dislocatory experiences for most of the 
world. The key moment came, I have argued, after the Second World War, when 
the United States came to replace Europe as the world hegemonic power and a 
new discourse on world politics was articulated, a discourse whereby the
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privileged term ‘the West’ came to be opposed to its marked ‘the East,’ setting the 
terms between which the Mexican identity would derive its meaning, as an 
undecidable that would be provisionally ‘decided’ depending on which sets of 
frontiers were relevant at a given time. Just as the revolution had been 
determinant from ‘the inside,’ the position that became available for ‘Mexico’ in 
the broader discourse on world politics, a position within the dominance of ‘the 
West,’ was also determinant from ‘the outside’ as to what meanings the Mexican 
identity could take on.
The opposition between ‘the West’ and ‘the East,’ which naturalised the 
opposition between ‘capitalism’ and ‘communism’ through the displacement of 
economic terms by geographical terms, depended on ‘the West’ successfully 
articulating meanings that became dominant for ‘democracy,’ ‘prosperity’ and 
‘freedom,’ all of which were defined against what was the case in ‘the East.’ 
‘Democracy’ came first because, as the Soviet Union had been an ally during the 
war against the Nazis, it had been bound in a chain of equivalence with the United 
States and others in that chain. Wilson had included the Soviet Union in the 
‘democratic world’ when he proclaimed democracy as an aim of the allies in the 
First World War, and later Stalin declared the Soviet Union had “merged with the 
struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for independence and democratic 
liberty.” (Carr, 1945: 2) With the Nazis gone however ‘democracy’ ceased to 
derive its meaning from its opposition to ‘fascism’ and it was instead defined as 
the opposite of dictatorship, just what was the case in the Soviet Union’s 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’ In this way the Soviet Union, where democracy 
was defined as ‘the government of the people,’ was severed from its former links 
with some of the signifiers that used to define what later came to be ‘the West,’ 
and democracy continues to be a key signifier, even a master signifier in politics 
more generally, whose meaning any group contending for power must 
successfully articulate if it is to become hegemonic.
The second crucial signifier was ‘freedom,’ the other key signifier of the 
Cold War which is currently being resurrected, now against the tyranny of 
‘Islamic Fundamentalism. ’ At that time, freedom was extended from ‘a free 
society’ —that is, a democratic society, not under tyrannical rule— into
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‘economic freedom’ defined in turn, again versus ‘the East,’ as a lack of planning, 
which was construed as ‘artificial,’ as ‘human intervention.’ ‘Freedom’ on the 
contrary was ‘natural,’ even the result of a Darwinian process of evolution that 
had rendered the current state of affairs the best one since it was the one that had 
‘survived.’ A lot of what today is being understood as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ was 
‘freedom’ during the hegemonic period of the Cold War discourse, which lasted 
until the beginning of the 1990s.
Finally, ‘prosperity’ was defined not as merely meeting basic needs — 
food, clothing, shelter and even a few less basic others— with relevant 
satisfactors, as was the result of planned economies of the Soviet style, but as 
producing an excess that removes the very idea of necessity since every demand is 
met, beyond by a matching satisfactor, by a choice of satisfactors. It was claimed 
it would be necessary to go beyond either the Hegelian or the materialist-based 
Marxian syntheses and deal with a Bataillean excess to theorise production —or 
rather, consumption— under capitalism, so to speak. Democracy itself came to be 
bound into the chain of prosperity, since for there to be democracy in the Western 
narrative there had to be contending Parties, unlike the elections that took place 
under single Party regimes that depended on the Soviet Union and in the Soviet 
Union itself. The mere existence of more than one Party was presumed to imply 
choice. When the Cold War discourse ceased to be hegemonic, a lot of the former 
‘abundance’ began to be constructed as ‘excess’ and ‘waste’ and the human 
entitlement to limitless use of material resources was replaced by a concern for 
the environment and ‘sustainable development.’
The simultaneous deployment of all these positive meanings thus 
constructed ‘the West’ as the opposite of ‘the East,’ and this opposition also had 
the advantage that it allowed for the projection of the fundamental lack at the 
heart of every social arrangement, the void around which all discourses are 
constructed, upon ‘the Other.’ This is why I have argued that the disappearance of 
the Soviet Union was just as devastating for ‘the West,’ which was so imbricate in 
its Other, in that it was that which provided its very conditions for existence, that 
it also ceased to exist in the way it had existed during the Cold War. Just what 
‘the West’ was outside of the Cold War narrative was open to re-interpretation.
Conclusions 2 1 0
that is, contending narratives began to attempt to appropriate the meaning of ‘the 
West’ by re-grafting it into alternative discourses. What it means now depends on 
in opposition to what it stands in a particular discourse, such as ‘the clash of 
civilisations,’ ‘the end of history,’ ‘globalisation as westernisation’ etc.^ ^  ^ I have 
contended that this became evident not only in the fast-widening rift between the 
United States and Western Europe, but also in the democratic crises faced by 
almost all established democracies, in their failure to engage the young, in the rise 
of the far right, in the growing apathy and disregard towards a set of values that 
no longer appear as valuable since they are not to be fought for but actually 
inevitable. All this may of course change as soon as any one of the contending 
discourses or a newly emerging one becomes as hegemonic as the Cold War was 
during the latter part of the twentieth century.
Within the discourse of the Cold War sketched above and more fully 
developed under chapter one of this thesis, I have claimed that the subject position 
that became available for Mexico was, by geographic necessity and by the cultural 
and ethnic heritage as articulated by the discourse of the revolution, bound to be 
within the influence of the West. But because of the nature of the regime that 
ensued the revolution, because socialism was perceived as a sound alternative for 
quick development that allowed the elite the control of the country and because 
the East was the Americans’ most important Other, Mexico could also be grafted 
into a chain of equivalence with ‘the East.’ The strength of the regime, as I have 
explained, lay in its resistance to decide the identity either way, keeping both sets 
of boundaries simultaneously and becoming ‘the Other’ every time as became 
necessary. Macro statistics that portray Mexico as ‘the World’s tenth largest 
economy,’ the gross national product, the fast industrialisation period of the 
‘Mexican miracle,’ the oil boom, etc. constructed a Western Mexico, that is, a 
Mexico that shared in the meanings of ‘West’ outlined above. But the — 
effectively— one Party regime, the deeply unequal distribution of wealth, the 
external debt, etc. also constructed Mexico as sharing into the meanings of ‘the
‘The West’ means ‘development,’ ‘post-industrialisation’ and ‘secularism’ when opposed to 
‘the Rest,’ but this dichotomy is not as effective as the ‘East/West’ dichotomy because, as 
mentioned before, the stronger an opposition, the deeper the contrast it generates and thus the 
more meaningfulness for the identities in the positions thus crafted.
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East,’ as a threat that must be contained. The disappearance of ‘the East’ not only 
‘forced’ the identity to be ‘decided,’ by default but also ‘drained’ all meaning out 
of the best part of the revolutionary narrative that had until then seemed so 
compelling.
After the Cold War: the External Challenge
There is broad agreement that it is as of then that the meaning of the Mexican 
national identity began to be questioned. Whether inferred from the traditional 
cultural markers employed by nationalist discourses as explained earlier, namely 
language, religion and ethnicity, or whether inferred from varying patterns of 
cultural consumption, it became common sense to observe changes in the identity. 
Although still dominant, Catholicism was said to be in decline while 
Protestantism and secularism were taking over. Private schools began to teach 
English to children from a very early age and knowledge of the language became 
indispensable in an important sector of the labour market. Indigenous minorities 
came forward with demands for autonomy and put the homogeneity of the ethnic 
status of the nation into question. They also demanded recognition to their culture 
which they claimed as their own and not as Mexican and this included their 
languages. Also because of large-scale migration, mostly to the United States, 
about a fifth of the population resided beyond the territorial boundaries of the 
nation and put them under strain. The close links emigrants maintained with 
their families and the way they involved themselves in the political and economic 
lives of their communities of origin made them oddly ever-present in their 
absence, unsettling the articulation between the national territory and the nation. 
Furthermore, the proverbial proliferation of fast-food restaurants, video outlets 
and multiplex cinemas also made its appearance. All aspects of popular culture, 
from music to the dress codes, were said to match the trends of, depending on 
whose contention it is, ‘Americanisation,’ ‘modernisation’ or ‘Westernisation,’ 
especially among the middle and upper classes. In any case, whether celebrating a 
purported newly hybrid —and more ‘advanced’— globalised Mexican identity, or
This was exacerbated by the contiguity of the land occupied by this diaspora, and the 
historical relationship to it.
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bemoaning the ‘dilution’ of the national essence in the powerful solvent of the 
cardboard empire of consumption, from almost all quarters of society ‘we are 
Mexican’ did not really seem to answer the question ‘who are we?’ that well 
anymore. While some of the claims made about the identity do not stand up to 
close scrutiny as demonstrated in this thesis, for instance claims about the 
overwhelming rise of Protestantism and secularism, it nonetheless began to be 
unclear who ‘we’ were.
Traditional Accounts
Traditional accounts explain these transformations allowing for a role for the 
disappearance of the Soviet Union in different ways. From the Marxist 
perspective, this would be due to the spread of capitalism worldwide that followed 
the Soviet collapse, to its imperial stage as described by Lenin. Other accounts 
which also give a priority to economic variables over political variables but which 
regard the Liberal world order as benign do not cast it as an empire, and credit 
those who led the change with choosing sets of policies that would benefit their 
countries and the world economy as a whole. On the other hand, accounts that 
leave a large margin for agency in the hands of individuals resort to the particular 
background of the technocrat elite in Mexico, all of whom held doctorates in 
economics and/or administration from key American universities, had extensive 
contacts with their American counterparts and indeed could more accurately be 
described as belonging to a new cosmopolitan class of international neoliberal 
elites. These accounts also hold that elites in America too were particularly 
inclined towards Mexico, drawing attention to the close friendship between 
Salinas, Zedillo and their circle and the Bush family and Clinton. (Bertrab, 1997: 
79; Russell, 1994: 331) Many of those who were Mexican immigrants had 
become increasingly enfranchised American citizens, gaining relevance as a 
general ‘Hispanic vote’ and climbing into positions of power in the US.
The Discursive Account
While I do not dispute that the transformation of the national identity can to some 
extent be explained by these traditional accounts, I have in this work put forward
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an alternative account, an account that relies on the discursive construction of a 
subject position for ‘Mexico’ that attempted to articulate it together into a chain of 
equivalence with ‘the United States’ in a relationship of supplementarity. This 
subject position was partly crafted by a younger generation of the former PRI 
elite, who redefined the boundaries of the political class to exclude most of the 
traditional Party membership but to include several of the Conservatives, partly 
crafted by a section of the American elites likely to benefit from energy-related 
natural resources, labour power and enlarged market size; but it was also crafted 
by the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union amounted to a dislocation in the 
discourse on world poUtics, a dislocation that put an end to the Cold War and 
allowed for a redefinition of all identities if subjects were to be interpellated 
persuasively. In particular, theories of international relations that regarded 
regionalism in the form of competitive trading regions as an alternative to the 
global order, fashionable in the 1990s and especially so in the United States, 
provided an ideal subject position for Mexico as a supplement in a broader albeit 
brief discourse of post-Cold War world politics. The account that I have put 
forward thus both considers all factors identified as relevant by other accounts, 
but goes beyond, taking into consideration the role of ideology as well as that of 
the economic structure and individual agency, and crucially because, if my 
argument is right, it can also explain why nationalism apparently suddenly 
became the root of renewed and even bloody conflict in various regions of the 
world at around this particular time, when boundaries were being re-defmed and 
the pressing question of identity was brought to the forefront. Even in regions 
where it did not manifest itself exactly under the guise of nationalism, conflict 
raised by the collapse of discursive boundaries of belonging gave way to the rise 
of the far right and to the démonisation of ‘asylum seekers,’ ‘refugees’ and even 
‘economic migrants.
The Supplement
More recently, it has been said of Iraq that “the ambitious attempts at re-ordering 
international politics under globahsation promoted by the Bush doctrine may be curtailed by a 
force with its roots deep in international history: Third World Nationalism.” (Dodge, 2004: 5)
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The process whereby it was attempted to make of ‘Mexico’ a discursive 
‘supplement’ to the United States was framed within the North American Free 
Trade Agreement and all the social and economic reorganisation it entailed. Long 
the unmarked term, ‘America’ has for several years meant in English ‘the United 
States.’ To refer to any of the other nations one must qualify ‘America’: ‘Latin’ or 
‘Hispanic.’ For ‘Mexico’ however, a ‘North’ American status arising from 
geography was brought to bear into the politics of NAFTA. And while earlier 
narratives had stressed divergence from the United States, administrations from 
Salinas onwards have been stressing convergence instead. Apart from the re­
composition of the political elite, history books were re-written and blame was re­
apportioned. Among the long-enduring grievances, the northern territories lost in 
1847 were not lost due the American invasion but to the disunity of Mexicans. 
The Diaz regime and his outward-looking, modernising approach were thoroughly 
vindicated, even by means of soap operas.^^  ^ Academia constructed ‘North 
America’ as an object of study that included Mexico through the creation of 
research centres and the funding of research projects dealing with Canada, the 
United States and Mexico. Education was de-centralised and largely privatised 
and most of the welfare state dismantled.
Most of the narratives of convergence were woven around the issues 
which constituted the bilateral agenda, namely drug trafficking, migration and 
Mexico’s external debt. These issues were recast in terms not of antagonism as 
had been done during the heydays of the PRI but of —unequal but positive— 
partnership. Apart from extensive lobbying and the professional help of marketing 
campaigns that cast the image of the President and the country in very favourable 
terms, representations in the media also changed in content and scope. According 
to recent research on the American media, they use the experience of trauma or 
fascination, such as the hostage situation in Iran or the spread of glasnost in the 
Soviet Union, to create analytical imageries that are later applied to other 
international phenomena, sometimes wholly unrelated. The ‘Iran syndrome’ had
178 Nonetheless, an attempt to have a specially-commissioned statue of Diaz installed in the state 
of Veracruz, whence the ship that had carried him into exile departed, instead of the existing 
monument to the memory of the sailors who defended the port against an American invasion in 
1914, failed. (Taibo, 2002) Since monuments, as institutions, can be regarded as ‘solidified’ 
discourses, it is clear the elite now in power is still strugghng to become truly hegemonic.
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been applied to Mexico during the Lopez Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid years. 
The country had been constructed as growing increasingly uncontrollable and on 
the verge of collapse. The Salinas administration however was perceived as an 
instance of Mexican glasnost. (Capetillo, 2002) But important as they were, 
representations in academia and the press, read mostly by the ehtes, were of 
secondary importance when compared to the broad reach of the representations of 
the visual-media, such as cinema, discussed in chapter five and summarised 
below.
Internal Challenges to the Discourse
The Challenge of Indigenous Minorities
Just as some of the Mexican and American elites were, with the help of the media, 
succeeding in integrating Mexico to the United States by crafting a supplementary 
subject-position for Mexico, a movement which began as an Indian uprising in the 
south-eastern state of Chiapas and which grew to become a powerful force for 
peaceful social change contested the versions that Mexico was quite the country 
its leaders were seeking to portray or indeed that becoming such a country was at 
all desirable, for modernising implied a renunciation: we must renounce that 
which we are in order to become something else. In other words, seeking 
modernity takes us closer to death. A quest for the national ‘authenticity,’ on the 
contrary, defers the moment to stop being. It is true that an identity, in order to be 
recognisable as such, must be ‘repeatable’ into a variety of contexts and that each 
new repetition —or more accurately, iteration— will endow it with new meanings 
through connotation, thus tradition is “not a tradition that remains the same, but a 
complex combination of continuities and breaks, similarities and differences: 
what Gilroy calls a conception of tradition as ‘the changing same.’” (Hall, 1995: 
208) What I am arguing however is that those discourses which appeal to those 
necessary changes the identity needs to undergo every time it is performed in 
order to ‘remain the same’ through ‘a return to the origin’ or ‘authenticity’ are 
bound to be from the nationalist point of view more effective than those
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discourses which appeal to changes through ‘modernisation’ since they seemingly 
endeavour to project identities into the future and thus, in a linear fashion, closer 
to the end. This is, indeed, one reason nationalist discourses can be so persuasive: 
they appear to convey a transcendental identity more effectively than other similar 
discourses.
Therefore, the Zapatista appeal was a very convincing one. Through the 
specific demands of indigenous populations, the Zapatistas emerged as a group 
contending for power, attempting to legitimise and update the discourse of the 
revolution, starting with iconic revolutionary hero Emiliano Zapata’s demands for 
land and freedom, in order to re-appropriate them as their own. Working by 
means of chains of equivalence and differentiation, Zapatistas further extended 
the claims of ‘indigenous peoples’ to become those of ‘women,’ ‘the 
disenfranchised,’ and finally ‘the poor,’ thus bringing what had started as a 
‘minority’ to represent ‘the majority.’ Likewise, ‘the government’ was equated 
with ‘globalisation,’ with ‘the United States,’ and thus with ‘foreigners.’ The 
Zapatistas stood for ‘our traditions’ and thus were ‘authentic,’ whereas the 
government’s modernising project appeared by comparison as ‘fake.’ Traditional 
accounts of the Zapatista rebellion point out that, if the Salinas team had managed 
the media effectively, Zapatista leader ‘subcomandante Marcos’ proved to be an 
even more effective conununicator, deploying in the favour of his cause most of 
the liberal public opinion around the world. Pro-Zapatista overseas committees 
included supporting groups in Barcelona, Berlin, Toulouse and London among 
others. (Leyva, 1998: 48) In a few years Zapatistas were able to mount a serious 
challenge both to any remaining local power of the PRI and to the emerging 
Conservative project that still seeks to carry forward the neoliberal discourse 
despite the hostile context in which it must now bid for credibility.
I have argued however that the methodological framework I have applied 
to the subject of this research allows further insight into the way the Zapatistas 
emerged as contenders for power, and into the way that Marcos acquired a 
socially-privileged position from which to address ‘the people’ with a narrative 
very similar to the one the PRI had employed but rendering it far more credible 
and thus restoring its appeal. I have contended in this work that what seems as the
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sudden appearance of indigenous populations, who decided to come forward with 
their demands for social justice just as Salinas would have Mexico cross the First 
World threshold, can be understood as the result of the collapse of the ‘ethnic’ 
boundaries set by the Cardenas nationahst discourse which had assigned to 
‘Indians’ the role of ancestors and to what now appear as ‘Indians’ the role of 
poor Mexican peasants, who happened to be as Mexican as any mestizo or creole, 
only living in —rural— poverty. A person who, for a period of sixty or seventy 
years during which the discourse of the PRI was the main cultural framework by 
which the population made sense of their social reality, was constructed as ‘a poor 
peasant’ began upon the collapse of this discourse to be constructed as ‘an Indian’ 
i ns t ead .Thi s  person’s ‘objective features’ did not change but it is possible to 
infer where power lies from whether they are ‘selected’ as relevant and in what 
way for the entitlement of the person to membership of the group. I have 
discussed this matter at some length within the main body of the thesis, 
addressing membership through language as well.
The Challenge of Chicanes
I have argued too that the dislocation of the discourse of the PRI was also evident 
in the collapse of the ethnic boundaries of the nation not just in the form of 
Indigenous minorities —which incidentally also posed a territorial challenge, with 
their early claims for autonomy— but also in the form of Chicanos, American 
citizens of Mexican ancestry, who were seen as ‘neither Mexican nor American’ 
and thus thoroughly despised and rejected. But for a discourse that was trying to 
create a supplementary subject position for Mexico, Chicanos offered new 
possibilities for the representation of the national identity. There is a vast 
literature on Mexican legal and illegal migration to the United States, but for the 
purposes of this thesis, I have argued that it can be broadly classified, along with 
other non-academic discourses from the media, as constructing two opposing 
interpretations of the phenomenon.
Furthermore, no distinctions are made between Chamulas, Lacandones, Mixtecos etc. at this 
level of the discourse. ‘They’ all appear as simply ‘Indian.’
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The first one constructs illegal immigration as a crime perpetrated against 
the government and the citizens of the United States. Illegal immigrants violate 
the law. They are the direct cause of unemployment for Americans. They also 
consume the money of American tax payers in the form of state benefits. They 
tend to be uneducated and their way of life forces them into gangs and other 
criminal activity. Finally, perhaps because of the contiguity of their motherland 
and the continuous influx of new immigrants Mexican migrants do not really 
assimilate in the way other immigrants do over generations. Furthermore, they 
tend to settle almost exclusively in the southwest and their rate of reproduction is 
five times higher than that of the whites so they pose a serious challenge to the 
American nation.
The second type of narrative constructs Mexican illegal migration into the 
United States as the necessary and welcome outcome of globalisation where 
demand for cheap labour is met with the offer required. Illegal inunigrants are not 
criminals, but merely young, hard working, entrepreneurial people. They are often 
afraid of being caught and this deters them from applying for benefits. They end 
up contributing more to the economy than they get from it. While most 
immigrants may have been unskilled in the past, recent waves of immigration 
consist of skilled workers with more opportunities for upward social mobility who 
are further aided by established networks of employers and kin. Finally, although 
they may keep their culture they partake in the American dream and thus pose no 
threat. America should rid itself of bigotry and celebrate its multicultural society 
instead.
I have demonstrated that while of these two accounts the former was for a 
long time held in the United States and the latter one in Mexico, during the 1990s 
the second one tended, over all, to be the one subscribed to by epistemic 
conununities in both countries. While this may no longer be the case the Chicano 
population and the Chicano movement have certainly grown to become a political 
force that both the Mexican and the American political estabhshments, especially 
in the southwest, must engage with if their respective discourses are to succeed. 
But the Mexican government too has funded projects for the production of 
Chicano culture and opened up spaces for its circulation. ‘Chicanos’ are for the
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‘nationalist’ Conservative project what ‘Indians’ were to the Cardenas progressive 
one: a way to lay down an ethnic boundary for ‘the nation,’ in this case through 
the policies that remove the territorial requirement for the granting of the 
nationality and allowed the dual nationality, and which have integrated 
‘inunigrant’ representatives into local congresses. The dominant criteria on which 
the need of a Congressman/woman is now assessed is geographical: every state is 
entitled to two senators, regardless its size or population. Allowing for two 
Congressmen for ‘immigrants’ in the local Congress of Zacatecas thus seems to 
put the American States where Mexican-Americans inhabit on a par with a 
Mexican territory.
In short, when the ‘revolutionary’ nationalist discourse began to collapse, 
both the ethnic and the territorial boundaries of the nation it had established were 
challenged. Both ‘Indians’ and ‘Chicanos’ are forcing the question ‘who is this 
‘we’ in Mexico.’ And if ‘Indians’ posed a threat to the territorial boundaries when 
they demanded autonomy in the lands of the Mexican southeast, Chicanos posed 
it by rendering the border to the north fuzzy and u n c l e a r . A  fussy border is a 
problematic border, since the play of difference on which identities depend is 
more difficult to perceive.
The Challenge to and From Religion
As mentioned above, one of the points that most traditional accounts of the 
transformation of the national identity point to is the decline of Catholicism, 
supposedly to the benefit of Protestantism and secularism. There are two different 
aspects under discussion with regards to the role of religion as a ‘cultural marker’ 
of the national identity. On the one hand, there is the issue of the Church as a 
hegemonic group, a distinct group within the ruling elite seeking to interpellate 
‘the people’ as ‘the (Mexican) faithful.’ On the other hand is the narrative they 
use itself: not just the Christian set of beliefs, but also the peculiar way in which 
they are embodied by the syncretism which makes this Catholicism Mexican. I 
have demonstrated in this work that there are now two competing narratives
180 While these demands have not been dropped, the definition of ‘autonomy’ has since been
changed.
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regarding these two issues. Both of them deploy ‘hard evidence’ and ‘facts’ in the 
form of statistics as necessary to the role they seek to portray ‘the Church’ in: 
either as still crucial to the identity or as becoming increasingly irrelevant.
I have argued here that, perhaps because many of the creole ehtes 
identified by Anderson as the original architects of the Latin American nations 
were, in the case of Mexico, priests themselves, the Church has since been at the 
heart of the pohtical elites, supporting the Conservatives. After a protracted war 
even the secular Liberal elites realised that the symbols of the Catholic Church 
conveyed a Mexican identity in a clear and unique way and would enhance the 
revolutionary nationalism discourse. The Virgin of Guadalupe, in whom goddess 
‘Tonantzin’ (meaning ‘our mother’) is fused, is constructed as ‘the mother of 
Mexicans,’ and if the government had put itself metaphorically into the fatherly 
position, the Church was also metaphorically in the motherly position, providing 
above all consolation for the suffering and hope in a way associated with feminine 
quahties. The government took instead the male qualities as a provider —through 
the welfare state. Together they both set the boundaries of the extended Mexican 
family. I have also argued that it is misleading to conceive of ‘the Catholic 
Church’ as a solid group that remained wholly determined and unified while the 
hegemony of the PRI collapsed. What happened instead was that, just as the 
Salinas team redrew the boundaries of the political elite to include some of the 
Conservatives —regardless the Party— and exclude most of the traditional PRI, 
so too was some of ‘the Church’ included and excluded. The upper hierarchy 
sided with the new government, already the conservative, neoliberal elite even if 
retaining the name of the PRI, while many among the lower clergy joined the 
Zapatista group that emerged as a challenger. Their respective narratives of the 
nation reflect the different ways in which they seek to appropriate its meaning: by 
equating it with ‘the people’ in the case of liberation theologians, and by equating 
it to the interests of the ruling elite in the case of the factions at the far right.
I have also argued that the apparent benefits the Church derived from 
having an openly pro-Catholic government in office for the first time since the 
revolution, despite the substantial changes made to legislation and the further 
privileges the Church was granted, actually worked against it. This can be
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explained by the fact, mentioned once and again in these conclusions, that since 
identity arises as the result of a play of difference, the more a difference is 
perceived, the more compelling its narrative will become for those who choose to 
put themselves in the position of its subjects. Thus if there is a difference 
perceived between ‘the government’ against whom there are so many grievances, 
and ‘the Church’ that is threatened and even attacked by it, the Church is bound to 
appear as legitimate and as a nodal point on which to weave other identities that 
also oppose ‘the government.’ But if they are perceived as bound in a chain of 
equivalence, claims that seek to be redressed would also be somehow directed 
against the Church. This is perhaps one of the reasons that recent surveys seem to 
point constantly to a discrepancy between the ‘hard line’ expressed by the Church 
and the actual opinions and behaviour of most Mexican ‘Catholics.’ This would 
also partly explain the sympathy and support conunanded by former Bishop of 
San Cristobal, Samuel Ruiz, who also relied on what Laclau has termed ‘a 
populist mode of articulation’ on the discourse being put forward by the 
Zapatistas. In the light of this, it can now be contended that Mexican Catholicism 
can be identified as a ‘trace,’ as that which, although changed, remains 
identifiable every time the identity is performed —discursively re-grafted— 
within a new context for a period of time. There is bound to be some Catholic 
signifier or other in any narrative construction of the national identity put forward 
by elites if they are to succeed, to be identified as ‘Mexican.’
Representations on Film
For reasons explained at some length in the introduction, having to do with the 
suitability of cinema for the analysis of national identity, to the widespread 
circulation of the representations it puts forward and the nature of the cinematic 
viewing experience, particularly propitious for discursive interpellation, films 
constituted the empirical evidence for analysis to test the hypotheses in this
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thesis/^^ There is a section on films at the end of chapter two, where the 
undecidability of the identity that I argued was the case during the Cold War is 
evidenced in the way Mexicans were portrayed by Hollywood throughout most of 
the twentieth century. While most of the time they appeared in genres of 
‘contested space’ that celebrate order and the rule of law versus anarchy, starring 
as bandits, greasers, illegal immigrants and drug dealers, there were exceptions to 
this that matched the position Mexico took in the prevailing discourse. (Schatz in 
Abrams, 2001: 181) One such period was the time around and during the Second 
World War, when Latin America was nearly the only foreign market for 
Hollywood films and a ‘good neighbour’ policy was officially implemented. 
Later, as Fascism began to rise in Germany, Italy and Japan, Hollywood’s close 
co-operation with the CIA and the State Department meant that ‘Others’ against 
whom the national identity would be defined would become Nazis rather than 
Mexicans or Indians, depicted in a variety of war films and film noir, and 
projected into paranoid fantasies of persecution in science fiction. As soon as 
Nazis were defeated, spy films were added to the stock of genres and Communists 
took their place. After this long absence Mexican characters returned to 
Hollywood films during the 1980s, when they stood for an ethnic threat to the 
American culture in the form of illegal ahens, drug traffickers and criminals of all 
sorts.
In the 1990s however it has been argued that representations became 
‘more generous,’ and this is the topic developed in the first section of chapter five, 
‘the challenge on film.’ (Wood, 2002) Here I propose a threefold explanation for 
the change, which matches the construction of Mexico as a supplement in other 
discursive arenas, such as academia and the news. The first reason for the change 
would be the rise of the Hispanic ‘minority’ in the US, which has become an 
important market in its own right, whose tastes must be catered for if films are to 
be successful in this niche. Apart from their role as consumers, Mexican 
Americans in the US have now become producers of culture with the capability
The debate on what counts as national cinema is beyond the scope of this work since the 
main focus is on representations of the identity both in Hollywood and in the Mexican 
production. For theories on national cinema(s) however see Crofts, 2002: 25-51 and Higson, 
2002: 52-67.
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and willingness to reach beyond the marginalised position of earlier days and into 
the mainstream. Examples of this are the work of directors Robert Rodriguez {El 
Mariachi: 1992; Desperado: 1995; Once Upon a Time in Mexico: 2003), Gregory 
Nava {Selena: 1997; My Family: 1991), Luis Valdes {La Bomba: 1987) and 
others, as well as actor and activist Edward James Olmos {Stand and Deliver^ 
Menéndez: 2000), and actress Elpidia Carrillo. A second explanation is the work 
of Mexican directors working in Hollywood, notably Alfonso Cuaron, who along 
with films such as Harry Potter and Great Expectations has made films on 
Mexico such as Solo con tu Pareja (1991), analysed in this thesis, and Y tu Marna 
También (2001), or Alfonso Arau’s Like Water for Chocolate (1994). Finally, 
American directors too have recently made films broadly along the same ‘more 
generous’ lines, such Frida (Taymore: 2002) and Traffic (Sodenbergh: 2000), 
discussed here.
Traffic was chosen because it deals directly with one of the key issues in 
the bilateral relation, namely that of drug trafficking. Instead of all drugs, 
corruption and all evil coming from Mexico and suffered by the United States as 
used to be almost always the rule, in Traffic there is an honest policeman that 
proves key for the Americans to bring about the positive outcome. While critics 
have made the point that exceptions are there to confirm the rule, what is 
interesting for the purpose of this thesis is the fact that what makes this policeman 
a good character is precisely his mode of engagement with the Americans, not as 
an antagonist, but as a supplement. He is just one man being ‘added’ to the mighty 
machinery of the DEA and the American judicial system. But he proves to be an 
important addition, an addition after which those fighting drug trafficking ‘on 
both sides of the border’ seem to be just one more powerful team.^^  ^ Also 
discussed in this thesis is British director Ken Loach’s Bread and Roses (2000) 
because, although not exactly a Hollywood product in many respects, it does 
contribute to the re-writing of former ‘problems’ as instances of ‘opportunities’ 
and ‘partnership,’ here as regards the second key issue in the bilateral agenda, that 
of migration. In Bread and Roses the problem to be solved is the exploitation
Apart from Sex, Lies and Videotape (1989), it was Traffic that made the reputation for Steven 
Sodenbergh, put Catherine Z. Jones in a Mexican role for the second time after The Mask of 
Zorro (Campbell, 1998) and won ‘Latino’ actor Benicio del Toro an Academy Award.
Conclusions 2 2 4
suffered by illegal immigrants who face unfair working conditions in the United 
States, with a specific focus on women. It is resolved through the organisation of 
a union and a series of strikes. By the end of the film, Mexican and Central 
American janitors have obtained their rise and somehow they have also obtained 
the possibility to gain access to the American dream, which they help to make 
happen for white Americans. Migration here comes across as a symbiotic relation.
Inasmuch as genres depict shared expectations and tell of what is 
culturally permissible in society, docudramas during the 1990s made it possible to 
think of Mexico as supplementary to the United States.
As for Mexico, cinema has been since its invention instrumental to the 
construction of the national identity. For several years there was a buoyant film 
industry whose audience grew in size and importance as the country became 
increasingly urbanised. Producing well over a hundred films a year in its heyday, 
the film industry generated a number of representations of the country and the 
identity and a shared general cultural background. In fact, part of its initial success 
has been attributed to its producing representations that coincided with 
expectations of ‘Mexicannes’ abroad. (Lopez, 2000: 427) Indeed, directors such 
as Fernando de Fuentes and Emilio Fernandez could be said to have put on 
celluloid the very representations that Rivera, Orozco and Siqueiros so famously 
put on their murals, available for a far wider audience. After a very successful and 
productive period —incidentally known as ‘the Golden Age’— which lasted from 
the late 1930s to the early 1950s, the film industry began to decline.
It is really throughout the 1990s and early 2000s that Mexican films 
portraying the type of ‘cosmopolitan Mexicanity’ that suited the discourse of the 
supplement then being crafted began to be produced and distributed. These films 
were mainly of two types: first of all, there was a series of erotic comedies 
depicting Mexico as a developed, industrialised and secular country, pretty much 
as any country in ‘the West,’ while on the other hand there was a series of films 
seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the PRI and to question the meaning for 
the identity that the regime had constructed. These films were made, distributed 
and shown amidst the almost total collapse of the national industry that followed 
the signing of NAFTA, where films were negotiated as industrial as opposed to
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cultural products and thus remained unprotected. Only ten films were made at the 
worst point in 1998. Most cinemas closed down and were replaced by multiplexes 
in the more affluent neighbourhoods. Attendance fell from 302 million tickets 
sold per year on average during the late 1980s to only 62 million in 1995. 
(Mantecôn, 2001) The price-liberation that took place meant the audience became 
skewed, with the upper middle classes being over-represented. Thus cinematic 
representations of the national identity during this period matched efforts being 
made in other areas of the cultural field to re-present the identity in new ways, in 
this case to people likely to embrace such representations. The only positive 
outcome of NAFTA on the film industry was the fact that some of the very few 
films made now had access to large distributing corporations, mainly Twentieth 
Century Fox and Columbia. This has meant that these few films are having a 
broader reach. Cinema attendance has since the mid 1990s begun to recover. In 
some cases, such as the films analysed here, Mexican films have been more 
successful domestically than the competing Hollywood blockbusters, remaining 
on screen for longer and attracting more viewers.
In this work I have dealt both with the erotic comedies of the 1990s, 
explaining how they sought to portray Mexico as a member of the post Cold War 
West, and with films that sought to undermine the regime of the PRI, questioning 
issues relating to the national identity. The comedies were analysed together since 
it is as a group that they make sense, while films in the latter category were 
analysed separately.
Consisting of urban stories of violence and betrayal between ‘brother 
against brother,’ centred around a car-crash and the consequences that follow. 
Amoves Perros was analysed with regards to the metaphor of the nation as an 
extended family and the very violent crash between the upper classes and ‘the 
underdog,’ since the class struggle naturally strains the national narrative. The 
film presents very vividly the contrast between the elite of ‘modernisers’ that 
emerged from triumphant neoliberalism, and the asphyxiating lack of options and 
opportunities for the growing poor, their different takes on ‘Mexico’ and on how 
to go about with their everyday lives in their respective circumstances. Only the 
(Zapatista) guerrilla, depicted in the form of an outcast who is in a sense above
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the conflict, is vindicated in the film. When hit man ‘El Chivo’ spares ‘el Negro,’ 
the fighting dog that has killed all his beloved dogs, saying it is not responsible 
for these deaths, but that it was taught to behave in that ruthless way, it is as if 
ironically the guerrilla knows that it is only understanding —and possibly 
forgiveness— and not further violence that can stop the cycle.
So far the best-selling Mexican film in history. The Crime o f Father 
Amaro was here analysed with regards to the narrative put forward on the links 
between religion and national identity and the role of the Church within the ruling 
elite, not only through the film itself, but also through the debate it sparked on the 
media and the actions it spawned from activists in civil organisations on the far 
right. I have argued that although the film was sold as a ‘devastating attack on the 
Catholic Church’ only shown by the Conservative government of ostensibly 
Catholic Vicente Fox as proof of the openness of his administration and also as 
proof of the degree of démocratisation and tolerance achieved by the Mexican 
civil society, the film is actually polysémie and invites viewers to engage with it 
in very different ways, likely to vary according to age and gender. Inasmuch as it 
is critical to the Church it is mostly so in order to exonerate it. Most importantly, 
Catholicism is on this film presented as bound up with ‘Mexicanity,’ since the 
story takes place in a rural rather than an urban setting, and on its bid for 
authenticity and credibility the film relies on the constant depiction of ‘traditions,’ 
thus linking ‘real Mexico’ and the Catholic religion.^^  ^ However, it is the 
Liberation Theologians that the film is most sympathetic to.
Finally, Amaro's ‘twin film’ Herod's Law was also analysed, since it uses 
exactly the same formula, although in a different genre, to mount an attack on the 
Mexican political system, especially on the PRI, but also dismissing the PAN as 
mild, ineffective and ultimately hypocritical opposition and the Church as cynical 
and manipulative. Only the private sector fares well on this film as on all of the 
others, depicted as honest and hard working, indeed as beyond corruption. Unlike 
Amaro however this film is not really open to negotiating interpretation: ‘the 
system’ is to blame and it is beyond repair. ‘We’ can and must continue to be 
‘Mexican’ but the PRI does not at all equal ‘the nation.’ This film also attempts to
183 Although not necessarily approvingly.
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sever the still mythical administration of Lazaro Cardenas from the PRI, perhaps 
for the appropriation of forthcoming ‘true inheritors of the revolution.’
On balance, it is thus fair to conclude that although cinematic 
representations of the national identity during the 1990s were crafting a subject 
position for ‘Mexicans’ as not antagonistic but supplementary to ‘Americans,’ 
representations since 2000 indicate that this subject position was not effectively 
articulated into a persuasive discourse and is being rejected by a sizeable group of 
the population. Both those films analysed for this work and many others recently 
produced seem instead to endorse the narrative being put forward by the 
Zapatistas. Cosmopolitan high-rise apartment dwellers of the new Millennium and 
their romantic lives are being replaced by ‘guerrillas,’ peasants, ‘Indians,’ 
students, working class young men and women, etc. and all sorts of ‘authentic’ 
characters appear in leading, positive roles while ‘traditions’ feature in plots. 
These narratives seem to resonate with the public judging from responses in the 
box office and the criticism they receive. Particularly significant has been the role 
of women directors.
I would argue that this failure is owed mainly to two reasons: one, that 
since it is difference rather than similarity that produces meaning, and since it is 
the setting of boundaries rather than their removal what actually generates 
subjectivity, it was not enough to engage in discourses of ‘convergence’ as long 
as there was not an external boundary that really put Mexico within North 
America. The second reason is that, just as the Mexican national identity was 
dislocated as a result of the dislocation of the discourse that sustained it, so was 
the case too with the American identity, as I argued above with regards to the 
meaning of ‘the West.’^^"^ Even as they were trying to identify with it, 
representations in Mexico continued to reify American Otherness as it was 
constructed during the times of the PRI, when other discourses were hegemonic 
both inside Mexico and abroad. Moreover, other sets of oppositions seem to be at
Indeed, research on representations of the American identity in cinema during the 1990s 
found that national identity emerged “as a central topic of debate in the United States” and the 
American past became “a contested domain” evident in the release of, among others. Glory 
(Zwick: 1992), JFK (Stone: 1991), Malcolm X (Lee: 1992) and Forrest Gump (Zemeckiz: 
1994). (Burgoyne, 1997: 1)
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work on the discourse on world politics since September 11* 2001, bringing their 
own sets of boundaries.
Concluding Remarks
During the 1990s nationalism, whose demise had long been predicted, re-emerged 
as the source of renewed and entrenched international conflict, and even in many 
instances when it did not lead to conflict, questions on the meaning of the national 
identity began to surface. In Mexico, where the regime that had been in place for 
the best part of the twentieth century had relied on nationalism to remain in 
power, these questions became very pressing.
Recently, globalisation has been the backdrop against which debates on 
the transformation of national identities have taken place. That is, these 
transformations are assumed to be occurring and they are assumed to be the 
product of ‘globalisation,’ cast either as “the growing shared awareness of the 
world as a single place” associated with ‘postmodemity’ or ‘late modernity,’ 
which is in turn said to increasingly tear “space away from place by fostering 
relations between absent Others,” or as “effects of deterritorialised capitalism and 
neo-Fordism on global cultural flows.” (Lechner and Boli, 2000: xvii; Giddens, 
1990: 18; Staiger: 2002, 237) Transformations are generally not d i spu t ed .But  
while those at one end of the debate regard globalisation as a natural outcome of 
the evolution of science and technology and celebrate the transformations as ways 
to renew the identity without threatening it, as an ongoing process of hybridisation 
so to speak, that through a pattern of change and repetition manages continuity, at 
the other end of the debate the transformation is bemoaned as the victory of a 
cultural imperialism that matches the economic imperialism underpinning 
globalisation. The transformation is regarded as threatening to some platonic 
essence that is somehow diluted or lost through the contact of the dominating 
culture, which almost always is that of the United States. Again, this is 
particularly pertinent in the case of Mexico, where the threat coming from the
In the case of Mexico, a nation wide survey carried out in 1995 by Enrique Alduncin for the 
Bank of Mexico seemed to confirm these perceptions. (Alduncin, 1999: 112-158)
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United States is perhaps perceived more acutely than in many other places around 
the world.
The methodology I have applied to construct a theory of the 
transformation of the Mexican national identity allows one to go beyond the terms 
within which this debate is traditionally framed, and it is thus more fruitful and 
useful. Rather than thinking of immutable essences under threat or of mutable 
essences enhanced through combination, I have argued that thinking instead of 
boundaries set through practices, of traces of meaning left on signifiers constantly 
rearticulated on different contexts and of interactions is a more accurate way of 
conceiving national identities. Theorising in this way permits one to account for a 
number of issues that in traditional accounts appear as contradictory or 
incoherent, such as the rise of pressures for separatism at a time of integration and 
unification, while in other cases it allows to trace the mechanisms whereby power 
is at work on issues that appeared as mere coincidences, such as the sudden 
appearance of the Zapatista rebellion, again at a time when Mexico was supposed 
to be entering ‘the First World.’ Finally, and perhaps more importantly, theorising 
in this way switches the focus back from a diffuse ‘globahsation’, a complex set 
of impersonal processes, into the hegemonic groups and elites, established as well 
as emerging, that actually both shape and are the result of those processes, and on 
the people whose beliefs they seek to conunand, especially since
“For a long time people assumed that the reserves of belief were 
limitless. All one had to do was to create islands of rationality in the 
ocean of increduhty, isolate and secure the fragile conquests made by 
critical thinking...httle by little, [however], belief became polluted 
like the air and the water...There are now too many things to believe 
and not enough credibility to go around.” (De Certeau, 1984: 178- 
179)
Discourses on national belonging, warts and all, seem to be among the few 
stocks whence credibility can still be drawn to make meaning ‘in the age of 
globalisation’ which is also increasingly becoming ‘the age of scepticism.’
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Afterword
As is often the case in International Relations when reporting findings on research 
carried out spanning a period of four years, it now seems pertinent to bring the 
thesis up to date by considering the latest developments of the topics discussed.
Writing at a time when the Cold War framework had come to an end but 
when a new one to replace it had not yet become hegemonic, I put forward the 
contention that Mexican identity was then undergoing a radical transformation, 
which involved abandonment of the antagonistic position vis-à-vis the United 
States for an alternative one of supplementarity.
It seems now evident, however, that a reconfiguration of global power is 
under way. Literature on the current state of world politics is abundant, and a 
variety of explanations have been put forward as to the causes and directions of 
this reconfiguration. From a discourse-analysis perspective, however, and solely 
concerned with the implications for national identities, the reconfiguration can be 
described as being mainly an attempt to recast the ‘bifurcated World’ that is 
always at the heart of International Relations discourses, whether consisting of 
“the civilised and barbarian, the rich and poor, the controllers and consumers of 
knowledge...the stable and the chaotic, the liberal democratic against the 
authoritarian” etc. into a very concrete opposition between ‘the United States plus 
Israel’ and ‘Islamic Fundamentalism.’ (O’Hagan and Fry, 2000: 250) As noted on 
chapter three, this opposition is rooted on compelling narratives of religion and 
belonging and it allows for the projection of one’s ‘sore spots’ on the Other, as 
well as for blame for the fundamental lack inherent in society to be conveniently 
laid at their door. Thus this opposition can render a polarised political field not 
dissimilar to the one that prevailed during the Cold War. A first outcome of the 
inclusion of ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ in the key meaning-making opposition of 
the almost-dominant discourse has been a profound crisis, described even as “the 
end of the West”, a fact variously deplored or hailed by academics and policy 
makers on both sides of the Atlantic. (Garton-Ash, 2004; Marquand, 2004; 
Gordon, 2(X)4; Halper and Clarke, 2004)
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This power reconfiguration has also had consequences for Mexican 
identity. At first it seemed that both the Bush and Fox administrations and the 
elites more generally would continue supporting the integrationist project, seeking 
to institutionalise practices that started during the late 1980s and capitalising on 
the majorities that already were in favour in both countries. But soon after George 
W. Bush took over, a number of developments caused the supplementarity 
narrative to be severely strained. First there were the events of September 11^ 
2001, which cast negotiations on inunigration, on which success of the whole 
enterprise so crucially depended, under a different light than had been the case 
during the Salinas and Zedillo administrations. Then and more importantly it was 
the invasion of Iraq, which the Mexican government failed to endorse while in the 
Security Council, and which public opinion strongly and overwhelmingly 
opposed, that pretty much revived the traditional antagonistic position. Those 
sectors that had opposed the integrationist project, notably the Mexican 
intelhgentsia and a variety of interest groups in the United States as discussed in 
chapter three, have become increasingly vocal.
In this context, earlier antagonistic narratives are being resurrected. 
Among them, Samuel P. Huntington’s most recent work, dealing with Mexican 
migration to the United States, subscribes the myth of the unilateral benefit 
outlined in chapter three and goes beyond, casting Mexican immigrants and even 
Mexican Americans as “the single most immediate and most serious” threat to 
American identity. (Huntington, 2004: 32) Echoing those who deplore America’s 
‘cultural imperiaUsm’ all over the world, Huntington deplores the loss of the 
white Anglo-protestant essence he maintains is at the core of the US identity, an 
essence that had acted as a powerful solvent, so to speak, able to dissolve all 
traces of ‘foreigness’ in Europeans but which is left powerless to cope with “the 
persistent strength of [Mexican] communal bonds” and the general features of 
Mexican migration. (Huntington quoting Janowitz, 2004: 39)
In brief, the whole of Huntington’s argument can be conceived as part of a 
battle over the definition of the true America. In Huntingon’s argument it is its 
being founded by British settlers and the culture thereof that proves the defining 
feature. Had this not been the case “it would not be the United States. It would be
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Quebec, Mexico or Brazil.”(Huntington, 2004: 32) For other Americans, 
however, notably for those of Mexican ancestry, what makes America American 
is not its past but its present of diversity. Australia and New Zealand as well as 
Anglophone Canada are also largely the outcome of British settlement yet these 
countries are not America either. The core of American identity should be 
conceived in terms of Spanish language and Catholicism at least as much as it is 
conceived as English language and Protestantism, they maintain, especially since, 
as put by Luis Valdes, they did not come to the US, but the US came to them. 
(Gorodezky, 1993: 143) To Huntington “there is only the American dream created 
by an Anglo-Protestant society” and Mexican Americans will “share into that 
dream...only if they dream it in English.” (Huntington, 2004: 45) Not so, say 
Mexican Americans. What makes the American dream American at this point in 
the US history is precisely the fact that it is also ‘dreamable’ in Spanish, and it has 
been and remains so dreamed in the Southwest and beyond. More than merely 
being there for them to share, the dream is also theirs in their own right. Even if it 
were to become a subtitled dream, it would be no less American. These two 
narratives and other positions in between will surely hotly contend to prevail in 
the coming years.
As this research work comes to an end, it only remains to be said that 
despite the resistance that the ‘narrative of supplementarity’ is encountering 
lately, especially among those who deplore the transformation of American 
identity it attempts to bring about, the conclusions reached here are nonetheless 
valid. Contemporary international relations can be understood as partly the 
outcome of seeking to construct persuasive narratives that will tell us who we are, 
and that will make sense within the scope of the territorial boundaries of the 
national states we presently inhabit —as the timely publication of Huntington’s 
book only too well illustrates. Just as the period of the post Cold War was the 
framework in which he sought this answer looking for differences to the Other 
‘outside’, in a “clash of civilisations,” in the post September 11^ world he seeks 
the same answer ‘inside.’ (Huntington, 1993) Be it as it may, in the US as well as 
Mexico and beyond, the meaning of national identities continues to be shaped by 
discourses on world politics at least as much as by domestic factors, and at the
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same time the actual construction of those identities continue to be a key driving 
force behind the interactions among national states that actually take place.
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Yes, it can be done!
1
By Malaquias Montoya
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Reclamation
By Jessica Roa
A history was denied me
My grandmother’s tongue ripped out of my mouth
I was too young to know how to grieve the loss properly
The wound healed
In the shape of my Americanness
“Work hard and you’ll succeed” I heard
And so I did
My 22°  ^year the truth was revealed to me 
“White man is on top”
“And you? Sorry honey, you’re somewhere near the bottom”
Anger
Anger turned my insides into a seething crimson 
The death of my ignorance shook me hard and 
Choked me out of my complacency
I have fallen many times since the first breaths of truth were inhaled 
But I always come back to standing 
And now
A language has been found
The language of the coloniser twisted
And shape-shifted
To resist
To empower
Their words, now mine, woven into a 
Tempestuous cloth that’s wrapped protectively 
Around my shoulders
Their words, now mine, used to reclaim my history
To reclaim what was taken from me
And to make the promise
To speak the words
That this, is only the beginning.
